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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis aims to provide a compelling and distinctive response to the Problem of 
Consciousness. This is achieved by offering a bipartite analysis of the epistemic gap at 
the heart of that problem, and by building upon the hypothesis that the apparent 
problem is symptomatic of our limited conception of the physical. 
 Chapter 1 introduces the problem. The key question is whether phenomenal 
consciousness is onticly dependent on the physical, or onticly independent of it. There 
are powerful arguments for the Primitivist view that consciousness is independent of 
the physical. These arguments rest on the apparent epistemic gap between the 
physical and the phenomenal. I propose that this apparent gap must be understood as 
a composite of two deeper conceptual gaps pertaining to the subjective character and 
qualitative character of consciousness respectively. The ‘–tivity gap’ claims that 
physical states are objective, phenomenal states are subjective and that there is no 
entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ claims that 
physical properties are extrinsic (structural), that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic 
(non-structural) and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic to the intrinsic. After 
refining the case for Primitivism, I consider the compelling reasons for rejecting 
Primitivism in favour of Physicalism. The challenge posed by the Problem of 
Consciousness is to resolve this antinomy between Primitivism and Physicalism. 
 In Chapter 2 I consider standard responses to the problem. The failings of these 
positions lead me to introduce three criteria that an adequate response must satisfy. I 
reject the view that Primitivism can be salvaged, and hold that a satisfactory response 
to the problem must protect Physicalism. I reject standard ‘Type-A’ responses 
according to which there is no epistemic gap between the physical and the 
phenomenal, and argue that a satisfactory response cannot deny the manifest reality 
of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, I reject ‘Type-B’ responses according to which 
the epistemic gap does not entail ontic distinctness. I hold that if Physicalism is true, 
the entailment from the physical facts to the phenomenal facts must be knowable a 
priori for an epistemically ideal subject. 
[2] 
 
 Chapter 3 evaluates a non-standard Type-A response to the Problem of 
Consciousness which promises to satisfy all three criteria. According to Stoljar’s 
Epistemic View (EV), consciousness only seems inexplicable in physical terms because 
we have a limited conception of the physical. I argue that EV should be supported iff 
two demanding challenges can be met: the Relevance Condition requires adequate 
reason to believe that unknown physical properties could address the –tivity gap and 
the –trinsicality gap. The Integration Condition requires adequate reason to believe 
that there is a specific blind-spot in our current conception of the physical that is 
plausibly occupied by properties that perform the requisite explanatory role. To satisfy 
these conditions, the advocate of EV must make positive claims about the content of 
our proposed ignorance. 
 In Chapter 4 I argue that EV stands or falls with the plausibility of the Russellian 
Ignorance Hypothesis (RIH). According to RIH, we have no concepts of the intrinsic 
properties of physical entities, and those intrinsic properties are integral to the 
physical explanation of consciousness. I argue that we are indeed conceptually 
ignorant of intrinsic physical properties. I also argue that RIH meets the Integration 
Condition, and goes some way to satisfying the Relevance Condition. RIH plausibly 
undermines the –trinsicality gap by showing that some physical properties are 
intrinsic, though they are beyond our current conception. The apparent gap is then an 
illusion resulting from the fact that all known physical properties are extrinsic. RIH fails, 
however, to address the –tivity gap. I conclude that no version of EV can offer a full 
response to the Problem of Consciousness. 
 In Chapter 5 I explore an entirely different kind of response to the Problem of 
Consciousness. Representationalism claims that consciousness is explicable in terms of 
intentional properties, and that intentional properties are explicable in terms of 
physical properties. I argue that standard Representationalist proposals are unable to 
account for the qualitative character of conscious states, and diagnose this failure in 
terms of the –trinsicality gap. However, the prospects for a Representationalist 
account of subjective character are more promising. Specifically, Kriegel’s Self-
Representationalism holds that a mental state is a phenomenal state in virtue of 
[3] 
 
suitably representing itself. I argue that this proposal plausibly addresses the –tivity 
gap. 
 RIH and Self-Representationalism each deal with one of the two apparent 
conceptual gaps between the physical and the phenomenal, but not the other. In 
Chapter 6 I develop a hybrid proposal that combines the best of both positions. The 
‘Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis’ (NRIH) claims that a mental state is a 
phenomenal state at all in virtue of suitably representing itself, and has its qualitative 
character in virtue of the intrinsic physical properties involved in its implementation. I 
expand this claim and defend it against a number of potential criticisms. I also explore 
the relationship between its two components, suggesting that they are each founded 
on a common epistemic insight. I argue that NRIH successfully addresses the –tivity 
and –trinsicality gaps and, moreover, that it provides a compelling account of why 
consciousness appears to be inexplicable in physical terms. I conclude that NRIH offers 
a powerful response to the Problem of Consciousness that successfully undermines the 
case for Primitivism. Furthermore, I conclude that NRIH has substantial advantages 
over competing attempted responses, and offers the best possible way of capitalising 
on the insights of EV and Representationalism. 
[4] 
 
CHAPTER 1 
THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the Problem of Consciousness. The 
problem arises in connection with the following question: what is the ontic 
relationship between consciousness and the physical? I will outline the two possible 
answers to this question: Primitivism, which claims consciousness is onticly distinct 
from the physical world, and Physicalism, which denies that claim. I consider the 
standard case in favour of Primitivism, examining the Conceivability Argument and the 
Knowledge Argument. The limitations of these arguments, however, lead me to 
supplement them with two further considerations, which I label the ‘–tivity gap’ and 
the ‘–trinsicality gap’. I argue that these two conceptual gaps have important 
ramifications for the debate between Primitivists and Physicalists. After concluding 
that a serious case can be made in favour of Primitivism, I move on to consider the 
case against Primitivism. Focusing on the threat of ‘epiphenomenalism’, I conclude 
that a strong case can be made against Primitivism. This puts us in a position to 
formulate the Problem of Consciousness: when faced with the question of the ontic 
status of consciousness, we find compelling reasons to adopt a Primitivist stance, and 
compelling reasons to reject such a stance. Solutions to the problem must offer us a 
plausible resolution of this antinomy. In Chapter 2 I move on to consider the standard 
attempts to provide such a solution, and show why they are unsatisfactory. 
 
SECTION 1 
THE QUESTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
What is the ontic relationship between consciousness and the physical world? This is 
the central question of the philosophy of consciousness, and any attempt to answer it 
faces the Problem of Consciousness. The subject matter of this question has a three-
[5] 
 
part structure: the two relata and their ontic relation, each of which I will explore in 
this section. Setting up this question raises a variety of philosophical issues before we 
even consider how best to answer it. Clarifying concepts of consciousness and the 
physical is a philosophical task in its own right. In fact, proposed answers to the 
question often involve a distinctive analysis of these categories. Furthermore, asking 
about their ontic relationship presupposes some range of possible relations, but the 
nature of such relations is subject to a great deal of debate. Again, proposed answers 
to the question are often based on distinctive accounts of the possible relations. I will 
aim to offer a path through these issues that allows us to form a clear conception of 
the question without digressing too far into these complications. 
 
 1.1. CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
The term ‘consciousness’ is notoriously ambiguous, and our target question concerns 
one specific aspect or variety of consciousness. To uncover the relevant sense of the 
term, we should first draw a distinction between two alternative ways of 
characterising mental states, including conscious states. A mental state can be 
described functionally or described phenomenally.1 To describe a mental state 
functionally is to describe what it does. For example, the mental state of being in pain 
has a distinctive causal profile. It is the kind of state typically caused by bodily damage, 
and which typically has the effect of promoting avoidance behaviour. It will also make 
a range of standard contributions to the wider behavioural dispositions of its bearer, 
such as the disposition to say “I am in pain” when asked. Functional descriptions of a 
mental state are available from a third-person perspective: the causes and effects of a 
mental state can be observed by others. There are some uses of ‘conscious’ that can 
be defined in functional terms. For example, on Block’s (2002) notion of ‘access 
consciousness’ a mental state is conscious when it is available to a subject for use in 
reasoning and action control. Other related uses of ‘conscious’ revolve around 
                                                 
1
 Güzeldere (1997, p.11) offers a particularly useful exposition of this distinction and its ramifications. 
[6] 
 
wakefulness, attention or verbal reportability. On all these accounts, if a state does 
what a conscious state does, then it is a conscious state. 
 To describe a state phenomenally is to describe how things seem for the 
subject of that mental state. Nagel (1974), building on Sprigge (1971), famously 
describes conscious experience in terms of ‘what it is like’ for the subject to be in that 
mental state. A state is phenomenally conscious iff there is something it’s like to be in 
that state for its subject. The functional description of the pain state does not capture 
that the pain is being experienced, nor does it capture how that pain experience feels 
for its subject. To describe the phenomenal aspect of a mental state is to describe it 
from a first person perspective: to characterise how it seems for its bearer rather than 
how it manifests to an outside observer. Phenomenal states presumably have some 
functional profile, and it is plausible that a state’s phenomenal and functional 
properties are intimately connected. Nevertheless, there is a clear conceptual 
distinction to be made between a state being phenomenally conscious and it having 
some particular functional profile. Mental states that are not phenomenal are 
plausibly open to a purely functional characterisation, but the concept of phenomenal 
consciousness is not a functional concept. The target question concerns phenomenal 
consciousness as opposed to any purely functional notion of consciousness. The 
functional notions raise a variety of interesting puzzles but, as Chalmers (1995/1997) 
argues, these are ‘easy’ problems in that we understand how it is possible for 
insentient matter to perform some functional role. By contrast, when we start to think 
about how the brain generates phenomenal consciousness, we run into the ‘hard 
problem’. 
What more can we say about the nature of phenomenal consciousness? Block 
proposes that ‘…all one can do is point to the phenomenon…’ since there is no non-
circular way of defining it (2002, p.206). In discussing phenomenal consciousness, we 
can only assume that we are each ‘pointing’ to the same type of state. This is an 
important claim, and we will often have recourse to appeal to the immediate and 
inarticulate grasp we have of what experiences are. That said, there is room for us to 
shed light on phenomenal consciousness by differentiating two aspects of 
phenomenal states; their subjectivity and their qualitative character. 
[7] 
 
 Kriegel (2008, pp.45-57), drawing on Levine (2001), distinguishes between the 
subjective character and the qualitative character of phenomenal states. Subjectivity is 
the existence condition of a phenomenal state – the property in virtue of which it is a 
phenomenal state at all. A state is subjective iff there’s something it’s like to be in that 
state for its subject.2 The pain caused by stubbing your toe is not just an event that 
occurs in you – it is painful for you, the subject. It is your pain. Similarly, a visual 
experience is reddish for you. An unconscious process associated with toe damage or 
sensitivity to redness is not presented to any subject – it is not experienced by anyone 
– so it is not a phenomenal state. There is a conscious experience iff there is a 
conscious subject experiencing it.3 This characteristic of awareness, or seeming, or 
presentedness, is what distinguishes the conscious from the non-conscious. 
 Given that subjectivity is the existence condition of phenomenal states, all 
phenomenal states are subjective states. In what respect, then, can phenomenal states 
differ from one another? The identity condition of a phenomenal state – the feature 
that makes it the kind of phenomenal state it is – is its qualitative character. A state is 
phenomenal iff there’s something it’s like to be in that state, and its qualitative 
character constitutes what it’s like to be in that state. An experience of pain and an 
experience of redness share the property of subjectivity, but they differ qualitatively. 
What it’s like to undergo a pain experience is very different to what it’s like to undergo 
a reddish experience. Phenomenal qualities are those fully specific properties that 
characterise our conscious lives. All experiential states have qualitative character. Just 
as something cannot have the determinable property ‘being a shape’ without having 
some determinate shape such as ‘being a square’, so a state cannot have the property 
‘being phenomenal’ without having some determinate phenomenal character such as 
‘being reddish’. As this appeal to the ‘determinable-determinate’ relation indicates, 
the distinction between subjectivity and phenomenal character does not entail that 
                                                 
2
 We must be sensitive to the fact that there are other senses of the term ‘subjective’ in play in the 
consciousness literature, and that these different uses are often not distinguished with sufficient clarity. 
The use defined here is not intended to match all other uses. 
3
 Furthermore, it is plausible that there must be no more than one subject of an experience. Your pain, 
or your impression of redness, is essentially yours and yours alone. The privacy of experience is bound 
to its subjectivity. However, it would detract from the pivotal claims about subjectivity to take on any 
commitments regarding privacy at this stage. See Strawson (2008) for an exposition of this. 
[8] 
 
phenomenal qualities and the awareness of those qualities are separate states.4 
Rather, qualitative character is the determination of a single state of awareness.  
Of course, our experiential state at any given time will be characterised by a 
vast array of qualities. There are qualities distinctive to our different sense modalities, 
to our emotional states and perhaps to our intellectual states, all simultaneously 
contributing to our experience.5 For instance, what it’s like for a subject as they look at 
a painting might involve a visual impression of its colours, an emotional sense of 
admiration for the painter and an intellectual experience of thinking about its 
composition. The qualitative character of our experience at any given time is the sum 
of the qualitative properties it instantiates (Kriegel, 2008, p.46). Two experiential 
states are qualitatively identical iff what it’s like for their subjects to be in those states 
is precisely the same.6 As such, wherever two states differ in what it is like to undergo 
them, there must be some difference in qualitative character (see Stoljar 2005, p.469). 
 We thus have a characterisation of the first element of the question of 
consciousness. There will be more to say about the concept of phenomenal 
consciousness in due course. Nevertheless, we have enough of a notion of 
phenomenal consciousness to capture the target question. From this point forward, 
‘consciousness’ will mean phenomenal consciousness. In this sense, a state is 
conscious iff it is a state of subjective qualitative awareness. Sometimes I will talk of a 
creature or person being conscious, rather than a state being conscious, but a creature 
or person is conscious at a time precisely if it is a bearer of conscious states at that 
time (Kriegel, 2008, p.28). 
 
1.2. THE PHYSICAL 
 
When asking about the relationship between consciousness and the physical, how 
                                                 
4
 In Chapter 5, I will argue that there are good reasons to reject such a claim of separability. 
5
 The notion of qualities of intellectual experience is controversial. Horgan & Tienson (2002), Strawson 
(2008, pp.291-295) and others argue for the existence of such properties. Since the Problem of 
Consciousness can be captured using paradigm phenomenal properties such as pain and redness, we 
can sidestep this debate. 
6
 This is compatible with the possibility that, in reality, no two experiential states have ever been 
precisely alike. 
[9] 
 
should ‘the physical’ be understood? One common route is to characterise physical 
entities in terms of physical theory. Rather than giving an a priori definition of what 
physical entities are, this approach defers to science to tell us about the physical: the 
physical is whatever physical theory tells us it is.7 ‘Physical theory’ is typically 
understood in terms of fundamental physics, which describes the basic physical 
entities out of which all physical things are constituted.  
To evaluate an account of ‘the physical’, we must consider its implications for 
the notion of ‘Physicalism’. Physicalism is the view that all concrete entities are 
exhaustively constituted by fundamental physical entities. To ask what the ontic 
relationship is between the physical and the phenomenal is effectively to ask whether 
or not the existence of consciousness is compatible with a Physicalist ontology. I argue 
that the ‘physical theory’ account of what it is to be physical has unacceptable 
implications for the content of Physicalism. 
The physical theory approach faces a problem known as ‘Hempel’s Dilemma’.8 
Should we define ‘physical’ in terms of current physics or in terms of a hypothetical 
complete physics? The first choice gives ‘physical’ a clear meaning, but renders 
Physicalism obviously false. It is completely implausible that the entities described by 
current physics constitute all concrete entities, including phenomenal states. The 
second choice sounds like it could be true. The problem, though, is that the meaning of 
‘physical’ (and so of ‘Physicalism’) becomes obscure since we do not know what the 
complete physical theory looks like. We would have no substantive grasp on what 
Physicalism about consciousness really is, and so no good reason to ask whether or not 
it is true. Furthermore, this characterisation risks rendering Physicalism trivially true, 
since a physical theory is only complete if it succeeds in accommodating all concrete 
entities, which inevitably includes all phenomenal states. 
How, then, should we characterise ‘the physical’ if not in terms of physical 
theory? Rather than offering necessary and sufficient conditions for being physical, I 
suggest we make do with a minimal condition of physicality. Fundamental physical 
properties are non-phenomenal properties. We have already characterised what it is to 
                                                 
7
 Chomsky (2009) argues that the concept ‘physical’ places no a priori constraints on what kind of 
property could be countenanced as physical by our best physical theories. 
8
 See Crane & Mellor (1990), Levine (2001) and Stoljar (2010). 
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be phenomenal, so can give a straightforward negative characterisation of the non-
phenomenal. Being non-phenomenal is not sufficient for being physical, but it is an 
important necessary condition.9 On this account, Physicalism about the phenomenal is 
true only if phenomenal properties are ultimately realised by properties that are not 
themselves phenomenal. Physical theory still has a role to play: without defining the 
physical in terms of physical theory, science remains our guide to how the physical 
world is. 
Maybe a richer account of physicality is available – an account that goes 
beyond the negative characterisation and perhaps overcomes Hempel’s dilemma to 
bind physicality to physical theory. Even if this were so, it remains the case that the 
minimal condition is the most appropriate way of capturing the question of 
consciousness. There is an intuitive puzzle concerning whether or not consciousness 
boils down to anything more simple then itself. This puzzle does not arise due to any 
complex characterisation of what consciousness might boil down to, so to define ‘the 
physical’ as anything more than non-phenomenal would distort the driving question, 
and take us into controversial territory unnecessarily.10 
 
1.3. ONTIC RELATIONS 
 
We now have our two relata, the phenomenal and the physical, but we are yet to 
explore the kind of relation with which the question of consciousness is concerned. 
Any two categories of state will stand in any number of relations to one another, but 
we are concerned specifically with the ontic relationship between the physical and the 
phenomenal. What kind of dependence, if any, does the existence of one category of 
state have on the other? Perhaps we could form a complete list of the candidate 
relations, and so see the range of possible answers to the question. The difficulty here 
is that there is no consensus on what the options are. A wide range of relations have 
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been proposed, but some have been dismissed as meaningless, some have been 
claimed to collapse into one another and others have been accused of being too broad 
to constitute an informative answer to the question at hand.11 
 At this stage we can side-step some of these issues by making the question 
more precise. Is the phenomenal onticly distinct from the physical, or onticly 
dependent upon it? That is, does the instantiation of consciousness involve something 
over and above the instantiation of any non-phenomenal properties, or is the 
instantiation of certain non-phenomenal properties sufficient for the instantiation of 
consciousness? Kripke (1980) offers a useful way of understanding this kind of 
question: if God created the universe, once he set how things are physically, did he 
thereby fix how things are phenomenally, or did he have to create the phenomenal 
separately? If how things are phenomenally was already fixed, then the phenomenal is 
not onticly distinct from the physical. If a further creative act was required, then the 
phenomenal is onticly distinct from the physical. 
Ontic dependence should not be confused with causal dependence. Consider 
an image on a computer screen, the pixels that compose that image, and the computer 
to which that screen is hooked up. The computer screen’s state of displaying a 
particular image is causally dependent on some state of the computer. But this is not a 
case of ontic dependence. The two states are separable – it is possible for the image 
on the screen to remain in the absence of that state of the computer, or in the total 
absence of the computer. By contrast, the computer screen’s state of displaying a 
particular image is onticly dependent on the state of the screen’s pixels. The two states 
are inseparable. The existence of the image depends on the existence of the pixels. To 
describe this as an identity relation would be too strong since the two states could 
have different properties. It is better to describe it in the following terms: the state of 
the screen is nothing more than the state of the pixels. The existence of the image is 
exhausted by the existence of the pixel state. There is no further ingredient involved in 
the occurrence of the image.  
Are phenomenal states nothing more than physical states, or are they 
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 Options presented include emergence (Broad 1925), weak and strong supervenience (Kim 1982) 
superdupervenience (Horgan 1993), reduction (Churchland 1996) and identity (Smart 1959). 
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separable from one another? As this formulation shows, the question is not one of 
identity. To claim that any phenomenal state is identical to a non-phenomenal state 
would be incoherent since the two states will differ from each other in at least one 
respect: one is phenomenal and the other is non-phenomenal. By contrast, to claim 
that a phenomenal state is exhaustively constituted by non-phenomenal goings-on is 
far from being plainly incoherent. It might be no more problematic than an image 
being constituted by things that are not images. As such, the interesting question of 
ontic dependence should not be confused with the un-interesting question of identity. 
 The question of ontic dependence can informatively be put in modal terms. Is 
there a possible world in which the A-property instantiations remain exactly as they 
are, but the B-property instantiations differ? More precisely, is there a ‘minimal A-
property duplicate’ of this world in which the A-properties are held constant and no 
extra properties are added, but in which the B-properties differ?12 If so, the B-
properties are not onticly dependent on the A-properties. The B-properties are further 
properties that contribute to how the world is. Once the A-properties have been set, it 
remains an open question what the distribution of B-properties is, so the B-properties 
are something over and above the A-properties. If, by contrast, any world where the A-
properties are such is also a world where the B-properties are such, then the B-
properties are onticly dependent on the A-properties. That is, the A-properties 
necessitate the B-properties. This account of dependence will apply mutatis mutandis 
to talk of states, objects and entities. 
Applying the schema to consciousness, is there a possible world that is a 
minimal physical duplicate of the actual world, but in which how things are 
phenomenally differs from the actual world? If so, the phenomenal is onticly 
independent of the physical. If not, the phenomenal is onticly dependent on the 
physical. There are many different ways of being onticly dependent, but identifying 
these different ways would lead us into unnecessarily complicated territory. Ontic 
(in)dependence is a relatively intuitive notion; after all, it is only by appealing to that 
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 This ‘minimal duplicate’ clause is required so we can ignore worlds in which the A-facts are the same 
as in the actual world but some extra factor means the B-facts differ. This world would differ from ours 
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intuitive notion that philosophers have tested the accuracy of proposed accounts of 
ontic (in)dependence. It is this notion that is key to the question of consciousness. We 
are now in a position to formulate the target question as follows:  
The Question of Consciousness: Is the phenomenal onticly dependent 
on the physical, or onticly independent of the physical? 
Primitivism is the view that the phenomenal is onticly independent; that phenomenal 
properties are basic non-physical features of reality. Physicalism is the view that the 
phenomenal is onticly dependent on the physical; that phenomenal states are not 
primitive components of the world, but are rather necessitated by how things stand 
physically. Our minimal understanding of the term ‘physical’ brings with it a minimal 
understanding of the term ‘Physicalism’. Others may insist on reserving the label for a 
stronger position – perhaps involving reducibility to the terms of fundamental physics 
– but this is not how I will use the term. For us, the core commitment of Physicalism is 
that phenomenal properties are onticly dependent on non-phenomenal properties. 
 
SECTION 2 
THE INITIAL CASE FOR PRIMITIVISM 
 
There are two main arguments in favour of Primitivism: the Conceivability Argument 
(CA) and the Knowledge Argument (KA). CA and KA adopt the same general strategy. I 
begin by considering the shared structure behind those two arguments.13 Identifying 
that structure will allow us to better appreciate how those arguments work, what the 
relationship is between them, and where a critic can raise objections relevant to both 
arguments. I then move on to outline each argument separately. In Section 3, though, I 
will suggest that in order to make the best possible case for Primitivism these initial 
arguments must be supplemented by further arguments. 
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 This simple shared structure is explained by Chalmers (2002). 
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2.1. THE PRIMITIVIST STRATEGY 
 
The Schematic Argument (SA) for Primitivism runs as follows: 
SA1) There is an epistemic gap between the physical and the 
phenomenal. 
SA2) If there is an epistemic gap between the physical and the 
phenomenal, then there is an ontic gap. 
SA3) Therefore, there is an ontic gap between the physical and the 
phenomenal. 
 
2.1.1. The Epistemic Step 
SA1 is the epistemic step of an argument for Primitivism. This step must establish that 
there is failure of epistemic entailment between the physical facts and the 
phenomenal facts. No knowledge of the physical facts could ever explain the 
phenomenal facts (on an appropriately strong understanding of ‘explain’). Levine 
(2002) labels this the ‘explanatory gap’. The kind of entailment in question is a priori 
entailment. Call the totality of physical facts ‘P’ and the totality of phenomenal facts 
‘Q’. There is an epistemic entailment from P to Q iff the conditional proposition ‘P→Q’ 
is knowable a priori. Of course, neither P nor Q can be known a priori: they are 
contingent complex facts. It is only the conditional proposition, often labelled ‘the 
psychophysical conditional’, that must be knowable a priori. The proposition ‘George 
Clooney is a bachelor’ is not knowable a priori, but the proposition ‘if George Clooney 
is a bachelor then he is male’ is knowable a priori. Knowledge that the antecedent 
holds would be a posteriori, but knowledge of the conditional as a whole is a priori. 
Contrast this with the conditional claim ‘if George Clooney directs a film next year, he’ll 
win an Oscar’. This proposition is not knowable a priori. Establishing the truth of the 
antecedent is again an a posteriori matter, but this time the conditional as a whole can 
only be established by looking to the world rather than by looking to the concepts it 
involves. 
Primitivists deny that ‘P→Q’ is an a priori truth. If true, it is only an a posteriori 
truth. They claim that there is an ‘epistemic gap’ between the physical facts and the 
phenomenal facts. Various thought-experiments can be used that point to this 
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epistemic gap, but in and of themselves these will not generate any ontic conclusions. 
Establishing an epistemic gap would tell us something about the relationship between 
our physical and our phenomenal concepts, but further work is required if a conclusion 
is to be drawn about the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. 
This is the job of the second step. 
  
2.1.2. The Ontic Step 
Primitivism holds that there is an ontic gap between the physical and the phenomenal. 
In order to reach this ontic conclusion from an epistemic premise, a conditional 
binding the two is required. If there is an epistemic gap between the physical and the 
phenomenal, then there is an ontic gap. This conditional claim is motivated by the 
more general thought that if there is an epistemic gap between A-facts and B-facts, 
then there is an ontological gap between them. It would be implausible to deny that 
this ontological conditional holds generally but to maintain that it holds in the special 
case of the physical and the phenomenal. The case for Primitivism rests on the wider 
claim that any failure of a priori entailment means a failure of ontic entailment. 
If the phenomenal is onticly dependent on the physical, then ‘P→Q’ is a 
necessary truth. The ontic step claims that if ‘P→Q’ is a necessary truth, then ‘P→Q’ 
must be knowable a priori. By showing, in the epistemic step, that ‘P→Q’ is not 
knowable a priori, the Primitivist can thus infer that the phenomenal is onticly 
independent of the physical. Though this inference is clearly valid, the Primitivist must 
give us reason to accept the two steps. CA and KA take different routes to establishing 
that there is an epistemic gap. There are also various ways to establish the ontic step, 
but I will postpone discussion of these until Chapter 2. 
 
2.2. THE CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT (CA) 
 
2.2.1. Conceivability and Entailment 
The strategy of CA is to use what we can conceive of as a test of epistemic entailment. 
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Conceivability and epistemic possibility come hand in hand, as do inconceivability and 
epistemic impossibility. Imagination is a testing ground for what our concepts can do. 
Roughly, if our concepts can formulate a certain scenario in our imagination, that 
scenario is an epistemic possibility. If our concepts cannot do so, then the scenario is 
epistemically impossible. Conceiving of a flying pig shows that such a creature is an 
epistemic possibility – there is nothing about the concepts ‘pig’ and ‘flying’ that makes 
a flying pig unthinkable. By contrast, round squares are not a genuine epistemic 
possibility and, accordingly, are inconceivable. 
Of course, conceivability tests can misfire. Sometimes we think we are 
conceiving of one scenario when really we are conceiving of another. Say p is 
conceivable and q is inconceivable. If you conceived p but believed that you were 
conceiving q, you would mistakenly claim that q is an epistemic possibility. This is a 
case of ‘proposition confusion’ (Stoljar 2006, p.74). But this possibility does no damage 
to the claim that if we really are conceiving of a scenario, then it is epistemically 
possible. 
A further consideration is that conceivability only entails epistemic possibility if 
it is the right kind of conceivability. Van Cleve distinguishes between strong and weak 
conceivability (see Stoljar, 2006, p.75). A subject weakly conceives of p if they 
entertain p, and it is not the case that p strikes them as impossible. A subject strongly 
conceives of p if it imaginatively appears to them that p is possible. Significant 
considerations show that weak conceivability is a poor test of epistemic possibility. A 
conceivability test might then misfire if we take ourselves to be strongly conceiving of 
p, when really we are only weakly conceiving of p. This mistake is known as ‘mode 
confusion’ (Stoljar 2006, p.75). By ‘conceivable’, we will always mean strongly 
conceivable unless otherwise stated. 
 What does epistemic possibility have to do with epistemic entailment? If ‘A→B’ 
is knowable a priori, then ‘A ∧ ¬B’ must be a priori false. If ‘A ∧ ¬B’ is a priori false, then 
‘A ∧ ¬B’ is epistemically impossible. It must be the kind of proposition that we can 
know is false just by reflecting on the concepts involved. From this it follows that if we 
can conceive of ‘A ∧ ¬B’, then ‘A→B’ is not an a priori truth. Applying this to 
consciousness, the question becomes whether ‘P ∧ ¬Q’ is conceivable. That is, can we 
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conceive of a scenario in which the physical facts are held exactly as they are in reality, 
but in which how things are phenomenally is different? 
 
2.2.2. Zombies and Inverts 
To perform an appropriate conceivability test, we should start with something more 
manageable than P, the complete set of physical facts, and Q, the complete set of 
phenomenal facts. A sub-set of those facts should do the job. Since we only have direct 
access to our own phenomenal states, the scenario we attempt to conceive should 
involve our conscious experiences. Accordingly, the non-phenomenal facts in question 
should be those pertaining to our own physico-functional constitution.14 Can we 
conceive of a physical duplicate of ourselves – a being like us in all non-phenomenal 
respects – but who differs from us phenomenally? To answer this, we should consider 
some alternative ways in which this duplicate might ‘differ from us phenomenally’. For 
our purposes, two types of phenomenally divergent physical duplicates will be 
informative: zombies and inverts. 
 We have phenomenal consciousness. A being with no phenomenal states 
therefore differs from us in a phenomenal respect: there are phenomenal states that 
we have and they do not. One way of imagining a duplicate like you in all non-
phenomenal respects, but unlike you phenomenally, is to imagine your zombie twin. 
Your zombie twin has all the same physical characteristics you have, but has no 
conscious states. The notion of ‘zombie twins’ is championed by Chalmers (1996). The 
Primitivist cannot show that zombie twins are conceivable. They can only ask you to 
perform the conceivability test. Many claim to find their zombie twin conceivable, so 
CA has some serious purchase here. 
 We have phenomenal states with a particular qualitative character. A being 
that has phenomenal states with a different qualitative character would differ from us 
phenomenally. If we are to conceive of a being like us in all physical respects, but who 
differs from us in respect to their qualitative character, it is useful to have an idea of 
what qualitative character their experience has. Shoemaker (1982) introduces the idea 
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 One might insist that the physical states responsible for consciousness extend beyond the individual. 
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of ‘qualia inversion’. Our visual experiences are characterised by a rich spectrum of 
colour-qualities. A qualia invert is someone whose colour spectrum is turned upside 
down relative to ours. The quality we enjoy when looking at green objects, they enjoy 
when looking at red objects, and vice versa. They are responsive to all the same visual 
properties as we are, but have different experiences when presented with those 
properties. Your invert twin has all the same physical characteristics you have, but 
their colour-qualities are inverted relative to your own. Again, such a being is widely 
held to be conceivable. 
 There are many other ways of imagining beings like us physically, but unlike us 
phenomenally.15 Why focus on precisely these two? Consider the distinction drawn 
earlier between subjectivity – the existence condition of a phenomenal state – and 
qualitative character – the identity condition of a phenomenal state. A zombie twin is a 
being devoid of subjectivity, where an invert twin is a being who has subjective 
awareness, but is such that the qualitative character of that awareness diverges from 
our own. Later we will see that worries about the explanation of subjectivity, and 
worries about the explanation of qualitative character, can come apart. As such, it will 
be useful to have conceivability scenarios that address each aspect of consciousness 
separately. All other available conceivability scenarios are simply variations on these 
two: different ways of changing whether the duplicate has subjective awareness, or 
different ways of changing the character of that awareness. As such, they will not add 
anything substantial to our inquiry. 
 
2.2.3. Conceivability to Possibility 
Zombies and inverts are conceivable, and therefore epistemically possible. But are 
they metaphysically possible? Perhaps our physical concepts fail to entail anything 
about the phenomenal, but physical properties actually necessitate the instantiation of 
phenomenal properties. This is where the ontic step comes in. The claim is that there is 
no such thing as ontic dependence without some kind of conceptual entailment. 
Consequently, the conceivability of zombies and inverts shows that they are 
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metaphysically possible. If zombies and inverts are possible, the phenomenal is not 
necessitated by the physical, therefore Primitivism is true. We will leave discussion of 
whether this move from conceivability to possibility is defensible until later when we 
consider critics who reject that move. The general Conceivability Argument (CA) then 
goes as follows: 
CA1) A being identical to you in all physical respects, but which differs 
from you phenomenally, is conceivable. 
CA2) If such a being is conceivable, then phenomenal states are not 
epistemically entailed by physical states. 
CA3) If phenomenal states are not epistemically entailed by physical 
states, then they are onticly independent of the physical. 
CA4) Therefore the phenomenal is onticly independent of the physical. 
The ‘zombie argument’ is the same as CA, but with the phrase ‘differs from you 
phenomenally’ in CA1 replaced with the more specific ‘has no phenomenal 
consciousness’. Similarly, we can take the ‘invert argument’ to be the same as CA, but 
with that phrase replaced with ‘has spectrum-inverted qualia relative to your own’. 
 
2.3. THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT (KA) 
 
2.3.1. Mary the Neurologist 
An interesting way of exploring whether there is an epistemic entailment between the 
physical and the phenomenal is to consider a subject who has complete relevant 
knowledge of the physical. Jackson (1982) invites us to imagine Mary the neurologist.16 
Mary has been confined since birth to a black and white room. In this room, she learns 
everything there is to know about the science of colour, including the physics of 
colours and the neurophysiology of colour perception. She has complete knowledge of 
the physical facts associated with seeing colours, but she has never seen colour 
herself. One day, she escapes her monochromatic prison and stumbles across a ripe 
tomato. For the first time, she experiences redness. Clearly, Mary learns something 
new here that her science textbooks could not tell her. She learns what it’s like to 
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experience redness. 
 What bearing does Mary’s discovery have on whether there is an epistemic 
entailment from the physical to the phenomenal? What it’s like to experience redness 
is a phenomenal fact. If that fact was epistemically entailed by the physical facts, Mary 
would have known it before she escaped her room. She had knowledge of those 
physical facts and, we can stipulate, has an unlimited ability to extrapolate the 
conceptual implications of that knowledge. Since Mary learns something new on 
seeing the tomato, what she learns cannot have been epistemically entailed by the 
physical facts. 
 There are many controversies surrounding what this scenario really shows, but 
one in particular is worth mentioning. The above presupposes that if p epistemically 
entails q, then someone with full knowledge of p can infer that q. This might usually be 
the case, but there is something unusual about the Mary scenario that puts pressure 
on that generalisation. Mary had no concept of phenomenal redness before leaving 
her room. It is too strong to say that p epistemically entails q only if knowing p 
automatically provides one with the concepts required to entertain the proposition q. 
 To get round this complication, we need to imagine a less neat, but more 
revealing scenario. Stoljar (2005) introduces experienced Mary, who has the same life-
story described above, only at some point before her escape she is kidnapped. The 
kidnappers show her something red, then give her a pill that makes her forget what 
she saw and when she saw it, before returning her to the monochromatic room. Now 
Mary has a concept of phenomenal redness, but no knowledge connecting it with any 
of her physical knowledge. On escaping the room, experienced Mary still learns 
something new. She learns that her qualitative concept applies to what it is like to 
perceive red (and not, say, to perceptions of green). If the phenomenal facts were 
epistemically entailed by the physical facts, Mary would already have known this and 
so would have nothing new to learn. From here on, by ‘Mary’ I will mean experienced 
Mary. 
 So far we have stayed firmly on the epistemic level. Of course, for the Mary 
scenario to lend support to Primitivism, the ontic step must be added. If Mary cannot 
infer the phenomenal facts from the physical facts, then there is no ontic entailment 
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from the physical to the phenomenal. What Mary learns is a new phenomenal fact. We 
can formulate KA as follows: 
KA1) Mary knows all the physical facts before leaving her room, and 
learns a phenomenal fact on leaving her room. 
KA2) If Mary learns a phenomenal fact on leaving her room, then the 
phenomenal facts are not epistemically entailed by the physical facts. 
KA3) If the phenomenal facts are not epistemically entailed by the 
physical facts, then they are not onticly entailed by the physical facts. 
KA4) Therefore the phenomenal is not onticly dependent on the 
physical.17 
 
2.3.2. KA’s Relationship with CA 
A brief comparison with CA is in order. The real difference between CA and KA is in 
their first premises: each argument offers a different way of establishing the epistemic 
gap, and then does the same thing with that gap to establish Primitivism. Some find 
the concept of conceivability problematic, and KA has the advantage of deploying the 
more straightforward notion of learning something new.  
With CA, the zombie and invert formulations homed in on the subjectivity of 
consciousness and the qualitative character of consciousness respectively. As it stands, 
KA is only concerned with qualitative character – with Mary’s discovery of what it is 
like to experience red. It is hard to see how a parallel scenario could be formulated in 
which Mary is ignorant of subjective awareness as such. Purging a particular kind of 
subjective state from Mary’s life – the reddish kind – is one thing, but purging all 
subjective awareness is quite another.  We would have to imagine a zombie Mary who 
studies the complete science of subjective awareness without ever having a 
phenomenal state.18 One day she has her first conscious experience, and learns that 
this is the special kind of state associated with all those non-phenomenal states she 
had been studying. It is hard to make sense of Mary being a subject of knowledge at all 
before she becomes conscious, or at least hard to understand it as the same subject 
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who is both the zombie at one time then the conscious subject at another. 
Furthermore, there is unlikely to be a viable analogue of experienced Mary in this 
scenario: a Mary who has a full concept of what subjective awareness is, but who has 
forgotten which physical states it is associated with. We should conclude that KA is a 
vivid way of capturing the failure of epistemic entailment between physical facts and 
the facts of phenomenal character, but should rely on the zombie argument to capture 
the gap between the physical and the subjective-as-such. 
 
SECTION 3 
THE REFINED CASE FOR PRIMITIVISM 
 
We have outlined the standard case for Primitivism in terms of CA and KA. The purpose 
of this section is to improve upon this standard case. I will present a rudimentary 
response to CA and KA. Though it is clear that this response is inadequate as it stands, 
it is important to understand why it fails. I argue that to fend off the rudimentary 
response, Primitivism must appeal to two conceptual gaps that I dub the ‘–tivity gap’ 
and the ‘–trinsicality gap’. Here I draw on what Primitivists have actually said on the 
subject, but also make the more idiosyncratic claim that these two gaps require us to 
re-think the status of CA and KA. I conclude that the refined case offers serious reasons 
to advocate Primitivism. 
 
3.1. THE RUDIMENTARY RESPONSE TO PRIMITIVISM 
 
When presented with the initial case for Primitivism, one straightforward response 
would be to claim that science will eventually close the epistemic gap between the 
physical and the phenomenal. After all, a failure of explanation does not constitute 
evidence of in-principle inexplicability. The claim is that though we do not presently 
have an explanation of phenomenal consciousness in physical terms, such an 
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explanation will eventually be uncovered. This thought can be reinforced with 
reference to the state of current science. Neuroscience and cognitive science are very 
young, so we have a limited grasp of the kind of explanations that they will ultimately 
be able to provide. Perhaps they just need to be given the chance to chip away at the 
task of explaining consciousness. One could also speculate that the epistemic gap will 
be closed by progress on some other frontier of science; for example, there is a great 
deal of speculation about quantum phenomena being integral to the explanation of 
consciousness (Penrose 1989, Lockwood 1989, Atmanspacher 2011). 
 How does this kind of response address CA and KA? Regarding CA, the claim is 
that when we try to imagine zombies or inverts, we are not really conceiving of 
complete physical duplicates of ourselves. We do not have the complete science 
required to conceive of a physical duplicate of ourselves in any real detail. Once our 
scientific understanding is fully developed, however, we will be able to conceive of 
complete physical duplicates of ourselves, but it will be inconceivable to us for them to 
differ from us phenomenally. Regarding KA, the claim is that we have no substantive 
grip on Mary’s epistemic situation, as her complete physical knowledge will include 
scientific theories that we do not have at our disposal. Consequently, we are not in a 
position to conclude that she would learn anything new on escaping her 
monochromatic prison. 
 At this point, the Primitivist might insist that not only do we currently lack a 
scientific explanation of consciousness, we cannot even imagine what such an 
explanation would be like. This deeper sense of mystery is what distinguishes the ‘hard 
problem’ of consciousness from more mundane explanatory problems - problems that 
appear open to scientific solutions. This defence, however, is ineffective. P.S. 
Churchland emphasises that ‘[a]dding “I cannot imagine explaining P” merely adds a 
psychological fact about the speaker, from which again, nothing significant follows 
about the nature of the phenomenon in question.’ (1996, p.407) She goes on to 
explain, ‘[g]iven that neuroscience is still very much in its early stages, it is actually not 
a very interesting fact that someone or other cannot imagine a certain kind of 
explanation of some brain phenomenon.’ (1996, p.407) In other words, the fact that 
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we cannot imagine the proposed explanation of consciousness does not constitute 
evidence that there is no such explanation. 
 This attack on Primitivism can be supported with reference to other 
explanatory problems. ‘Life’ once appeared to be a property that could not be 
explained in more basic terms i.e. in non-life terms (Dennett 1996, p.4, P.S. Churchland 
1996, p.407). Just as Primitivism posits basic phenomenal properties, Vitalism posits a 
basic life force. Thanks to the progress of science, though, life can now be explained in 
more basic terms. The Vitalists were simply wrong that there was a case of permanent 
inexplicability here, rather than a mere temporary failure of explanation. Just as the 
Vitalists should not have trusted the intuitions of inexplicability that they had in their 
limited epistemic position, the Primitivist should not trust the intuitions of 
inexplicability they have from their analogously limited epistemic position. 
 One way of understanding this challenge to Primitivism is through the 
distinction between the ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ problems of consciousness. We previously 
recognised that psychological consciousness raises a range of explanatory problems, 
but suggested that these were easy in comparison to the deeper problem of explaining 
phenomenal consciousness (Section 1.1.1). However, given that we do not yet have the 
scientific theories that resolve the so-called ‘easy problems’, how could we be in a 
position to know that discovering the full cognitive story of consciousness will not 
simultaneously solve the ‘hard problem’?19 How can we be sure that future theories 
will leave an unexplained residue, despite our being deeply ignorant of the content of 
those theories? 
 In Chapter 3, we will consider a more sophisticated version of this kind of 
attack on Primitivism. In the meantime, however, we should ask how Primitivism can 
defend itself against the relatively simple objection just outlined. Why should we 
believe that no discoveries about the physical world, such as might be provided by 
future brain science, could close the apparent epistemic gap between the physical and 
the phenomenal? 
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The standard defence against this line of thought is to argue that more of the 
same won’t do – that further developments in science will inevitably yield the wrong 
kind of information to explain the phenomenal (e.g. Chalmers, 2002 pp.258-9). 
Defenders of the epistemic gap concede, as they should, that we are a long way from 
being epistemically ideal subjects. Nevertheless, they maintain that even from our 
limited position, we have a grip on what kind of knowledge an ideal subject would 
have, and so have a grip on whether such knowledge could explain phenomenal states. 
Of course, the plausibility of this move depends upon how the notion of ‘wrong kind’ is 
fleshed out. 
 
3.2. TWO CONCEPTUAL GAPS 
 
If there is a principled ‘conceptual gap’ between the physical and the phenomenal, we 
can be sure that no future discoveries about the physical will allow the epistemic gap 
to be closed. There are two conceptual gaps that might do the job. In the long term I 
will attempt to undermine these gaps, but in the meantime I will try to capture their 
intuitive force. Interestingly, these two gaps map on to the two aspects of phenomenal 
states identified earlier: subjectivity and qualitative character. This will have significant 
implications for our understanding of the epistemic gap. Though the distinction 
between the two conceptual gaps and the distinction between the two aspects of 
consciousness are each fairly well recognised, this correspondence between them is 
not.20 
 
3.2.1. The –tivity Gap 
The –tivity gap, as I will call it, pertains to the subjective aspect of phenomenal states. 
Phenomenal states are subjective in that there is something it’s like to be in a 
phenomenal state for its subject. There are other senses in which phenomenal states 
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and intrinsicality – that are each problematic. He does not, however, describe their relationship with 
one another and with the physical world in the way I do. 
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might be called subjective, but they do not concern us here. Physical states are 
objective. They exist, but they do not exist for a subject in the way that subjective 
states do. An objective state need not be presented to anyone; it just is. The 
compelling thought that drives the –tivity gap is that there can be no entailment from 
the objective to the subjective. Facts about how things are cannot entail facts about 
things seeming some way to a subject. For any objective state, it is always an open 
possibility for that state not to be accompanied by any kind of awareness – for it to 
lack any inside view. Similarly, how a state is objectively will never rule out the 
possibility that there is something it’s like to occupy that state. We can summarise this 
line of argument as follows: 
TIV1) All physical states are objective states. 
TIV2) All phenomenal states are subjective states. 
TIV3) There can be no epistemic entailment from the objective to the 
subjective. 
TIV4) Therefore, there can be no epistemic entailment from the 
physical to the phenomenal. 
If this argument is taken seriously, it is not merely that the objective facts with which 
we are familiar are unsuited to the explanation of subjective awareness. Rather, 
objective facts are simply the wrong kind of fact to entail the existence of subjective 
states. Though a complete science may contain facts radically different from those we 
find in current science, it is plausible that these facts will still be exclusively objective 
(Nagel 1974, p.527). Levine claims that ‘[n]o matter how rich the information 
processing or the neuro-physiological story gets, it still seems quite coherent to 
imagine that all that should be going on without there being anything it’s like to 
undergo the states in question.’ (2002, p.359) Consequently, the speculation that 
future discoveries about the physical world will close the epistemic gap can be ruled 
out. 
 In our discussion of CA, we identified that the zombie scenario pertained to the 
subjectivity of consciousness while the invert scenario pertained to the qualitative 
character of consciousness. As such, the –tivity gap is best understood in connection to 
the zombie scenario. To conceive of a physical duplicate of yourself is to conceive of an 
objective duplicate of yourself i.e. a being like you in all respects that do not, in and of 
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themselves, involve any subjective awareness. If there is a principled conceptual gap 
between the objective and the subjective, we can be sure that no matter how much 
we fill in the details of our imagined objective duplicate, it will remain conceivable for 
that duplicate to be devoid of subjective awareness. Future discoveries will have no 
impact on the conceivability of zombies. 
 
3.2.2. The –trinsicality Gap 
The –trinsicality gap is based on the idea that phenomenal qualities are non-structural, 
or intrinsic, while physical properties are structural, or extrinsic. This gap pertains to 
the qualitative aspect of phenomenal states.21 Physics characterises fundamental 
physical entities structurally. It describes the spatiotemporal structure of entities - how 
those entities are located in space-time. It also describes the causal properties of those 
entities. These causal properties ‘…are ultimately defined in terms of spaces of states 
that have a certain abstract structure…such that the states play a certain causal role 
with respect to other states.’ (Chalmers 2002, p.258) In other words, the causal 
properties are powers to influence the location of entities in space-time, and their 
location in abstract state spaces. Physics thus describes a rich web of relations 
between entities but never describes any non-structural properties.22 
Alter explains that ‘[n]ot only does current microphysics tend to characterise its 
basic properties in solely structural/dynamic terms: it is a reasonable, if controversial, 
conjecture that completed physics would so characterise all its basic properties’ (2009, 
p.760). It looks like we can be sure that an ideal physics will describe the world in 
structural terms.23 Furthermore, we have reason to believe that ‘…from structure and 
dynamics, one can infer only structure and dynamics.’ (Chalmers 2002, p.259) Though 
physics might entail the facts of biology or of economics, these are plausibly still 
structural facts, just on a different scale to those described by microphysics. Structural 
properties can never entail non-structural properties. 
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22
 Though this point is best understood in terms of fundamental physics, it is equally relevant to brain 
sciences (see Bolender 2001, p.44). 
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 It might be noticed that this argument ignores the possibility of non-structural physical properties that 
aren’t revealed by physical theory. I will take advantage of this loop-hole in due course.   
[28] 
 
The qualities that characterise phenomenal consciousness are non-structural 
properties. A reddish quality stands in many relations, and has a specific location in the 
quality-space of all colour qualities. To describe the quality in terms of its relational 
profile, however, would be to miss out its essential nature – its redness. If a subject 
experiences a reddish quality but is totally ignorant of the relational features of that 
quality, they would still be acquainted with what redness is. Conversely, building on 
the Mary scenario, a subject with complete structural knowledge who knows, for 
instance, everything about the location of reddish qualities in some perceptual state 
space, would not thereby know what reddish experiences are like. The –trinsicality gap 
supports the epistemic gap with the following argument: 
TRIN1) All physical properties are structural properties. 
TRIN2) All phenomenal states involve the instantiation of non-structural 
properties. 
TRIN3) There can be no epistemic entailment from the structural to the 
non-structural. 
TRIN4) Therefore, there can be no epistemic entailment from the 
physical to the phenomenal. 
The claim is that structural facts are the wrong kind of fact to entail anything non-
structural, and since any future insights into the physical world will be exclusively 
structural, the epistemic gap will inevitably remain untouched.24 Inverts will remain 
conceivable, and it will still appear that Mary would learn something new. Overall, the 
principled conceptual gap between the structural and the non-structural indicates a 
principled conceptual gap between the physical and the phenomenal. 
 
3.3. THE DIALECTICAL SITUATION 
 
3.3.1. The Relationship of the Conceptual Gaps 
The –tivity gap presents Physicalists with the following challenge: why is there 
something it’s like to occupy a state with particular objective physical properties rather 
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 I will postpone discussion of how this fits in with the intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy until Chapter 4, 
where we will also lend further support to ‘TRIN1’. 
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than nothing at all? The –trinsicality gap presents them with a further challenge: why 
does what it’s like to occupy a state with particular structural physical properties have 
the qualitative character it has rather than some other? These two questions overlap 
in a variety of ways, and are easily confused with one another, so it will be worth our 
while to clarify how exactly they are connected. 
 The –tivity gap claims that the subjectivity of conscious states cannot be 
accounted for in physical terms. It also claims that it is the objectivity of the physical 
that is responsible for this failure of entailment. Some defenders of the epistemic gap 
would affirm the former claim but deny the latter. Chalmers (1996/2002), for example, 
holds that it is the structural nature of the physical that makes an explanation of 
subjective awareness impossible. This would extend the –trinsicality gap so that it 
pertains to the subjectivity of consciousness rather than just to its qualitative 
character. I argue that such an extension is inappropriate. 
Chalmers claims that ‘[f]or any complex macroscopic structural or dynamic 
description of a system, one can conceive of that description being instantiated 
without consciousness’ (2002, p.259). Though this is plausibly correct, it is misleading. 
The implication is that it is because such a description is structural that it inevitably 
fails to entail the occurrence of subjective awareness. This suggests that if a non-
structural description of physical states was available, the subjectivity of phenomenal 
consciousness would cease to present an explanatory obstacle. But why should we 
think this? So long as the non-structural description is objective – so long as it does not 
already involve an experiential point of view – it will remain conceivable for that 
description to be instantiated without consciousness. To show this, we should consider 
what a non-structural description of the physical world might involve.25 
Imagine a world in which qualitative redness is a fundamental physical 
property. As we know from the –trinsicality gap, redness is a non-structural property. 
Levine argues: 
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 In Chalmers’s defence, there is a sense in which subjective awareness itself is non-structural, and 
therefore inexplicable in structural terms. The plausibility of this claim depends on the sense of 
‘structural’ in play. When we explore the notion of structure in greater depth in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.), 
it will emerge that subjectivity is not relevantly non-structural. 
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…if nature just has a richer stock of basic properties than we thought-so 
that reddishness is somehow included in the base…-it's not clear how 
subjectivity, the cognitive relation constitutive of a point of view, can be 
explained in terms of these properties. (2001, p.177) 
In other words, subjectivity would remain equally inexplicable if the physical world 
included non-structural properties. The –tivity gap offers a plausible account of why 
this is the case: it is because the non-structural properties would still be objective, and 
there is an inevitable failure of entailment from the objective to the subjective. 
We can defend the –tivity gap  against the claim that it is the structural nature, 
rather than the objective nature, of the physical that makes subjectivity inexplicable. 
This is not deny that the structural nature of the physical presents an explanatory 
problem; it is just that this problem pertains to the qualitative character of 
phenomenal states and not to their subjectivity. Of course, all subjective states must 
have some qualitative character, therefore no subjective state can be fully explained in 
structural terms. Nevertheless, we must be clear about which aspect of phenomenal 
states is responsible for which explanatory impasse. 
Parallel considerations arise in connection with the –trinsicality gap. The –
trinsicality gap claims that the qualitative character of phenomenal states cannot be 
accounted for in physical terms. It also claims that it is the structural nature of physical 
states or, to put it another way, the extrinsicality of physical properties, that is 
responsible for this failure of entailment. Again, some defenders of the epistemic gap 
might affirm the former claim but deny the latter. Nagel (1974) holds that the 
objectivity of the physical makes an explanation of qualitative character impossible, 
and shows no concern for considerations surrounding the structural. This encourages 
an extension of the –tivity gap that incorporates the qualitative character of 
phenomenal states rather than just their subjectivity. Nagel argues as follows: 
…if the facts of experience - facts about what it is like for the 
experiencing organism - are accessible only from one point of view, 
then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be 
revealed in the physical operation of that organism. The latter is a 
domain of objective facts par excellence - the kind that can be observed 
and understood from many points of view and by individuals with 
differing perceptual systems. (1974, p.442, my italics) 
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In a sense, Nagel is right to hold that phenomenal character can never be explained in 
objective terms. Since phenomenal character belongs to subjective states, and 
subjective states cannot be explained in objective terms, phenomenal character 
cannot be explained in objective terms. However, Nagel’s line of thought is potentially 
misleading in at least two ways. 
 First, Nagel’s position implies that if the –tivity gap could be overcome, the 
qualitative character of phenomenal states would no longer be mysterious. This simply 
ignores the genuine gap between extrinsic physical properties and intrinsic 
phenomenal qualities. If we somehow found an explanation of why there is something 
it’s like to occupy states with particular objective properties, we would be left with the 
mystery of how what it’s like to occupy that state could be exhaustively determined by 
non-structural properties. 
Second, to claim that the phenomenal qualities accessed from a specific point 
of view are inexplicable in objective terms implies that the existence of the point of 
view itself does not present an explanatory problem. Put another way, what it is like to 
be in that state is deemed mysterious, but there being something it’s like to occupy a 
state is regarded as unmysterious. This is reflected in Nagel being comfortable 
asserting that there is something it’s like to be a bat, but arguing that what it’s like to 
be a bat is inaccessible to us (1974, p.438). This outlook distorts the real nature of the 
–tivity gap. Levine captures this: ‘…it seems to me that [Nagel] doesn't sufficiently 
appreciate that the entire idea of a point of view is itself deeply puzzling. A way to put 
the problem…is just this: how could anything like a point of view exist?’ (2001, p.177) 
The fact that there is anything it’s like at all to occupy a state is inexplicable in 
objective terms.26 To capture why the objective nature of the physical generates an 
explanatory impasse, we should therefore refer to the subjectivity of phenomenal 
states as such rather than to the qualitative character of subjective awareness. 
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 The –trinsicality gap can be defended against the claim that it is the objectivity 
of the physical, rather than its structural nature, that prohibits a physical explanation 
of qualitative character. This is consistent with the objectivity of the physical 
generating an explanatory impasse, but that impasse pertains to the existence of 
phenomenal states as such rather than to the character of those states, as captured by 
the –tivity gap. Phenomenal qualities may indeed be inexplicable in objective terms, 
but only because they are properties of subjective states, not because of some further 
complication that phenomenal qualities add to the situation. 
 The commitments of the two gaps and the relationship between them should 
now be more clear. These two gaps reflect existing insights into the epistemic gap, 
including Chalmers’s work on the non-structural/structural divide and Nagel’s work on 
the objective/subjective divide. However, my account of the two conceptual gaps 
diverges from existing positions in certain respects. I have by no means put forward a 
new account of why consciousness is inexplicable in physical terms, but I have argued 
for a shift in our understanding of existing key insights. 
Other conceptual gaps between the physical and phenomenal have been 
proposed. McGinn (2004), for instance, draws on Descartes to argue that the non-
spatiality of experience renders it inexplicable in spatial terms. It would take us too far 
afield to evaluate these proposals, but I will make the following general comment: 
these alternative conceptual gaps are either less compelling than the two we have 
established, or are merely variations on those gaps. As such, we can afford to put them 
aside. 
 
3.3.2. The Ramifications of the Conceptual Gaps 
The two conceptual considerations are meant to act as vetoes against the speculation 
that an improved epistemic position could close the epistemic gap.27 Consequently, 
advocates of the epistemic gap can maintain that the gap is absolute whilst 
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acknowledging our less-than-ideal epistemic position. However, by appealing to the –
tivity gap and the –trinsicality gap, the importance of CA and KA is diminished. Those 
arguments were supposed to reveal a failure of entailment from the physical to the 
phenomenal. The two conceptual gaps show that this failure of entailment is inevitable 
given what kind of fact physical facts are, and what kind of fact phenomenal facts are. 
But if these conceptual gaps reveal an inevitable failure of entailment, the original 
arguments are no longer required. Plugging the ontic conditional into the arguments 
TIV and TRIN would generate a conclusion of Primitivism independently. CA and KA 
might make the gaps more vivid but they are not where the real philosophical action is 
happening (see Stoljar 2006, p.155). In a sense, the conceptual gaps do not so much 
reinforce CA and KA as replace them. 
Regarding CA, what we can conceive does not show that phenomenal 
properties are inexplicable in non-phenomenal terms. What an epistemically ideal 
subject can conceive might show this, but our insight into such a subject is provided by 
our appreciation of the conceptual gaps, not by any conceivability test that we 
perform ourselves. It is because those conceptual gaps reveal an inevitable failure of 
entailment that they put us in a position to draw conclusions about what an ideal 
subject can conceive. Similarly, KA relies on our having some grip on what Mary’s 
complete knowledge is like (Alter 2009, p.761). We can characterise her knowledge as 
objective and/or as structural, but why should we believe that she is unable to deduce 
the phenomenal facts from such knowledge? It is only because we have an 
independent understanding of the conceptual gaps between the objective and the 
subjective, and between the structural and the non-structural, that we can be sure 
that Mary is unable to deduce the phenomenal facts. But if these conceptual gaps 
reveal the failure of entailment by themselves, it is not intuitions about Mary that 
justify a commitment to the epistemic gap. 
Primitivists can, and must, defend themselves against the rudimentary 
response by appealing to the two conceptual gaps. But by making this move the 
dialectical situation undergoes an important shift. The task for the Physicalist is no 
longer to confront CA and KA face on. Instead, if they can cast doubt on the –tivity gap 
and –trinsicality gap, the path is open for the rudimentary response to explain away 
[34] 
 
the intuitions that drive CA and KA. Without the conceptual gaps, any sense that 
zombies and inverts are conceivable, and that Mary would learn something new, could 
be dismissed as a reflection of our limited knowledge of the physical explanation of 
consciousness. The case for Primitivism thus depends on the plausibility of the 
conceptual gaps. 
Claiming that Primitivists must move from the ‘initial’ case to the ‘refined’ case 
by no means counts against the truth of Primitivism. Indeed, the two conceptual gaps 
have substantial prima facie value. Looking at the refined case for Primitivism, it is 
tempting to offer a straightforward answer to the question of consciousness: 
phenomenal properties are onticly independent of physical properties. However, we 
will soon see that matters are not so simple. 
 
SECTION 4 
THE CASE AGAINST PRIMITIVISM 
 
The refined case for Primitivism concludes that the phenomenal is onticly distinct from 
the physical. This conclusion alone does not tell us a great deal about the place of 
consciousness in nature. How things are physically clearly influences how things are 
phenomenally, and vice versa. For instance, states of your brain can influence your 
conscious experience, and your conscious states can influence states of your brain and 
your bodily behaviour. The task for the Primitivist is to offer a metaphysical account of 
this apparent two-way interaction. Explaining these interactions in terms of 
phenomenal states constituted by physical states would only be an option for a 
Physicalist ontology. For the Primitivist, these interactions must be understood as 
causal interactions between distinct existences. Causal interactions between distinct 
existences are bound to laws of nature.28 In order to make sense of physical-
phenomenal causal interactions, the Primitivist should thus posit psychophysical laws 
                                                 
28
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that govern such interactions (e.g. Chalmers 1996, p.213). I will put aside worries 
about the notion of psychophysical laws as such, and about whether there are 
plausible laws that could provide the requisite correlations between physical and 
phenomenal events. Instead, the issue I will focus on concerns phenomenal-to-physical 
causation. I argue that Primitivism is unable to provide a defensible account of these 
apparent causal interactions. By contrast, a Physicalist account is not affected by these 
concerns, which strongly encourages the rejection of Primitivism. 
 
4.1. PHENOMENAL CAUSES AND PHYSICAL EFFECTS 
 
Do conscious states have physical effects? If the Primitivist answers ‘yes’, then they are 
committed to a violation of the ‘causal closure’ of the physical, but such a violation is 
unacceptable. If the Primitivist answers ‘no’, then they are committed to 
‘epiphenomenalism’, but that too is unacceptable. As such, phenomenal-to-physical 
causation raises a serious dilemma for Primitivism. I will consider each horn of this 
dilemma in turn before showing that a Physicalist stance is more plausible. 
 
4.1.1. Efficacy and Causal Closure 
When asked whether conscious states have physical effects, the intuitive answer 
would be ‘yes’. From the first person perspective, it appears that our phenomenal 
states are part of the causal story behind at least some of our physical behaviour. 
Imagine looking at some paint and declaring “that paint is red, not purple”. Intuitively, 
your having a perceptual experience characterised by red-qualities rather than by 
purple-qualities is a cause of this verbal behaviour. It seems, for instance, that if you 
had instead had a perceptual experience characterised by orange-qualities, you would 
not have behaved in that way. Furthermore, it seems that your being conscious at all is 
causally relevant to your actions. Putting aside the qualities of your experience, the 
very fact that you are conscious rather than unconscious seems to influence what you 
do. Our phenomenal states also seem to affect our non-verbal behaviour and our non-
behavioural physiological states. In order to respect this, the Primitivist should 
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maintain that the phenomenal is physically efficacious: that phenomenal events can 
cause physical events to occur. 
 Primitivism claims that phenomenal events are non-physical – that they involve 
the instantiation of phenomenal properties that are onticly distinct from physical 
properties. Consequently, to hold that some physical events have phenomenal causes 
is to hold that some physical events have non-physical causes. However, the ‘causal 
closure’ of the physical is thought to prohibit physical events having non-physical 
causes. Causal closure says that all physical events have a complete physical cause.29  
When giving a causal explanation for a physical event, there will never be any need to 
step outside the physical domain.30 We can apply this principle to the case of the 
utterance “that paint is red, not purple”. The causal story here involves the paint 
reflecting light-waves onto the eye, information being transferred via the optic nerve 
to the brain, a sequence of neurological events in which that information is processed, 
and electrical signals being sent to the mouth and vocal chords that produce sound-
waves we would recognise as the utterance “that paint is red, not purple”. The details 
of the causal story are not important. What’s important is the thought that there are 
no gaps at any point in the physical causal story. We have reason to believe each 
physical event finds a complete causal explanation in the event preceding it. There are 
no physical events that call out to be explained in terms of non-physical causes. 
We can conclude that for any physical event with a putative non-physical 
cause, that physical event will have a complete physical explanation. This does not yet 
exclude the possibility of the physical event also having a non-physical cause, but it is 
easy to justify this further step.31 If in all cases of phenomenal-to-physical causation, 
the physical event has a complete physical cause, that event will always be 
overdetermined.32 This means that phenomenal states can only ever cause physical 
events that would have happened anyway. Can we really make sense of phenomenal 
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reference to physical theory, it is appropriate to use physical theory as a guide to how things stand in 
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states being physically efficacious if they only cause events that would still have 
occurred in their absence? It is doubtful that we can make sense of this kind of 
systematic overdetermination. As Kim points out (2002, p.174), if the physical event 
already has a complete physical cause, what causal work is there left for the 
phenomenal state to contribute? Furthermore, even if we could make sense of this, 
the causal role assigned to conscious states would be unsatisfactory. It does not 
merely appear to us that our experiences cause our physical behaviour, but that if we 
had not had that experience, we would not have behaved in that way. The 
overdetermination model cannot respect the second of these thoughts. Overall, the 
Primitivist cannot protect the physical efficacy of phenomenal states whilst respecting 
the causal closure of the physical. Rejecting causal closure, however, is not a viable 
option.33 
 
4.1.2. Inefficacy and Epiphenomenalism 
The Primitivist is now left with the other horn of the dilemma: denying that 
phenomenal states are physically efficacious. This ‘epiphenomenalist’ stance is deeply 
counter-intuitive. On this view, none of your physical behaviour is caused by your 
phenomenal states. Even the act of saying “I am phenomenally conscious” is not the 
result of your actually being phenomenally conscious. Epiphenomenalism also raises 
concerns about the purpose of phenomenal consciousness. If consciousness does not 
do anything, why do we have it? Given that our traits are the product of our 
evolutionary history, we should expect consciousness to have some survival value, but 
according to epiphenomenalism it can have no such value.34 
 These considerations, and many others like them, show that 
epiphenomenalism is an unattractive position, but not that it is false (see Chalmers 
1996, p.160). We would need a compelling argument to justify the acceptance of such 
a strange position, but the combination of the case for Primitivism and considerations 
surrounding causal closure could be deemed to provide just such an argument. 
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Furthermore, the right Primitivist theory might be able to explain away the powerful 
intuition that our physical actions are caused by our phenomenal states. Particular 
psychophysical laws could guarantee an appropriate correspondence between our 
physical and phenomenal states even if the phenomenal states are ultimately 
inefficacious. For instance, the utterance “that paint is red, not purple” has a complete 
physical cause. Part of the physical explanation of that utterance is a non-phenomenal 
state of the speaker’s brain that, thanks to some psychophysical law, also causes the 
occurrence of a conscious experience characterised by red-qualities (Chalmers 1996, 
p.159). A similar story will be told about the evolutionary origin of consciousness: the 
capacity for phenomenal consciousness does nothing useful, but could be lawfully 
correlated with physical capacities that are useful (Jackson 1982, Chalmers 1996, 
p.158).  
 It is unclear whether epiphenomenalism’s defence against these initial 
objections can be maintained. Allowing that it can, there remains a deeper objection 
to epiphenomenalism that strikes at the heart of Primitivism. If phenomenal states do 
not have physical effects, problems arise concerning the possibility of phenomenal 
knowledge. Phenomenal knowledge is the knowledge we have of our conscious states. 
Of course, the case for Primitivism is founded on our phenomenal knowledge, so the 
epiphenomenalist cannot simply ‘bite the bullet’ and accept that we do not have 
phenomenal knowledge without fatally undermining their own position. 
Here is a first pass at how epiphenomenalism precludes the possibility of 
phenomenal knowledge. Your zombie twin has no consciousness but is your duplicate 
in all physical respects. As such they have all the same functional states as you, 
including the state constitutive of believing that they are having a conscious 
experience. A cognitive story must be told about how your zombie twin comes to form 
this belief about themselves (see Chalmers 1996, pp.184-191). Whatever the cognitive 
mechanisms are that generate the belief, it is clear that they will not justify the belief. 
The zombie is victim of a deep cognitive malfunction when they form their false belief. 
The problem is that your phenomenal beliefs are the product of just the same 
cognitive processes as those of your zombie twin. Even if you are conscious, your 
phenomenal states cannot make any contribution to the belief-forming process. If your 
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zombie twin’s phenomenal beliefs are not justified, nor are yours. As such, even if we 
are in fact conscious, we cannot know that we are. According to epiphenomenalism, 
we cannot then know that we aren’t zombies. 
This is a serious problem for epiphenomenalism. Considerations along these 
lines have even convinced Jackson to reject his own Knowledge Argument, since KA 
appears to undermine itself by precluding the possibility of Mary gaining phenomenal 
knowledge (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 1996, p.141).35 However, Chalmers defends 
epiphenomenalism against this kind of objection by offering a more sophisticated 
model of how phenomenal knowledge works (1996/2003). The thought is that you and 
your zombie twin are not in the same epistemic position. There is something 
‘…intrinsically epistemic about experience…’, so by being conscious we have evidence 
for our phenomenal belief that is not available to our zombie twin (Chalmers 1996, 
p.196). Our phenomenal states can then justify our phenomenal belief without having 
any causal influence upon our functional states. The physical portion of you is no more 
justified in having the phenomenal belief than your zombie twin is, but as a conscious 
being you have both physical and non-physical components, and this composite 
subject of knowledge does have justification for their phenomenal belief.36 
This defence of epiphenomenalism raises some important points. For instance, 
in Chapters 5 and 6 we will see that there are good reasons to believe that our 
knowledge of phenomenal states should not be understood on the model of other 
kinds of knowledge. Nevertheless, the account offered by Chalmers is unsatisfactory. 
We should concede that being in a phenomenal state gives you evidence for the belief 
‘I am conscious’ that is not available to your zombie twin. However, it is one thing to 
be in possession of evidence that can justify a belief, and quite another to use that 
evidence in a way that justifies your belief. 
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 Nagasawa (2010) discusses this and concludes that the objection to KA should not be sustained. 
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 This position has deeply counter-intuitive metaphysical commitments: the physical world is such that 
we form phenomenal beliefs on the basis of flawed cognitive processes, but there happen to be non-
physical phenomenal events that are nomically bound to our cognitive states in such a way that our 
beliefs generally come out true. Though this is a serious objection, it just adds to the stack of counter-
intuitive implications of epiphenomenalism. By contrast, the epistemic objection under consideration 
promises to undermine the arguments that motivate such a position. 
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Consider a detective at the scene of a murder. The victim’s body was found by 
a decorator who has been painting the victim’s house. The decorator is actually the 
killer, but is playing innocent. However, the detective has a deep aversion to 
decorators, and immediately concludes that the decorator is the murderer. The 
detective inspects the knife in the victim’s body, and notices that there is fresh paint 
on its handle. Unfortunately, the detective is not very bright, and fails to realise that 
this lends support to his belief that the decorator is the killer. Does the detective know 
that the decorator is the killer? It would seem not. The detective’s belief is true, but 
the process that led him to form the belief fails to provide adequate justification. The 
detective is also in possession of evidence with the potential to justify his belief, but 
this does not help. It is not the case that the detective has the belief because of this 
good evidence, so the belief fails to qualify as knowledge.  
Chalmers’s account of phenomenal belief puts us in an epistemic position no 
better than that of the foolish detective. Our phenomenal belief is the product of the 
same misguided cognitive process as that of our zombie twin. Unlike our zombie twin, 
our belief is true and, thanks to the inherently epistemic nature of consciousness, we 
are aware of evidence that would justify our belief. But this is no better than the 
detective noticing the paint on the knife: if having good evidence does not play an 
appropriate role in the formation of a belief, it fails to justify that belief, and so fails to 
make that belief a case of knowledge.37 Inefficacious phenomenal states might provide 
subjects with evidence for their phenomenal beliefs, but without the capacity to 
influence physical processes they cannot justify their phenomenal beliefs.38 
We should not pretend that this objection to epiphenomenalism is 
straightforward. Bayne notes that ‘[t]he justification of phenomenal judgments raises 
some of the thorniest questions in epistemology…’ (2011, p.418), and Chalmers has 
done significant work that attempts to rebut the kind of objection we have raised 
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 This is similar to Bayne’s (2001, p.417) objection that the epistemic access a ‘self’ has to their own 
phenomenal states does not automatically justify the phenomenal beliefs that the subject forms.  
38
 The view that phenomenal states are constituents of our phenomenal beliefs might be thought to give 
phenomenal states the requisite justificatory role (Chalmers 1996, p.204 and 2003). However, it is not 
clear that such a constitutive role would bestow the required justificatory status, and it is doubtful that 
all cases of phenomenal knowledge have phenomenal states as a constituent. Furthermore, there are 
worries about how the physical ‘component’ of a phenomenal belief could possibly be set up to meld 
with non-physical epiphenomenal events to form a composite belief state.  
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(2003). Nevertheless, the prospects for epiphenomenalism look very poor. As such, we 
can conclude that the second horn of the dilemma raised by phenomenal-to-physical 
causation cannot be taken. 
 
4.2. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM 
 
The Problem of Consciousness only arises if we have reason to prefer Physicalism to 
Primitivism. However, the fact that Primitivism is in trouble when it comes to the 
physical efficacy of phenomenal states does not, in and of itself, lend support to 
Physicalism. Why should we believe that Physicalism could provide the phenomenal 
with an appropriate causal status? Physicalism denies that phenomenal states are non-
physical. As such, conscious experience falls within the causally closed system of the 
physical. Physical events, such as our bodily behaviour, have a complete physical 
cause. If phenomenal events in some sense are physical events, they can cause our 
behaviour (e.g. Levine 2001, p.5). 
 There are some complications with this picture. For instance, Kim (2002) 
suggests that even if mental states (such as phenomenal states) are constituted by 
lower-level physical states, it is those lower-level states that do all the causal work, 
meaning consciousness again becomes epiphenomenal. It is plausible, however, that 
arguments of this kind can be undermined given the right account of causation, or at 
least the right account of ‘explanation’ (Levine 2001, Yablo 2002). The key point is that 
on a Physicalist ontology there are not two causes – one physical and one phenomenal 
– competing to bring about an effect. Rather, there is one cause that can be described 
with a physical vocabulary but which can also be described in phenomenal terms. 
Overall, it is fair to conclude that causal considerations lend considerable support to a 
Physicalist view of consciousness.39 
                                                 
39
 Physical-to-phenomenal causation also generates serious difficulties for Primitivism. Psychophysical 
laws must account for why our physical states generate conscious experiences. This challenge generates 
the following dilemma: either the psychophysical laws are such that only physical states very close to 
our own can cause phenomenal events or our physical states do not have any special status in the 
psychophysical scheme of things. On the first route, psychophysical laws become unacceptably ad hoc 
and anthropocentric. On the second route, Primitivism ends up committed to ‘panphenomenalism’: the 
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As previously stated, a deep problem is revealed by the question ‘is the 
phenomenal onticly dependent on the physical, or onticly independent of the 
physical?’. That problem can be captured as follows: 
The Problem of Consciousness: There are persuasive reasons to believe 
that the phenomenal is onticly independent of the physical, and 
persuasive reasons to believe that the phenomenal is onticly dependent 
on the physical. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We have now considered the key arguments that lead us towards these opposing 
verdicts on the ontic status of consciousness. It should be recognised that the case for 
Physicalism indicates that something must be wrong with the arguments for 
Primitivism, but does not reveal where they go wrong. So far the case for Primitivism is 
untouched. We started our discussion of consciousness, in Section 1.1, with a 
distinction between how consciousness seems from a first-person perspective and 
what consciousness does. It is the ‘seeming’ dimension that drives the case for 
Primitivism: our phenomenology appears to be inexplicable in physical terms. It is the 
‘doing’ dimension that drives the case against Primitivism: the causal efficacy of 
consciousness appears to be inexplicable in non-physical terms. If we are to respect 
both dimensions of phenomenal consciousness, something must be done to resolve 
this antinomy. 
                                                                                                                                               
view that phenomenal consciousness is ubiquitous. There are serious objections to each route. 
Furthermore, a parallel dilemma arises in connection to the influence our physical states have upon the 
qualitative character of our conscious states. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the standard responses to the Problem of 
Consciousness established in the previous chapter. A proposed solution will either 
defend Primitivism from the objections raised against it, or attempt to undermine the 
case for Primitivism. For a variety of reasons, I will not consider attempts to defend 
Primitivism any further. First, the case against Primitivism already outlined is 
sufficiently strong. Second, in the debate between Primitivism and Physicalism, the 
burden of proof lies with the Primitivist. If nothing else, Occam's Razor puts the onus 
on Primitivists to show that a purely Physicalist ontology fails, and that basic 
phenomenal properties must be introduced into our ontology. Since the burden of 
proof is on Primitivism, if a defensible form of Physicalism can be provided then 
Primitivism should be rejected. The goal of this thesis is to develop a viable Physicalist 
account of consciousness. If the account is successful, that alone would thus provide us 
with sufficient reason to reject Primitivism. Third, extending the case against 
Primitivism will not significantly enhance our understanding of what a viable response 
to the Problem of Consciousness involves. By contrast, the evaluation of existing forms 
of Physicalism will yield important conclusions that will inform the overall trajectory of 
the thesis. 
 Strategies that attempt to undermine the case for Primitivism fall into two main 
categories. ‘Type-A’ positions reject the epistemic step of Primitivist arguments, 
denying that there is a genuine epistemic gap between the physical and the 
phenomenal.1 I argue that the standard positions of this type either fail to address the 
problem at hand, or deny the manifest reality of phenomenal consciousness. ‘Type-B’ 
positions reject the ontic step of those arguments, denying that an epistemic gap 
between the physical and the phenomenal entails that they are onticly distinct. I argue 
that this category of response rests on a mistaken understanding of a posteriori 
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The ‘type’ labels are taken from Chalmers (2002). 
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necessity. 
 I will conclude that standard responses to the Problem of Consciousness are 
unsatisfactory. Besides this negative conclusion, I will also establish three positive 
criteria that an adequate response to the problem should satisfy. I will state the first of 
these without further argument: 
The Physicalist Criterion: A defensible response to the Problem of 
Consciousness must not hold that the phenomenal is onticly distinct 
from the physical. 
The second and third criteria will emerge in my evaluation of Type-A and Type-B 
positions respectively. The failure of the standard responses motivates the exploration 
of an alternative approach to the problem in Chapter 3 and the three criteria I establish 
will guide the evaluation of that strategy. 
 
SECTION 1 
TYPE-A RESPONSES 
 
Type-A responses deny that there is a genuine epistemic gap between the physical and 
the phenomenal.2 On this view, the psychophysical conditional ‘P→Q’ is an a priori 
truth (see Chapter 1, Section 2.1.1). Regarding CA, zombies and inverts are not 
genuinely conceivable. Regarding KA, Mary does not really learn anything new on 
having her first experience of redness. Furthermore, the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps 
fail to present any genuine conceptual chasm between the physical and the 
phenomenal. How can Type-A theorists overcome the wide-spread and compelling 
intuitions that there is a genuine epistemic gap? Asserting that they do not have the 
relevant intuitions or that, given the case against Primitivism, the intuitions must be in 
error, does nothing to diminish the force of those intuitions in others. The task for the 
Type-A theorist is to undermine the epistemic gap whilst acknowledging its prima facie 
force. They must provide arguments that cast doubt on the gap rather than appealing 
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Advocates of Type-A positions might reject the ontic step of Primitivist arguments too (e.g. Dennett 
1991a). If so, they are still most informatively identified as Type-A theorists rather than Type-B theorists. 
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to intuition. 
We have already considered one such argument: the rudimentary response to 
Primitivism. By appealing to the potential of future science, and drawing analogies with 
apparent gaps that have ultimately been closed by science, the Type-A theorist can 
attempt to undermine the epistemic gap. However, we have also seen that the –tivity 
and –trinsicality gaps cast serious doubt on this response. Though the rudimentary 
response focuses on the physical side of the psychophysical conditional, the leading 
Type-A positions tend to focus on the phenomenal side. I divide these positions into 
two related kinds: Reductionism and Eliminativism. We will consider each in turn. 
 
1.1. REDUCTIONISM 
 
Reductionism aims to give an analysis of the concept ‘consciousness’ that makes 
consciousness amenable to explanation in physical terms. Analytic Functionalism, for 
instance, claims that consciousness is a functional concept: to be a conscious state is to 
have a certain functional profile, and the functional properties of that state determine 
the character of the conscious experience. Here consciousness is not analysed into 
physical terms directly, but the space is opened up for consciousness to be realised 
physically. There is no epistemic gap involved in the physical implementation of 
functional states, so if consciousness is a functional property, how things are physically 
can epistemically entail how things are phenomenally. That is, ‘P→Q’ would be 
knowable a priori. 
 The problem for Analytic Functionalism, and for other reductive analyses, is 
that they fail to do justice to our understanding of phenomenal consciousness. No 
functional (or related) analysis can capture the full nature of phenomenal 
consciousness. They inevitably leave an unexplained residue, and this phenomenal 
residue is responsible for the epistemic gap. To conceive of a zombie is to conceive of a 
being without that non-functional property that makes you more than a zombie. What 
Mary discovers is precisely what all her functional knowledge left out. The subjectivity 
of consciousness, and the intrinsicality of phenomenal qualities, refuse to be analysed 
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in functional terms. It seems that a reductive analysis of consciousness can only get off 
the ground by ignoring the very insights that underwrite the epistemic gap. Once you 
have fixed all the physico-functional details – all the details that might figure in a 
reductive analysis of consciousness – you will always be left with the further question 
of whether that physico-functional state is accompanied by phenomenal experience, 
and of what that experience is like for its subject (see Chalmers 1996, p.47). A 
reductive analysis is successful only if it closes off the possibility of such further 
questions. 
 One popular route for the Type-A theorist is to introduce a two-step analysis of 
consciousness. In particular, our concept of consciousness might be amenable to 
analysis in representational terms. After all, conscious states are plausibly a special kind 
of mental representation, and phenomenal character is plausibly bound to the content 
of conscious mental representations. Assuming such an analysis is plausible, how 
would this help the Type-A theorist? The hope is that representation can be explained 
in physical terms. Accounting for the intentionality of mental states may be a genuine 
philosophical puzzle, but many are optimistic about the tractability of the problem (see 
Jackson, quoted Davies 2008 p.27). Theories often account for representation in causal 
and/or ‘teleosemantic’ terms, which allow mental representations to be realised by 
physical states. If phenomenal consciousness is just a variety of mental representation, 
it too can be realised physically. 
 There is something of value in this line of thought, and I will explore 
Representationalist strategies further in Chapter 5. The basic appeal to representation, 
however, does not help the Type-A theorist. Collapsing the project of explaining 
consciousness into the more tractable project of explaining intentionality does not 
make the former project any easier –  it just makes the latter project harder. If 
consciousness is representational, then an explanation of mental representation will 
have to face up to the conceivability of zombies: a being like you in all physical respects 
but devoid of phenomenal representations (Crane 2007, p.24). Similarly, if Mary 
discovers a representational truth on leaving her room, then some representational 
truths are non-physical (Alter, 2007). Furthermore, the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps will 
now count against the plausibility of a complete physical explanation of representation. 
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If consciousness is susceptible to analysis in representational terms, there is an 
epistemic gap between the physical and the representational. If, on the other hand, 
mental representation can be accounted for in physical terms, then consciousness 
must involve the instantiation of non-representational properties. Either way, the 
epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal remains untouched. 
 
1.2. ELIMINATIVISM 
 
Eliminativists deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness. They concede that 
conscious experience cannot be explained by any physical theory but, as Levine 
explains, ‘…that’s not because of some lack in the theory. Rather, the problem is that 
conscious experience doesn't really exist.’ (2001, p.128)3 This kind of account takes the 
epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal seriously: the apparent 
residue left by physical accounts of consciousness is genuinely inexplicable in physical 
terms. The claim, however, is that this residue is a fiction. The apparent non-functional 
remainder does not exist. On the face of it, this is a bold and implausible position. The 
task for the Eliminativist is to give us reason to believe that phenomenal consciousness 
is an illusion. There are various ways in which this might be done, but they are all 
ultimately unpersuasive.4 
  One route for the Eliminativist is to regard phenomenal consciousness as a 
theoretical posit, then show that this posit is not warranted by the data. Following 
Dennett (1991a), one might focus on the data of verbal reports. People are inclined, for 
instance, to report that they have a special internal awareness characterised by 
ineffable qualities. A ‘folk psychology’ theory explains this verbal behaviour in terms of 
people really having such phenomenal states. Cognitive science, however, can offer a 
competing theory that explains such reports simply in terms of information-processing 
structures in the brain. For example, the disposition to make reports of a special ‘direct 
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 Some who claim to be Reductionists only offer a reduction of consciousness in the non-phenomenal 
sense of the term. If they deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness, they are ultimately 
Eliminativists. There is thus an extent to which Reductionism and Eliminativism merge into one another 
(Chalmers 2002, p.251). 
4
Eliminativist positions include Dennett (1991a) and Rey (1997). 
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apprehension’ could be accounted for in terms of a subject accessing information but 
having no contact with the mediating processes responsible for this access (see 
Chalmers 1996, p.172). The full cognitive account would be more complex than this, 
but the key point is that it promises to explain why subjects think they have 
phenomenal states without holding that they actually have them. Cognitive 
explanations along these lines would be more economical than an explanation that 
posits real phenomenal states. 
 The problem with this kind of Eliminativist argument is that it misrepresents the 
status of phenomenal consciousness. If the phenomenal was a theoretical posit, it 
would indeed come at too a high a price, and we would plausibly be better off without 
it (Levine 2001, p.133). However, the real reason for believing that phenomenal states 
exist is not anything like verbal data. Rather, it is the phenomenal states themselves. 
We know about phenomenal states and their qualities by having them, not by inferring 
their presence from some non-phenomenal data. Phenomenal consciousness is an 
immediate datum – perhaps our most immediate datum – and not a theoretical posit 
(Levine 2001, p.134). An Eliminativist might argue that this special immediate 
knowledge of consciousness is illusory – that we are really just zombies.  However, 
there is plausibly no space in which to argue that consciousness is an illusion. 
Sometimes how things seem is not how they really are, but since consciousness is itself 
the seeming how could it transpire to be unreal? The epistemic status of experience 
renders any attempt to cast doubt on its existence futile.5 
Eliminativists often denigrate such first-person data (e.g. Dennett 1991a, p.72). 
After all, science is driven by the principle that data must be open to public 
investigation. But this kind of response simply begs the question against those who 
claim to have phenomenal states that they know immediately from the first-person 
perspective (Chalmers 2002, p.251). They have no dialectical obligation to provide 
third-person evidence for the existence of first-person data. Conversely though, the 
Eliminativist is under no obligation to trust that such putative first-person data is 
genuine. Consequently, Eliminativists and their opponents must simply agree to 
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Some of the most popular forms of Eliminativism appeal to representational notions (e.g. Rey 1997). 
However, as with the Reductionist appeal to representation, this approach just faces the old explanatory 
problems under a new guise rather than successfully overcoming them (Levine 2001). 
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disagree. This dialectical impasse need not count against the epistemic gap though. The 
arguments for Primitivism can be addressed only to those who ‘take consciousness 
seriously’ (Chalmers 1996, p.165). If you persuade yourself to deny the data of 
conscious experience, the case for Primitivism will have no grip on you. But if you 
acknowledge the reality of phenomenal consciousness, the appearance of an epistemic 
gap between the physical and the phenomenal is compelling, and the Primitivist has 
firm ground on which to build their case. 
The failings of the standard Type-A positions point to a second criterion that a 
plausible response to the Problem of Consciousness must satisfy. 
The Phenomenal Realism Criterion: A defensible response to the 
Problem of Consciousness must acknowledge the manifest existence of 
phenomenal states. 
Reductionism fails to satisfy this condition as it ignores the distinctive characteristics of 
consciousness that are responsible for the epistemic gap. Eliminativism fails to satisfy 
this condition as it explicitly denies the existence of phenomenal consciousness. Any 
serious attempt to undermine the epistemic gap must take the existence of 
phenomenal consciousness seriously. 
 
SECTION 2 
TYPE-B RESPONSES 
 
Proponents of Type-B positions accept that there is an epistemic gap between the 
physical and the phenomenal. What they reject, however, is the inference from an 
epistemic gap to ontic distinctness. Type-B theorists hold that the psychophysical 
conditional is a necessary truth, but claim that it is an a posteriori necessity. On this 
view, the Primitivist arguments might show that ‘P→Q’ is not knowable a priori, but 
they fail to show that ‘P→Q’ is not necessary. In the first sub-section I introduce the 
notion of a posteriori necessity and explain how the Type-B theorist attempts to use 
this notion to undermine the case for Primitivism. In the second sub-section I argue 
that all a posteriori necessary truths must be knowable a priori for an appropriately 
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informed subject. As such, if there is a principled epistemic gap between properties 
then they must be onticly distinct. In the third sub-section I evaluate some responses 
to this argument against Type-B positions but maintain that they are unpersuasive. I 
conclude that Type-B positions fail to present a plausible case against Primitivism. 
 
2.1. A POSTERIORI NECESSITY 
 
The notion of a posteriori necessity was introduced by Kripke to account for the 
necessity of propositions such as ‘water is H2O’.
6 This proposition is true in all possible 
worlds, so is not contingent, yet cannot be established through conceptual analysis 
alone, so is not a priori. The discovery that water is H2O is thus an a posteriori insight 
into a necessary entailment between the instantiation of H2O and the instantiation of 
water. This discovery was made through empirical observation and inference to the 
best explanation – the hallmarks of science – rather than through conceptual analysis 
and logical derivation – the hallmarks, perhaps, of philosophy.7 As Byrne explains, 
‘Kripke pointed out that the notions of necessity and a prioricity are distinct: the 
former is from metaphysics, the latter from epistemology…’ (1999, p.372). The notion 
of a posteriori necessity thus opens the way for positing necessary truths without any 
epistemic commitment to the ‘apriority’ of that truth i.e. to its being knowable a priori. 
Claiming that the psychophysical conditional is an a posteriori necessary truth 
has significant prima facie appeal. Our discussion of Type-A positions revealed that the 
pursuit of an a priori derivation from the physical to the phenomenal is wildly over-
ambitious. A combination of taking the epistemic gap seriously and finding Primitivism 
implausible has led many philosophers to occupy the middle ground offered by Type-B 
positions. Within the debate surrounding the Problem of Consciousness, adopting 
some form of Type-B position is probably the majority stance (Davies 2008, p.38). I will 
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The literature typically uses identity statements as examples of a posteriori necessary truths.  An 
identity between the physical and the phenomenal would guarantee the necessity of the psychophysical 
conditional, but such an identity is by no means compulsory. As such, it is more appropriate to approach 
the discussion in terms of necessary truths in general, rather than specifically in terms of identity claims. 
7
Block and Stalnaker (2002) emphasise that conceptual analysis plays no role in our coming to know that 
‘water is H2O’. 
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outline how Type-B positions seek to undermine each of the Primitivist arguments. 
 CA rests on the premise that if something is epistemically possible, then it is 
metaphysically possible. Our capacity to appropriately conceive of zombies and inverts 
reveals their metaphysical possibility, thus showing that phenomenal properties are 
onticly basic. Type-B theorists, however, challenge this premise. Zombies and inverts 
may well be epistemically possible, but they are not metaphysically possible. There is 
no possible world occupied by beings that are like you in all physico-functional respects 
but who differ from you phenomenally. Our concepts allow us to imagine scenarios 
that are metaphysically impossible. 
 Type-B theorists challenge KA in a similar way. They allow that Mary is ignorant 
of certain phenomenal truths before leaving her room, but claim that these 
phenomenal truths are nevertheless necessitated by the physical truths.8 Type-B 
theorists often describe Mary’s discovery as her learning an old fact in a new way.9 The 
discovered phenomenal facts are just familiar physical facts accessed under a novel 
mode of presentation, rather than non-physical facts as the Primitivist would claim. 
What it’s like to undergo a red experience is necessitated by the physical facts – the 
facts Mary already knew – but the a posteriori character of this necessitation means 
we should not expect Mary to be able to deduce what qualitative redness is like from 
the relevant physical truths. It is informative for Mary to learn, on leaving her room, 
that being in the neurological state ‘N’ of red-perception has this reddish qualitative 
character rather than that greenish qualitative character. However, it does not follow 
that the link between N and phenomenal redness is contingent: that there are possible 
worlds in which N is associated with phenomenal green-ness. That may be a 
conceptual possibility but, according to the Type-B theorist, it is not a metaphysical 
possibility. Mary, no less than us, can entertain metaphysically impossible scenarios. 
 Type-B theorists do not typically address the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps, but it 
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Type-B theorists can also challenge KA by suggesting that the Mary scenario is metaphysically 
impossible. After all, according to Type-B positions our capacity to conceive of the scenario does not 
suffice to demonstrate its metaphysical possibility. 
9
For a useful overview of this response, see Stoljar & Nagasawa (2003). There is a variant of the ‘old 
fact/new way’ response that is concerned with Mary’s acquisition of new concepts on leaving her room 
rather than on the a posteriori character of the psychophysical conditional. This kind of response to KA 
is ruled out by our use of the experienced Mary scenario, in which she already has a concept of 
phenomenal redness before leaving her room. 
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is fairly clear how they would respond to these conceptual gaps. They can concede that 
there is no a priori derivation from the objective to the subjective, nor from the 
structural to the non-structural. Nevertheless, they would maintain that the objective 
facts necessitate the subjective facts and that the structural facts necessitate the non-
structural facts. The conceptual gaps rule out any a priori necessitation, but they do not 
thereby rule out necessitation as such. The Type-B theorist can hold that there are no 
possible worlds like ours in all objective and structural respects, but divergent from 
ours with respect to the phenomenal. 
 The Type-B view starts from standard cases of a posteriori necessity, such as 
‘water is H2O’, then claims that the psychophysical conditional is an analogous 
necessary truth. Any plausible version of the view must, however, acknowledge a 
certain degree of disanalogy between the standard cases and the psychophysical 
conditional. If the psychophysical conditional is like any other a posteriori necessity, 
why is there such a deep sense of mystery associated with the physical explanation of 
consciousness, and not with standard cases like the chemical composition of water? 
We are not worried about ‘zombie H2O worlds’ which are like our world with respect to 
H2O but in which water is not instantiated (Levine 2001 p.51). We are not faced with 
theorists who claim that the instantiation of water is something onticly over and above 
the instantiation of H2O (Levine 2001, p.80). If the psychophysical conditional is a run-
of-the-mill a posteriori necessity, we are owed an account of why it appears to be 
exceptional – of why we resist accepting it as a necessary truth. 
 There are various routes open to the Type-B theorist here. Perhaps we have a 
propensity towards dualist thinking that is innate, or an engrained cultural habit.10 
Perhaps our resistance has a deeper cognitive explanation: maybe the cognitive 
systems responsible for thinking about consciousness, and those responsible for 
thinking about the physical, are unable to mesh with one another. Where we can link 
together our information about water and H2O in a satisfactory way, there is an 
inevitable cognitive dissonance involved in the thought that phenomenal states are 
nothing more than physical states. Without adjudicating on this debate, it is quite 
plausible that a defensible psychological account of our resistance could be provided. 
                                                 
10
Papineau (2011, p.15) attributes the former view to Bloom and the latter to Rorty and Yablo. 
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With such an account, the psychophysical conditional could be regarded as a typical 
case of a posteriori necessity, associated with an atypical discomfort about that 
necessity. This discomfort alone is not enough to cast doubt on the necessity claim: 
discomfort is no grounds for metaphysics (Papineau 2011, p.19). Overall, Type-B 
positions show significant promise. I will argue, however, that they are ultimately 
unable to live up to that promise. 
 
2.2. AGAINST BRUTE A POSTERIORI NECESSITY 
 
I will argue that we should adopt the ‘Apriority Thesis’. This is the thesis that if the 
psychophysical conditional is necessary, then it must be knowable a priori for an 
appropriately informed subject. To permit a posteriori necessities that are not 
knowable a priori, even under ideal epistemic circumstances, is to permit what I will 
call ‘brute’ a posteriori necessities. This general rejection of brute a posteriori 
necessities justifies the specific rejection of the Type-B theorist’s claim that ‘P→Q’ is 
necessary but not knowable a priori. 
 
2.2.1. The Functional Role Account 
In order to get a grip on the thought that a posteriori necessities are ultimately 
knowable a priori, we should start with the ‘functional role’ account of a posteriori 
necessity advocated by Chalmers & Jackson (2001). They claim that the necessary truth 
‘water is H2O’ has a kind of context-dependent apriority. Knowledge of this truth comes 
in two stages. First, a subject needs a proper analysis of what water is. Chalmers and 
Jackson offer a functional account of the meaning of ‘water’ whereby water is 
whatever performs the causal role definitive of water. That role is being the x such that 
it is potable, transparent, quenches thirst, falls from the sky etc. Importantly, this part 
of the subject’s knowledge is a priori. Second, the subject learns that the substance 
H2O performs the water role in the actual world. This is the a posteriori insight that 
H2O is the actual stuff that is potable, transparent etc. From this, the subject can then 
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deduce that water is H2O.
11 We can summarise this water deduction (WD) as follows: 
WD1) Water is whatever x plays the waterish role. (a priori) 
WD2) H2O is the x that plays the waterish role. (a posteriori) 
WD3) Therefore, water is H2O. (follows with a priori necessity) 
This example provides a clear illustration of an a posteriori necessity that involves an a 
priori grasp of how meanings depend on our environment, plus an a posteriori 
knowledge of what our environment is in fact like, yielding an a priori deduction of the 
necessary truth. Since this knowledge involves the contingencies of how the world in 
fact is, it is quite unlike our a priori knowledge that all bachelors are male. It would be a 
mistake, however, to think that the a posteriori component of WD makes knowledge of 
its conclusion any less a priori in character. Once a subject has established the 
premises, they will find it inconceivable for water to be onticly distinct from H2O. 
According to this model, there is no such thing as brute a posteriori necessity, only a 
priori necessity with a posteriori components. 
There is some controversy surrounding the Chalmers-Jackson model of a 
posteriori necessity. First, it is not clear that our concept of water really has a 
functional analysis. McLaughlin, for instance, holds that it is ‘very much an open 
question’ whether such an analysis is available (2007, p.209). Second, it is disputable 
that conceptual analysis plays any role in our coming to learn a posteriori necessary 
truths (Block & Stalnaker 2002). Third, even if the Chalmers-Jackson account of ‘water 
is H2O’ is accepted, we would need compelling reasons to conclude that all a posteriori 
necessity must be understood on this model, and that there are no cases of brute a 
posteriori necessary truths (Polger 2008, p.114). 
It may well be that the Chalmers-Jackson model can be defended against these 
worries, but I suggest that a more secure case against the Type-B theorist can be made 
if we put the functional-role account of a posteriori necessity aside. The central tenet 
of the Chalmers-Jackson model is captured by the thesis that all necessary truths are 
knowable a priori for an appropriately informed subject. Call the thesis that if ‘P→Q’ is 
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If there are any concerns about using an identity claim as the example, the ‘is’ of identity can be 
replaced with the more modest ‘is nothing more than’. 
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necessary then it is knowable a priori the 'Apriority Thesis'. We can argue for the 
Apriority Thesis without attributing any special role to conceptual analyses, functional 
or otherwise.12 The two key premises of the argument are ‘The Redescription 
Requirement’ and ‘Semantic Rationalism’ which I will outline in turn. 
 
2.2.2. The Redescription Requirement 
Take the Physicalist claim that all properties instantiated in the actual world W* are 
nothing over and above physical properties. We have already outlined what such an 
ontic claim amounts to in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3). Now we must consider an important 
commitment entailed by such a claim of ontic dependence. If physical properties 
exhaustively determine how W* is, this has consequences regarding sentences true at 
W*. The truth-value of a sentence depends on truth-makers, and truth-makers are 
properties instantiated in the world. Many sentences true at W* will involve exclusively 
physical terms. As discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2), what qualifies a term as a 
physical term is contentious. Clearly terms from physical theory, such as ‘mass’ and 
‘electron’, are physical terms. For our purposes, we can make do with the minimal 
commitment that all physical terms are non-phenomenal terms. Take ‘P’ to be the 
conjunction of truths expressible in a physical vocabulary. Clearly the truth-makers for 
P will be physical properties. A more interesting commitment of Physicalism is that 
sentences true at W* that are not phrased in a purely physical vocabulary must also 
have physical properties as their truth-makers. If the truth-makers of those sentences 
were non-physical properties, then Physicalism would be false. Kirk describes this 
commitment as follows: 
If there are any true statements about the world which are not 
expressed in terms of the austere vocabulary of P, then those 
statements are different ways of talking about—describing, explaining, 
and so on—exactly the same world as is speciﬁed by P. (2006, p.524) 
Physicalism requires that any sentence true at W* that is not included in P must be a 
redescription of the states of affairs already specified by P. Kirk (2006) gives the useful 
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I also avoid using ‘two-dimensional modal semantics’ in the argument. The technicalities surrounding 
two-dimensional semantics can, as Polger (2008) suggests, distract from the important philosophical 
issues. Also, two-dimensionalism has been used to defend Type-B positions (e.g. Block & Stalnaker, 
2002) so is unlikely to provide a solid foundation for the Apriority Thesis. 
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example of the truths of microphysics and landscape truths. It is plausible that true 
descriptions of mountains are simply redescriptions of that which is already captured 
by a complete microphysics. This is why mountains are not ontological basics. If you 
included mountains in your fundamental ontology, you would be guilty of double 
counting – of adding entities to the world that had already been captured at a different 
level. Similarly, if Physicalism is true then the complete conjunction of phenomenal 
truths ‘Q’ must be a redescription of properties and states of affairs already captured 
by ‘P’.13 Physicalism, and any other claim of exhaustive ontic constitution, must respect 
this ‘Redescription Requirement’. 
 
2.2.3. Semantic Rationalism 
The ‘Redescription Requirement’ reveals how an ontological claim about W*, such as 
Physicalism, has semantic commitments concerning all sentences true at W*. The next 
step in the case for the Apriority Thesis is to show how these semantic commitments 
have epistemic implications. Semantic Rationalism is the label Witmer gives to the view 
that grasping the meaning of a term puts you in a position to work out how that term 
contributes to the truth-conditions of sentences in which it appears (2006, p.202).14 
Supporters of the Apriority Thesis generally seem to adhere to something like Semantic 
Rationalism. Witmer explains an important implication of the position: 
If I fully understand terms T1 and T2, then I know a priori how to figure 
out whether or not they have the same semantic value. More precisely, 
for any given situation in which both T1 and T2 may be used in a 
sentence, I can, if given sufficient empirical information about the 
situation, determine from that information alone whether T1 picks out 
the same thing as does T2. (2006 p.203) 
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A complication here is that it may not be possible to capture phenomenal truths by way of sentences. 
Our conception of phenomenal states plausibly exceeds any linguistic characterisation. For instance, 
phenomenal qualities are often claimed to be ineffable. To get round this concern, think of Q as a 
mental sentence or a complex thought. If that ‘sentence’ involves phenomenal concepts that do not 
correspond to any linguistic term, so be it. The important point is that Q is a truth-bearer, and that the 
properties instantiated in W* are its truth-makers. 
14
Semantic Rationalism, and related claims, are fiercely disputed by Type-B theorists. My aim is to show 
that it is plausible without attempting to engage in the various complex debates that surround it. This 
debate shades into Quinean arguments against the a priori/a posteriori distinction. Those who reject the 
distinction are not easily categorised as Type-A or Type-B theorists. Engaging with Type-Q (‘Q’ for Quine) 
positions will lead us too far astray (though see Rosenberg 2004, p.70 for cogent criticisms). 
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A subject who understands a pair of terms, and who knows the relevant non-semantic 
facts that contribute to the semantic value of those terms, is in a position to know 
whether the terms co-refer.15 No further factors could contribute to whether the terms 
co-refer, so there is no space for their co-referentiality to be hidden to the subject. The 
inferential route to the conclusion that the terms co-refer may be very complex, so a 
subject with inadequate inferential skills would be unable to draw the inference. But 
for a subject who does have optimal cognitive abilities, the inference is available. 
It is worth considering some examples. Understanding the term ‘water’ involves 
understanding how its reference depends on environmental factors. Combine this a 
priori understanding (which may or may not involve explicit conceptual analysis, 
functional or otherwise) with a full a posteriori knowledge of all relevant 
environmental factors, and you will be able to discern that ‘water’ refers to the same 
things as ‘H2O’. One can be a competent user of the terms ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel 
Clemens’ without knowing that they co-refer. However, full a posteriori knowledge of 
the relevant non-semantic facts would reveal that they co-refer. This includes the fact 
that there was a person named ‘Samuel Clemens’ by his parents who chose to publish 
his books under the pseudonym ‘Mark Twain’ (see Chalmers & Jackson 2001). Given 
enough information of this kind, one can infer that the two terms co-refer. Their co-
reference is not some further fact that must be learned a posteriori. There are a wide-
range of non-semantic factors that might contribute to the semantic value of a term: 
baptisms, causal connections, the history of a term, use of a term by the wider 
community, use of a term by experts. Understanding terms is compatible with 
substantial ignorance about such factors, but if a subject has full knowledge of those 
factors then they do not need any further information in order to discern whether their 
terms have the same referent. 
 Applying Semantic Rationalism on the level of sentences, to understand a 
sentence is to understand what it takes for that sentence to be true. A subject who 
understands two sentences S1 and S2, and who has complete relevant knowledge of 
the non-semantic facts, would be in a position to know whether the sentences are true 
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This is related to the Fregean view that those with mastery of a term have a priori access to the sense 
of that term, which determines its reference.   
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in virtue of the same truth-makers. In other words, if S2 is a redescription of a state of 
affairs described by S1, a fully informed subject would be in a position to know this. 
The fact that S2 is a redescription of the state of affairs described in S1 is not 
something that an ideal subject would need to learn a posteriori. All the relevant 
information is contained in the knowledge they already have, so if S2 is a redescription 
the subject could establish this a priori. 
 
2.2.4. An Argument For the Apriority Thesis 
What does all this mean for the psychophysical conditional? In order to qualify as 
Physicalist, Type-B theorists must respect the Redescription Requirement. This means 
that in the psychophysical conditional ‘P→Q’, ‘Q’ must be a redescription of properties 
and states of affairs already specified by ‘P’. The truth of ‘Q’ does not require the world 
to contain anything more than what ‘P’ requires. Now consider a subject who knows P 
(or at least knows the relevant sub-set of P) and who understands Q (or at least the 
relevant sub-set of Q). According to Semantic Rationalism, the subject should be able 
to establish a priori whether Q redescribes the states of affairs described by P. Non-
semantic factors might contribute to what terms (or concepts) in Q refer to, but the 
subject’s knowledge of P will include all those non-semantic factors.16 Of course, if a 
subject can know a priori that Q is a redescription of the world described by P, then 
they can know a priori that ‘P→Q’. The Argument for the Apriority Thesis (AAT) can be 
captured as follows: 
AAT1) If ‘P→Q’ is necessary then the truth-makers of ‘P’ exhaust the 
truth-makers of ‘Q’. 
AAT2) An ideal subject with full knowledge of P, full understanding of 
‘Q’, and optimal cognitive capacities, could determine a priori whether 
the truth-makers of ‘P’ exhaust the truth-makers of ‘Q’. 
AAT3) If an ideal subject can determine a priori that the truth-makers of 
‘P’ exhaust the truth-makers of ‘Q’, then the proposition ‘P→Q’ is 
                                                 
16
Technically we must include some non-semantic factors that are not included in P. P does not include 
the fact that the physical facts included in P are all the physical facts. Furthermore, P does not include 
facts about indexicals. For the sake of this discussion, we can just add a ‘that’s all’ clause, and all 
indexical facts, into the antecedent of the psychophysical conditional. They may not strictly be physical 
facts, but they clearly are not facts that require the instantiation of non-physical properties, so no 
compromise is being made on Physicalism (Chalmers & Jackson 2001). 
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knowable a priori for that subject. 
AAT4) Therefore, if ‘P→Q’ is necessary then ‘P→Q’ is knowable a priori 
for an ideal subject. 
The first premise is a simple way of capturing the Redescription Requirement on claims 
of exhaustive ontic constitution. The second premise is a straightforward application of 
Semantic Rationalism.17 P will include all the environmental factors that contribute to 
the meaning of Q – the factors that one cannot uncover by conceptual analysis alone. 
To deny that all such factors are included in P is to concede that non-physical factors 
contribute to Q holding, which is not an option for the Type-B theorist.18 The third 
premise should be uncontentious. If you know that what makes P true also makes Q 
true, then you can infer that if P is true then Q is true. The conclusion follows that 
‘P→Q’ is knowable a priori for an appropriately informed subject. Claiming that the 
psychophysical conditional is an a posteriori necessity does not do what the Type-B 
theorist needs it to. If the epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal 
holds, then ‘P→Q’ is unknowable a priori, even for an ideal subject. But if ‘P→Q’ is 
unknowable a priori even for an ideal subject then, from the argument above, it is not 
necessary. Overall, if ‘P→Q’ is an a posteriori necessary truth, it is still ultimately 
incompatible with the epistemic gap. The inference from an epistemic gap to an ontic 
gap still stands. 
 The Apriority Thesis allows us to reject the Type-B theorist’s challenge to 
Primitivist arguments. Regarding CA, conceivability and possibility must coincide for an 
ideal subject. If ‘P→Q’ is necessary, then ‘P∧¬Q’ is inconceivable for an ideal subject. Of 
course, what we can conceive provides only a limited insight into what an ideal subject 
can conceive. As such, the Primitivist must be able to argue that an ideal subject would 
still face the epistemic gap. This much has already been conceded in connection with 
the Rudimentary Response to Primitivism (Chapter 1, Section 3.3.2.), but now we can 
appreciate its importance. Regarding KA, Mary is an ideal subject, so she should be in a 
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Note, there is no assumption that the ideal subject could provide any kind of analysis of their 
phenomenal terms/concepts here. It is possession of those concepts that is doing the real philosophical 
work. The argument is not committed to the view, advocated by Chalmers & Jackson, that if there is no 
conceptual analysis of ‘consciousness’ then there can be no a priori entailment from the physical to the 
phenomenal. 
18
Boutel (forthcoming) argues that regarding the reference-fixing facts as non-physical has surprisingly 
little effect on the debate. It would just require supplementing P with the non-physical reference-fixing 
facts, then asking whether their conjunction entails Q a priori. 
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position to know (some sub-set of) the psychophysical conditional a priori. But the 
Type-B theorist fails to cast doubt on the intuition that Mary learns something new – 
something that she could not determine a priori from her physical knowledge and her 
concept of phenomenal redness – on leaving her monochromatic prison. 
 The responses to the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps that I attributed to the Type-B 
theorist can also be rejected. If there is a necessary entailment from objective and 
structural truths to the phenomenal truths, then that entailment must be a priori for 
an appropriately informed subject. Our comprehension of the objective/subjective and 
structural/non-structural dichotomies indicates that no such entailment could be 
knowable a priori. In light of the Apriority Thesis, we can then conclude that no such 
entailment is necessary. It is these insights that justify the claim that an ideal subject 
would still find zombies and inverts conceivable, and that Mary would learn something 
new. 
 
2.3. IS CONSCIOUSNESS AN EXCEPTION TO THE APRIORITY OF ENTAILMENT? 
 
How might the Type-B theorist respond to the Argument for the Apriority Thesis? One 
option is to insist that a posteriori necessities are generally brute a posteriori 
necessities: that they are not generally knowable a priori for an ideal subject. Though 
there are some arguments for such a stance, engaging any further in that debate would 
be beyond the scope of this thesis. An alternative strategy for the Type-B theorist is to 
concede that the standard a posteriori necessities are knowable a priori, but to 
maintain that the psychophysical conditional is an exception to the rule. On this view, 
there is something distinctive about ‘P→Q’ that justifies the claim that it is a brute a 
posteriori necessity. This strategy comes in two forms. Necessitarian Dual Attribute 
Theory challenges the application of the Redescription Requirement to the 
psychophysical conditional. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy challenges the 
application of Semantic Rationalism.19 Both positions will be rejected. 
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The label ‘Phenomenal Concept Strategy’ is taken from Stoljar (2005). 
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2.3.1. Necessitarian Dual Attribute Theory 
This is the view that ‘…phenomenal properties are distinct from, but strongly 
determined (necessitated) by, physical properties.’ (Davies 2008, p.25) According to this 
proposal, ‘P→Q’ is a necessary truth, but it is not the case that ‘Q’ is a redescription of 
properties and states of affairs already captured by ‘P’. The claim is that the truth-
makers of Q are phenomenal properties – properties distinct from the truth-makers of 
P – but that physical properties necessitate their occurrence. There is a psychophysical 
‘law of metaphysics’ that is true in all possible worlds, but which is not knowable a 
priori.20 On this account, the first premise (AAT1) of the Argument for the Apriority 
Thesis is false. Without the premise that ‘P→Q’ is necessary only if ‘Q’ is a redescription 
of P, the conclusion that ‘P→Q’ is knowable a priori cannot be reached. 
 There are many reasons to be suspicious of this proposal.21 First, if there are no 
minimal physical duplicates of W* that differ from W* phenomenally, in what sense are 
the phenomenal and physical properties instantiated in W* distinct? Plausibly, being 
distinct from the physical requires not being necessitated by the physical. Second, this 
position concedes a great deal to Primitivism. It may rule out the metaphysical 
possibility of zombies and inverts, but it comes with the problematic costs associated 
with Primitivism. If phenomenal properties are distinct from physical properties, the 
causal closure of the physical suggests that they cannot be physically efficacious. The 
fact that the phenomenal is necessitated by the physical, rather than bound to it 
contingently, is not enough to avoid the threat of epiphenomenalism (Davies 2008, 
p.25). Third, positing a distinctive metaphysical necessitation between the physical and 
the phenomenal is ad hoc. Why should we accept that such laws of metaphysics exist, 
and why should we accept that such a law holds between the physical and the 
phenomenal? The familiar Kripkean cases do not provide any precedent for such a 
relation, so good reasons would need to be provided for accepting that the 
psychophysical conditional has a special status. Furthermore, how could we come to 
know such a necessary entailment when we only have a posteriori knowledge of our 
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I borrow the phrase ‘laws of metaphysics’ from Rosenberg’s (2004, p.68) critique of the view. 
21
It is quite plausible that this position is ‘emergentism’ by another name. Serious objections to 
emergentism are easy to come by (see especially Kim, 1989) and could be turned against the 
Necessitarian Dual Attribute Theory. 
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own world, plus broadly conceptual knowledge, at our disposal? Overall, the 
implausibility of the Necessitarian Dual Attribute Theory serves to make AAT1 all the 
more plausible. 
 
2.3.2. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
This position has received a great deal of attention. It holds that the epistemic gap can 
be explained in terms of the distinctive cognitive status of our phenomenal concepts, 
and that there is no need to posit primitive phenomenal properties in order to account 
for the gap (e.g. Loar 1990). This position comes in many forms, but the most relevant 
variant seeks to qualify Semantic Rationalism, which is the second premise of the 
Argument for the Apriority Thesis.22 The claim is that our phenomenal concepts – such 
as the concept of phenomenal redness – refer to physical properties. The psychological 
status of these concepts, however, means that no amount of physical knowledge would 
equip us to infer that our phenomenal and physical concepts co-refer. Many different 
accounts have been given of what this special psychological status is (for a useful 
review, see Chalmers 2007). We can illustrate the kind of account on offer with the 
example of Hill’s (1997) view that phenomenal and physical concepts belong to distinct 
psychological faculties. The concepts are deployed in modes of reasoning that cannot 
appropriately interact with one another, so even where our phenomenal and physical 
concepts co-refer, we are unable to recognise this. As Davies explains, on this kind of 
view we have ‘…a duality of concepts without a duality of properties’ (2008, p.3). 
 The strongest criticism of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy is offered by 
Chalmers (2007). In order to succeed, the strategy must account for our epistemic 
situation regarding consciousness, and to do so in purely physical terms. If the 
psychological story of our epistemic situation can be accounted for in physical terms, 
then a being like us in all physical respects should be in the same epistemic situation. 
Of course, our zombie twins are like us in all physical respects, but are they in the same 
epistemic situation as us regarding consciousness? Here the phenomenal concept 
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One of the other variants rejects the general application of the apriority of necessity, and uses the 
cognitive status of phenomenal concepts to account for our resistance to the psychophysical 
conditional, as discussed in Section 2.1. of this chapter. 
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strategist faces a dilemma. On the one hand, they could deny that zombies are in our 
epistemic situation. After all, being conscious plausibly plays an integral role in our 
musings on the epistemic gap. However, conceding that our zombie twins do not have 
our epistemic situation means conceding that our epistemic situation does not have a 
purely physical explanation. But if the correct account of our epistemic situation 
involves non-physical properties, it will be of no use to the Type-B theorist. On the 
other hand, one could claim that zombies are in our epistemic situation. However, as 
we have already discussed (Section 1.2 of this chapter), our having phenomenal states 
contributes to our epistemic situation regarding consciousness. To leave consciousness 
out of the epistemic story is to leave out what makes the epistemic gap so intractable. 
 This objection is sufficient to cast serious doubt on the phenomenal concept 
strategy, but it is worth noting that the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps encourage a 
further objection. Assume that there is a genuine disconnect between our phenomenal 
and physical concepts, such that we cannot extract their co-referentiality even in ideal 
epistemic circumstances. This would explain why we are incapable of deducing the 
instantiation of phenomenal properties from the instantiation of physical properties. 
However, the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps do not merely make the negative claim that 
we are unable to perform such a deduction. Rather, they make the positive claim that 
physical properties are the wrong kind of property to be the referent of our 
phenomenal concepts. Even if we did suffer from the kind of cognitive blockage 
proposed by the phenomenal concept strategist, this would not undermine our insight 
that subjective states cannot be nothing over and above objective states, or that non-
structural properties cannot be nothing over and above structural properties. These 
insights suggest that a being without the relevant cognitive blockage would still be 
faced with an epistemic gap.23 
Overall, the Type-B theorist fails to undermine the case for Primitivism. The 
appeal to a posteriori necessity promised to block the inference from an epistemic gap 
to ontic distinctness. However, a proper understanding of a posteriori necessities 
suggests that such an inference is still sound. This conclusion allows us to put forward 
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The spirit of this objection is captured in Rosenberg’s comment (2004, p.41) that we have a positive 
insight into why consciousness cannot be physical rather than a mere cognitive blind-spot. Also see 
Levine (2001, p.84). 
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our third and final criterion for a satisfactory response to the Problem of 
Consciousness. 
The A Priori Entailment Criterion: A defensible response to the Problem 
of Consciousness must respect that Physicalism is true iff the 
psychophysical conditional is knowable a priori for an ideal subject. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This completes our survey of the standard responses to the Problem of Consciousness. 
The discussion of these positions has revealed three plausible criteria that a 
satisfactory response to the problem must satisfy. The positions discussed each fail to 
meet one or other of these criteria. In the next chapter I will consider a more promising 
kind of response. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EPISTEMIC VIEW OF THE 
PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore Stoljar’s Epistemic View (EV) of the Problem of 
Consciousness. Though Stoljar’s arguments will be our primary focus, I will also 
mention other positions that complement EV. In particular, points made by McGinn 
and Strawson are informative, though the positions they advocate diverge from 
Stoljar’s (and from each other). EV claims that the phenomenal is not onticly distinct 
from the physical.1 The appearance of a deep epistemic gap, it suggests, is 
symptomatic of our limited conception of the physical world. If we were equipped with 
certain physical concepts that we currently lack, it would be possible for us to account 
for consciousness in physical terms. 
 EV presents us with a novel strategy for confronting the Problem of 
Consciousness. Section 1 identifies EV’s core claims and Section 2 argues that EV has 
significant prima facie promise. Section 3 concerns whether EV can live up to this 
promise and identifies the key obstacles to its successful implementation. I conclude 
that EV should be advocated iff it can satisfy two challenging conditions: the Relevance 
Condition and the Integration Condition. This lays the way for Chapter 4, in which I 
consider whether any version of EV is capable of satisfying these conditions. 
 
SECTION 1 
WHAT IS THE EPISTEMIC VIEW? 
 
This section explores the fundamental idea behind the Epistemic View. The first sub-
section identifies EV’s core commitments. The second clarifies what kind of ignorance 
                                                 
1
 In order to be consistent with conclusions reached in Chapters 1 and 2, I will not always follow Stoljar’s 
precise formulation of EV. Any divergences from Stoljar will be justified over the course of this chapter. 
[66] 
 
EV claims we are suffering from. The third explains how EV responds to the arguments 
for Primitivism. 
 
1.1. THE IGNORANCE HYPOTHESIS 
 
1.1.1. Ignorance and the Problem of Consciousness 
The Epistemic View revolves around a hypothesis about our epistemic situation 
regarding consciousness: the ignorance hypothesis (Stoljar 2006, p.6). This is the 
hypothesis that we are deeply ignorant of a type of physical fact integral to the 
explanation of consciousness. The ignorance hypothesis is relevant to the Problem of 
Consciousness, EV claims, because if we are indeed in that epistemic position then the 
problem would be solved. The suggestion is that the case for Primitivism can be 
defused by citing such ignorance. Primitivist arguments are founded on the apparent 
epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal. EV claims that this 
appearance is merely a reflection of our impoverished epistemic situation, and that for 
an appropriately informed subject there is no epistemic gap. If EV succeeds in 
undermining the case for Primitivism, it breaks the antinomy constitutive of the 
Problem of Consciousness. Stoljar advocates a sharp distinction between the two 
claims at work in EV: 
…we may formulate the epistemic view as the conjunction of two 
theses. The first is a conditional thesis linking the ignorance hypothesis 
and the problem of experience: 
E1. If the ignorance hypothesis is true, the problem of experience is 
solved. 
The second is the categorical thesis about the antecedent of this 
conditional: 
E2. The ignorance hypothesis is true. (2006, p.6) 
McGinn explains that if this kind of epistemic claim is true then, contrary to 
Primitivism, ‘[t]he world itself is as smoothly natural and seamless as one could wish; it 
is just that we lack the conceptual resources with which to discover its objective 
lineaments’ (2004, p.64). This position recognises that physical states necessitating 
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phenomenal states appears mysterious to us, but McGinn explains that ‘…the sense of 
deep mystery we have, which naturally expresses itself in ontological rhetoric, is really 
entirely epistemic; the mystery is relative to the human intellect as it attempts to come 
to terms with the problem’ (2004, p.64). 
 EV is perfectly compatible with our ignorance being relieved in the future.2 We 
might acquire the ‘missing concepts’ and find ourselves in a position to account for 
consciousness in physical terms. Our failure to appreciate this possibility can be 
diagnosed in terms of our implicit belief that our conception of the physical world is 
quite comprehensive. Strawson explains that ‘…the idea that the mind-body problem is 
particularly perplexing flows from our unjustified and relatively modern faith that we 
have an adequate grasp of the fundamental nature of matter at some crucial general 
level of understanding…’ (1994, p.105). It is this presupposition that EV seeks to 
challenge.  
 Does EV require our ignorance to be of the explanatory basis of consciousness, 
rather than of the phenomenal itself? According to Chomsky (2009), Priestley cited our 
ignorance of ‘perceptions’ in his response to the mind-body problem. However, a 
contemporary analog of this position would be implausible. Strawson explains that 
‘…our acquaintance with the experiential simply doesn’t leave room for us to make a 
mistake about its basic nature of such a fundamental kind that exposing the mistake 
could entirely dissolve the mind-body problem…’ (1994, p.99). As such, EV is 
specifically a claim about our ignorance of the physical side of the psychophysical 
conditional. 
 Stoljar presents EV in terms of the unknown truths being ‘non-experiential’ (i.e. 
non-phenomenal) truths rather than physical truths. This is motivated in part by his 
conclusion that the notion of ‘the physical’ plays an inessential role in formulating the 
target problem. My conclusions in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2) echo some of Stoljar’s 
concerns. There I argued for a minimal conception of the physical as non-phenomenal, 
so my use of ‘physical’ is not that different to Stoljar’s use of ‘non-experiential’. One 
reason, though, for preferring the term ‘physical’ is its connection with the causal 
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 EV is also compatible with McGinn’s (1989) claim that our ignorance is permanent, which we will 
discuss further in due course. 
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closure of the physical. The case against Primitivism suggested that if consciousness 
involves non-physical properties, consciousness cannot be causally efficacious in the 
physical realm. If a proponent of EV claimed that the truths of which we are ignorant 
are non-physical truths, then they would likely be faced with the same 
epiphenomenalist commitments. In other words, if EV is defensible then the unknown 
truths had better be physical truths: that is, truths about non-phenomenal events 
within the causally closed system of the physical. This justifies putting Stoljar’s 
preferences aside and formulating EV in terms of unknown physical truths. 
 
1.1.2. The Explanatory Value of EV 
EV seems pessimistic about how close we are to explaining consciousness, arguing that 
we do not even have the conceptual tools required to formulate such an explanation. 
However, EV is optimistic when it comes to solving the Problem of Consciousness, 
holding that the ignorance hypothesis solves the problem. Are these two claims 
compatible with one another? If we stay clear on what is required of a solution to the 
Problem of Consciousness, we should not be concerned that EV takes a negative view 
of the explanatory project (Stoljar 2006, pp.97-98). 
The project of explaining consciousness is an empirical problem, on a par with 
projects such as explaining global warming (Stoljar 2006, p.42). These problems are 
scientific rather than philosophical, and they are solved precisely when a scientific 
explanation of the phenomenon in question has been provided. The philosophical 
problem, as explored in Chapter 1, is a very different kind of problem that requires a 
very different kind of solution. This problem is based on the fact that consciousness 
appears to be inexplicable - that it seems the empirical project cannot possibly succeed 
- and is concerned with the metaphysical implications of this explanatory impasse. The 
various responses to this problem can be seen as philosophical explanations of the 
empirical explanatory problem. In other words, they are meta-explanations. 
 Of course, one way of solving the philosophical problem would be to explain 
consciousness, thus overcoming the empirical impasse that seemed philosophically 
perplexing. This is not, however, a requirement. McGinn explains that:  
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…to give a constructive solution would be to produce the property or 
theory that explains how the brain causes consciousness; but a non-
constructive solution requires only that we find reason to suppose that 
such a property or theory exists, whether we can produce it or not. 
(2004, p.61) 
As such, one can make a case for the explicability of consciousness without making a 
case for some specific explanation. The only thing the philosopher needs to explain is 
the appearance of inexplicability.  
Primitivists claim that consciousness appears inexplicable in physical terms 
because it really is inexplicable in physical terms, but EV offers an alternative 
explanation. Stoljar argues that ‘…a hypothesis about our current epistemic situation is 
the best explanation for the distinctively philosophical predicament we are confronted 
with when we think about experience’ (2006, p.10). EV attempts to explain away the 
apparent inexplicability of consciousness without attempting to explain consciousness. 
Our sense that there is an impassable epistemic gap merely reflects our own epistemic 
situation regarding consciousness, and does not reflect anything about its ontological 
status. If EV succeeds in explaining our philosophical predicament, we should no longer 
feel drawn to the competing views of the problem, such as Primitivism. Again, McGinn 
captures the situation succinctly: 
When we have the right explanation for our failure to solve the 
[empirical] problem we see why it is that the [other] options are not 
forced upon us, and thus we are relieved of the philosophical pressure 
they seem to exert. (2004, p.72) 
It remains to be seen whether EV succeeds in this, but there is nothing wrong in 
principle with offering arguments in favour of the explicability of consciousness in 
physical terms whilst denying that such an explanation is available to subjects with our 
limited conceptual resources. 
 
1.2. WHAT TYPE OF IGNORANCE? 
 
1.2.1. Shallow Ignorance vs. Conceptual Ignorance 
EV is obviously based on an epistemic claim, but it is important to be clear about what 
kind of epistemic claim it makes. Like most claims of ignorance, the ignorance 
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hypothesis asserts that there are propositions that we do not know. In this case, the 
propositions are those that describe the physical explanatory base of consciousness. 
There are two ways in which one might be ignorant of those propositions. First, one 
might be able to entertain the propositions in question, but be ignorant of their truth. 
Call this ‘shallow ignorance’. Second, one might lack the concepts required to entertain 
the propositions in question. As with shallow ignorance, conceptual ignorance involves 
there being propositions that you do not know are true. Unlike shallow ignorance, if 
you are in a state of conceptual ignorance you cannot even entertain those truths. A 
consequence of conceptual ignorance is that it makes us ignorant of an entire type of 
truth: specifically, the set of truths which we could only represent if we had the 
relevant missing concept (Stoljar 2006, p.69). EV specifically claims that we are 
suffering from conceptual ignorance. 
 Stoljar clarifies this with reference to Russell: ‘According to Russell, a blind 
person—that is, a person who by definition has not had the relevant experiences—is 
ignorant in a certain dramatic way about color’ (2006, p.69). Our ignorance of the 
physical truths essential to the explanation of consciousness is claimed to be akin to 
this. EV holds that we have a conceptual blind-spot, and that the properties occupying 
this blind-spot are integral to the generation of phenomenal states. Asking us for the 
physical explanation of consciousness would be analogous to asking the blind person 
what colour grass is: neither we nor they have the concepts required to entertain the 
answer to the question. 
 It is worth noting that the blind person might be able to use colour terms with 
some competence and might have concepts that refer to colours. Nevertheless, there 
remains an obvious sense in which the subject has no colour concepts. To make sense 
of this, we can deploy Foster’s (2008) distinction between opaque and transparent 
ways of knowing. Transparent knowledge tells you about the nature of a thing. Opaque 
knowledge tells you about a thing indirectly, but does not reveal its nature. The blind 
person may have an opaque knowledge of colour, but they do not know colour in a 
transparent way. EV hypothesises a failure of transparent knowledge. We may well 
have an indirect opaque knowledge of the hypothetical unknown physical properties, 
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but we have no concept of what those properties are. That is, we do not know those 
properties transparently.3 
 Conceptual ignorance is clearly much deeper than shallow ignorance. It is by 
making a claim of conceptual ignorance that EV attempts to improve upon the 
rudimentary response to Primitivism discussed in Chapter 1. The rudimentary response 
simply claimed that we do not yet have the correct theory of consciousness. The 
problem with this response was that it failed to do justice to the epistemic gap: a mere 
failure of explanation does not account for a compelling appearance of inexplicability. 
By contrast, EV’s appeal to conceptual ignorance is supposed to provide a serious 
explanation of why consciousness appears inexplicable in physical terms. To 
understand how a claim of conceptual ignorance could account for the appearance of 
inexplicability, we should consider Stoljar’s story of the slugs and the tiles. 
 
1.2.2. The Story of the Slugs 
Stoljar offers a useful analogy that sheds light on what the Epistemic View is proposing 
and why it is relevant to the Problem of Consciousness. The analogy is inspired by 
Jackson’s story of the sea slugs. Jackson asks us to imagine that we discover a race of 
intelligent sea slugs at the bottom of the ocean. He explains that:  
Despite their intelligence, these sea slugs have only a very restricted 
conception of the world by comparison with ours, the explanation for 
this being the nature of their immediate environment. Nevertheless, 
they have developed sciences which work surprisingly well in these 
restricted terms. (1982, p.135)  
The success of their science might lead some of these slugs to conclude that their 
science is in principle capable of explaining all natural phenomena, though from our 
perspective we know their conception of the world to be severely restricted. Jackson 
suggests we may be in a similar epistemic situation to the slugs, failing to realise that 
the explanation of consciousness is beyond our limited concepts. 
 Stoljar develops a related story that seeks to offer a more precise analogue of 
our proposed epistemic situation. He portrays a race of slugs that live on a mosaic 
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constructed from two sorts of tiles - triangles and ‘pie-pieces’ (i.e. segments of a 
circle). These tiles are configured to form a variety of shapes, but the slugs’ perceptual 
access to them is limited to two shape-detecting systems. One detects triangles and 
the other detects circles. Stoljar argues:  
…given their access to the mosaic, it would be natural for these slugs to 
think that, at least so far as the tiles of the mosaic are concerned, it was 
constituted only by triangles and circles—of course this is a mistake, but 
it would be a natural one in the situation. (2006, p.1) 
The slugs are conceptually ignorant of a certain type of truth: specifically, those that 
involve pie-piece tiles. Since it is truths of this type that explain the circle-truths, it 
would appear to the slugs that circles are primitives that are inexplicable in noncircular 
terms. Of course, this intuition would not be a reflection of metaphysical fact, but 
rather of their epistemic limitations. Perhaps the appearance that consciousness is 
onticly basic can similarly be explained in terms of our epistemic failings, rather than in 
terms of the world’s actual ontic constitution.4 
 Stoljar extends the analogy with the idea of a slug monist who claims that 
circles must be reducible to triangles. This reductive project would inevitably fail, just 
like that of Physicalist Reductionism about consciousness (see Chapter 2, Section 1.1). 
The opponent of the slug monist would hold that circles are irreducible in principle, in 
much the same way as the Primitivist about consciousness does. Of course, both 
camps are mistaken. An account of the circular in noncircular terms is possible, but not 
in terms of triangles. Instead, the correct account would involve the pie-piece tiles, of 
which the slugs have no concept. Following the analogy through, perhaps an account 
of consciousness in physical terms is possible, though not within the parameters of our 
current conception of the physical world. We could only explain consciousness if we 
were to acquire some analogue of the pie-piece concept: some consciousness-relevant 
physical concept. 
It is worth noting that the slugs’ conceptual ignorance of pie-pieces only gets 
them into trouble because of the role the pie-pieces in fact play in the constitution of 
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 The slugs may well have an opaque conception of the pie-piece tiles. For instance, they have the 
concept ‘tile’ which includes pie-piece tiles in its extension. This modest kind of knowledge is quite 
consistent with them having no transparent knowledge of the pie-piece tiles.    
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circles. Being conceptually ignorant need not always generate philosophical puzzles 
analogous to the Problem of Consciousness. Rather, such ignorance only causes 
trouble when the unknown properties are appropriately integral to the explanation of 
the target phenomenon. As such, EV is not committed to predicting deep philosophical 
problems wherever we suffer from conceptual ignorance. Overall, the story of the 
slugs helps us clarify what kind of ignorance EV hypothesises, and how that ignorance 
could be relevant to solving the Problem of Consciousness. 
 
1.2.3. Missing Concepts vs. Misconceptions 
EV claims that our current conception of the physical is impoverished - that there are 
physical properties for which we are missing any concept. The claim that our current 
conception of the physical is incomplete should not be confused with the claim that we 
currently misconceive the physical in some way. There are at least two positions which 
hold that the apparent Problem of Consciousness is symptomatic of our misconception 
of the physical. Neither position is convincing, and they should be carefully 
distinguished from EV. 
 The first position takes the Problem of Consciousness to make essential use of 
the notion ‘physical’, and claims that our conception of the physical is faulty. Chomsky 
argues that ‘[t]he mind-body problem can be posed sensibly only insofar as we have a 
definite conception of body. If we have no such definite or fixed conception, we cannot 
ask whether some phenomena fall beyond its range’ (quoted Stoljar 2006, p.54). He 
suggests that since ‘[t]he Cartesians offered a fairly definite conception of body in 
terms of their contact mechanics…they could sensibly formulate the mind-body 
problem.’ (quoted Stoljar 2006, p.54) Today, however, we have no such substantive 
conception. More recently, Chomsky has argued that ‘…the concept “physical facts” 
means nothing more than what the best current scientific theory postulates hence 
should be seen as a rhetorical device of clarification, adding no substantive content’ 
(2009, p.199). This encourages a skeptical stance towards the so-called Problem of 
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Consciousness: on this view, the question of whether Physicalism about consciousness 
is true has no real content, so the problem cannot even get off the ground.5  
 How does the skeptical position differ from EV? EV does not claim that the 
concept ‘physical’ is a broken concept. Missing certain physical concepts does not 
entail a misconception of the physical any more than missing a concept of kumquat 
entails a misconception of fruit. The temptation to conflate EV and the skeptical stance 
is exacerbated by Chomsky reporting some sympathy for EV. He appears to present 
two different stances on the problem: ‘[t]here is no reason to believe that humans can 
solve every problem they pose or even that they can formulate the right questions...’ 
(2009, p.185). EV advocates something close to the first stance – we cannot, with our 
current conceptual repertoire, solve the empirical problem of explaining 
consciousness. EV is not, however, committed to the more radical second approach 
according to which the explanatory project, and so the philosophical problem it 
generates, is somehow misconceived. 
Why not put EV aside and adopt the skeptical position? The key failing of the 
skeptical stance is that it over-estimates the role that physical theory plays in 
formulating the Problem of Consciousness. As I argued in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2.), 
understanding ‘the physical’ in terms of physical theory is indeed problematic. 
However, to motivate the problem we need only conceive the physical as non-
phenomenal and causally closed. As such, Chomsky’s aforementioned analysis of 
‘physical facts’ is either false, or irrelevant to the sense of ‘physical facts’ that drives 
the problem.6 
 There is a second possible position according to which the Problem of 
Consciousness reflects our misconception of the physical, though this position does 
not have any unequivocal exponents. It is the view that our concept of ‘the physical’ as 
such is not at fault, but our particular concepts of physical properties are problematic. 
The claim is that we need to reconceptualise the physical world in a way that allows 
the phenomenal to be accommodated. Nagel advocates something along these lines, 
arguing that ‘…we need new intellectual tools, and that it is precisely by reflection on 
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 Other advocates of this stance include Crane and Mellor (1990). 
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 Stoljar (2006, Chapter 3) rejects the skeptical stance in a slightly different way, though this is mainly 
due to a difference in terminology rather than any real divergence from the objection just presented. 
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what appears impossible…that we will be forced to create such tools’ (1986, p.52).7 
Chomsky (2009) also presents arguments that complement this conclusion rather than 
the general skepticism discussed above. On this view, our current physical concepts 
distort the true nature of physical reality. Only when these concepts are replaced by 
better concepts will we be able to account for consciousness in physical terms. 
 This is not the kind of speculation with which EV should be concerned. Not only 
does EV allow that our concept of ‘the physical’ is sound, it allows that all our current 
physical concepts are in good working order. EV simply claims that we could only 
explain consciousness if these physical concepts were supplemented by new physical 
concepts that filled-in our current blind-spots. Acquiring the relevant missing concepts 
need not alter our current physical concepts any more than acquiring a concept of 
kumquat would alter your concept of apples. 
 The reason we should not put EV aside in favour of the reconceptualisation 
approach is that it is not clear that there is anything wrong with our existing physical 
concepts. Why should we believe that when we use concepts like ‘electron’ and ‘mass’ 
we misconceive the physical world? The fact that we cannot explain consciousness 
using such concepts does not give us reason to believe that they misrepresent the 
world. Furthermore, why believe that any reconceptualisation could open the way for 
a physical explanation of consciousness? It is implausible that there could be concepts 
that achieve everything our current physical concepts achieve and somehow allow us 
to account for subjective qualitative awareness. This is not the kind of speculation we 
should take seriously, and has little relevance to EV. The ignorance hypothesis is 
concerned with what we know about the physical world rather than how we think 
about it: it claims that there are physical properties of which we are conceptually 
ignorant, not that we need to think about familiar physical properties in a new way. 
 
1.2.4. Basic vs. Intermediate Ignorance 
There is an intuitive idea that the physical world can be divided into levels. Physics, for 
instance, is thought to deal with the bottom level while astronomy deals with a much 
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 Nagel (1986) also argues that a reconceptualisation of the phenomenal is required, though McGinn 
(1989) offers convincing objections to Nagel’s reflections on this.  
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higher level. Drawing on this notion, Stoljar makes the following distinction: 
Basic-level ignorance is ignorance of a truth concerning a particular 
element of nature or a basic fact of the world. Intermediate-level 
ignorance is ignorance of a truth that is not itself basic but is 
determined by the basic facts. (2006, p.72) 
Stoljar claims that EV is neutral on whether we suffer from basic-level ignorance or 
intermediate-level ignorance.8 I claim that we should take EV to be committed to our 
suffering from basic-level ignorance. Bennett (2009) argues persuasively that EV 
should not rest on a claim of intermediate-level ignorance. Take it that the C-truths are 
the basic truths, the A-truths are of a higher level and the B-truths mediate between 
them. Bennett asks us to imagine a subject ‘Iggy’ who knows the C-truths and wrongly 
believes that the C-truths do not entail the A-truths (2009, p.768). If his ignorance of B-
truths is responsible for his error, we are left with the further question of ‘…why he 
mistakenly thinks it is possible for the B-truths to vary independently of the C-truths.’ 
(2009, p.769)  
If the explanation of Iggy’s error is that he is ignorant of a particular type of C-
truth relevant to the B-truths, then his original mistake is ultimately down to basic-
level ignorance. If Iggy is ignorant of some fundamental principle that governs how C-
entities combine to form B-entities, this would again be a case of basic-level ignorance 
since the principle itself is basic (Bennett 2009, p.768). If the error is to do with Iggy 
not thinking things through adequately, or to do with the brute a posteriori character 
of the entailment from C-states to B-states, this would just be a reiteration of the 
standard Type-A and Type-B positions we have already rejected. Overall, it is not clear 
that intermediate-level ignorance could explain modal errors without collapsing into a 
claim of basic-level ignorance or into something akin to one of EV’s failed 
competitors.9 
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 Though the story of the slugs is a case of basic-level ignorance, Stoljar provides an illustration of 
intermediate-level ignorance involving intelligent moths (2006, pp.73-74).  
9
 As Bennett (2009, pp.769-770) and Stoljar (2009, p.781) observe, this issue for intermediate-level 
ignorance is related to the debate surrounding the apriority of the psychophysical conditional. We will 
see in Section 1.3.2 that Stoljar’s take on apriority is different to ours, which might explain his openness 
to a hypothesis of intermediate-level ignorance. 
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1.3. EV AND THE ARGUMENTS FOR PRIMITIVISM 
 
So far, we have considered what EV consists in and outlined how the ignorance 
hypothesis could cast doubt on the apparent inexplicability of consciousness in 
physical terms. It is worth spelling out how EV addresses the arguments for Primitivism 
as outlined in Chapter 1. This should make it clear why one would claim that if the 
ignorance hypothesis is true, then the Problem of Consciousness is solved. Nothing so 
far is intended to justify EV’s further claim that the ignorance hypothesis is in fact true. 
That will be considered in due course. 
 
1.3.1. EV’s General Response to Primitivism 
As discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 2.1), arguments for Primitivism involve two key 
stages: the epistemic step and the ontic step. EV casts doubt on the epistemic step. It 
claims that the apparent epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal is 
an illusion symptomatic of our limited conception of the physical. This respects the 
ontological conditional that if there is an epistemic gap then there is an ontic gap, but 
it rejects the antecedent of that conditional. EV is thus a Type-A position.10 In our 
initial discussion of the Type-A approach, we saw that the Type-A theorist must be able 
to explain why there appears to be an impassable epistemic gap between the physical 
and the phenomenal. EV has an intriguing response to this challenge. 
 EV can respect the fact that there is an epistemic gap between the-physical-as-
we-conceive-it and the phenomenal. It is true that the types of fact that can be 
captured by our current conception of the physical are not the types of fact that could 
possibly entail the phenomenal facts. What EV denies is that there is an epistemic gap 
between the-physical-as-such and the phenomenal. If we had the hypothetical missing 
concepts – if all the types of physical fact relevant to the explanation of consciousness 
were available to us – there would no longer appear to be an epistemic gap. The 
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 EV could also be characterised as a Type-C position. According to Type-C positions ‘…there is a deep 
epistemic gap between the physical and phenomenal domains, but it is closable in principle.’ (Chalmers 
2002, p.257). However, Chalmers goes on to explain that Type-C positions generally  ‘…collapse into one 
of the other views on the table…’ (2002, p.258). Since it is clear that EV is ultimately a kind of Type-A 
position, the ‘Type-C’ label is superfluous. 
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reason we have the intuition that the physical-as-such cannot be responsible for 
consciousness is our implicit belief that there is no difference between the physical-as-
we-conceive-it and the physical-as-such. We fail to acknowledge the possibility that we 
have a limited conception of the physical. We take it is a given that there are no types 
of physical fact beyond our current conception, or at least that we have enough of a 
grip on what any new type of fact would be like that we can be sure they are irrelevant 
to consciousness. Of course, according to EV this assumption is mistaken. We are like 
the slugs who mistakenly assume that the noncircular tiles to which they have access 
are the only kind of noncircular tile. 
 We previously noted that the rudimentary response to Primitivism can be 
countered by arguing that more of the same won’t do – that more of the same kind of 
physical discovery will inevitably leave the epistemic gap untouched. Again, EV can 
respect this insight since further discoveries that deploy only our current physical 
concepts will inevitably yield the wrong kind of physical fact to close the epistemic gap. 
However, according to EV more of something different might allow the gap to be 
closed. The unknown physical truths relevant to EV are precisely not the kind of truth 
with which we are familiar. We only believe that no future discoveries could close the 
gap because we have a limited grasp on the kind of physical truths that such 
discoveries could disclose. 
 Of course, the arguments for Primitivism do not just state that there is an 
epistemic gap. They deploy various considerations designed to reveal that gap. 
Whatever consideration is deployed, EV’s response is the same: for a subject with a 
relevantly complete conception of the physical, the consideration would have no force. 
As such, those considerations only have a grip on us because we erroneously take our 
limited conception of the physical to be relevantly complete. 
 
1.3.2. Stoljar on EV and A Priori Entailment 
It is worth noting that Stoljar has a different take on the status of EV. He recommends 
not taking a stance on whether the psychophysical conditional is an a priori truth or an 
a posteriori truth (2006, p.197). On this view, EV is not specifically directed at 
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challenging the epistemic gap. Stoljar claims that undermining our resistance to the 
psychophysical conditional has little to do with whether it is a priori or a posteriori, and 
that EV is the best way of undermining our resistance either way. As such, EV is neutral 
between Type-A and Type-B views. We have seen how EV could lend support to a 
Type-A view, but how could it help the Type-B view? Stoljar notes that if the 
psychophysical conditional is an a posteriori necessity, this alone would not explain 
why the psychophysical conditional appears to be contingent (2006, p.196). Additional 
claims are required to undermine the appearance of contingency (as we discussed in 
Chapter 2). Stoljar claims that standard attempts to provide the requisite additions fail, 
and that the ignorance hypothesis is the best way of explaining our mistaken belief 
that the psychophysical conditional is not necessary. 
Though Stoljar’s arguments raise some important points, I think it is 
appropriate to regard EV as a Type-A position. To justify this conclusion, we must 
address some of Stoljar’s comments. First, Stoljar claims that the debate over (what we 
are calling) the Apriority Thesis is irrelevant to the plausibility of EV. It is not clear that 
this is true. If proponents of EV allow the possibility that the psychophysical 
conditional is a posteriori, this would open the flood gates to a wide range of Type-B 
positions to compete with EV. Stoljar argues that such positions fail (2006, Ch.9). 
However, it is hard to provide conclusive objections to these positions on a one-to-one 
basis. The Apriority Thesis provides the all-purpose objection that no version of Type-B 
position is satisfactory, and without this EV will have difficulty ruling out all the other 
Type-B proposals.11 Dialectically speaking, EV is thus better off respecting the Apriority 
Thesis and identifying itself with the Type-A camp. 
Second, Stoljar claims that the arguments for the Apriority Thesis are 
inconclusive (2006, p.197). We can agree with Stoljar that the issues here are 
especially wide-reaching and controversial. Nevertheless, we have an argument in 
favour of the Apriority Thesis, and Stoljar does not offer any explicit objections to that 
kind of argument. Given our commitment to the A Priori Entailment Criterion for a 
satisfactory response to the Problem of Consciousness, we are justified in considering 
only those versions of EV that promise to satisfy that criterion. Even if EV does have 
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 An objection along these lines is persuasively made by Papineau (2007). 
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the potential to remain neutral between Type-A and Type-B positions, we have 
independent reason to prefer a Type-A version of EV.12 
  Third, Stoljar argues that EV must be sharply distinguished from standard 
Type-A positions, and that those standard positions are mistaken (2006, Chapter 10). 
Here we can simply agree with Stoljar. In Chapter 2 (Section 1) we saw how traditional 
Type-A positions fail, and in this chapter we have seen that EV promotes a quite 
different strategy. However, this conclusion is compatible with understanding EV as a 
distinctive form of Type-A theory. EV – or at least the best version of EV – denies that 
there is an epistemic gap. This qualifies EV as a Type-A theory regardless of how 
different it is to the other positions in the Type-A camp. Overall, we should evaluate EV 
as an attempt to undermine the epistemic step in the arguments for Primitivism. 
 
1.3.3. EV and the Conceivability Argument 
Can we really conceive of zombies and inverts? EV suggests we cannot. We do not 
have the conceptual resources required to imagine a being like us in all physical 
respects, or even to imagine a being like us in all those physical respects relevant to 
consciousness. As such, we cannot fully conceive of a being like us in all physical 
respects but which differs from us phenomenally. Why, then, do we think that we can 
conceive of zombies and inverts? In our original exposition of conceivability tests 
(Chapter 1, Section 2.2.1) we identified two of the standard ways in which 
conceivability tests might misfire: proposition confusion and mode confusion. EV 
makes it plausible that we are making one or other (or both) of these mistakes when 
we claim to conceive of zombies or inverts (Stoljar 2006, pp.80-82). 
 Proposition confusion is where you conceive of some possible scenario p but 
believe you are conceiving some other scenario q. If p is possible and q is impossible, 
this will lead you into a modal error. According to EV, we may well be able to conceive 
of beings like us in all those physical respects captured by our current conception of 
the physical, but who differ from us phenomenally. After all, EV accepts that the 
physical-as-we-conceive-it cannot entail phenomenal states. The mistake comes with 
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claims that respecting that thesis is an important virtue of his position. 
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our belief that such an imaginative act constitutes conceiving of a being like as in all 
physical respects but different from us phenomenally. We confuse imagining partial 
physical replicas with imagining complete physical replicas. EV suggests that if we really 
did imagine a complete physical replica of ourselves – if we had the conceptual 
resources to factor in all the physical properties relevant to consciousness – then we 
would find it inconceivable for that replica to differ from us phenomenally. 
 Mode confusion occurs when you believe that you are strongly conceiving of p 
when in fact you are only weakly conceiving of p. Since weak conceivability does not 
entail possibility, this confusion can lead to modal error. Strong conceivability demands 
a substantive grasp on the scenario you imagine but, according to EV, we do not 
possess the conceptual resources to have such a grasp on the zombie or invert 
scenarios. It may well be that we entertain those scenarios and no contradiction occurs 
to us, but this would merely be a case of weak conceivability. The belief that this 
superficial reflection is a case of strong conceivability is what leads us into error. EV 
claims that if we really were strongly conceiving of a physical replica, we would find it 
inconceivable for them to differ from us phenomenally.  
 Stoljar points out that it is quite plausible that if EV is true then both kinds of 
error are at work when we take ourselves to conceive of zombies or inverts (2006, 
p.82). It need not be just one or the other. By citing these standard errors, EV avoids 
an implausible general skepticism about using conceivability tests as a guide to 
metaphysical possibility. Instead, EV makes it plausible that CA misfires in a way that 
conceivability tests often misfire. As McGinn explains, ‘[o]ur modal faculty naturally 
goes haywire in the conceptual vacuum generated by our ignorance’ (2004, p.51).  
Stoljar illustrates his proposal with the story of the slugs (2006, p.81). It is 
plausible that the ignorant slugs would claim to be able to conceive a mosaic identical 
to the actual mosaic in all noncircular respects but which lacks circles. However, it is 
clear that for a slug with a concept of the pie-piece tiles this scenario would be 
inconceivable. The ignorant slugs could be misled by proposition confusion: they 
confuse conceiving of a mosaic like the actual mosaic in all triangular respects with 
conceiving of a mosaic like the actual mosaic in all noncircular respects. Furthermore, 
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where the slugs claim to be able to strongly conceive of the mosaic like the actual 
mosaic in all noncircular respects, they only really have the conceptual resources to 
weakly conceive that scenario. 
 
1.3.4. EV and the Knowledge Argument 
EV claims that when we reflect on the Mary scenario, we are guilty of the same kind of 
mistake as we are with CA (Stoljar 2006, pp.82-83). Our intuitions about the Mary 
scenario would be askew if we had no grasp of a type of physical truth integral to the 
explanation of consciousness. We imagine Mary acquiring a wealth of physical 
knowledge far beyond our own but, plausibly, we imagine that the truths she learns 
are the same type of physical truth that we know i.e. that they do not involve the 
instantiation of any physical properties beyond our current conception. The pseudo-
Mary we imagine would indeed be unable to infer the phenomenal truths from the 
physical truths. But we are not in a position to conclude that Mary-proper would be in 
the same situation. According to EV, Mary-proper would have knowledge of a type of 
physical truth beyond our current conception, and she would not learn anything new 
on leaving her room. 
 Here our mistake could be in taking ourselves to have a firm insight into Mary-
proper when really we only have a firm insight into pseudo-Mary. This would be a form 
of proposition confusion. Alternatively, we might take ourselves to have a firm insight 
into Mary-proper when really we have only a partial insight into what her complete 
physical knowledge would involve. This mistake would be analogous to mode 
confusion. Stoljar notes that it is a virtue of EV that here it ‘…provides a unified 
treatment of CA and KA’ (2006, p.82). 
 Again, the slugs shed light on things. It would plausibly appear to the slugs that 
it is possible for a ‘superslug’ to know all the noncircular truths and yet come to learn 
the circular truths separately. When reflecting on the superslug, they might imagine a 
slug with complete knowledge of the triangle truths, and they would be right in 
believing that such a slug would be unable to establish the circle truths a priori. But 
this would not be to imagine a genuine superslug. The genuine superslug would have a 
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concept of pie-piece tiles, and would be able to infer the circle truths from the 
noncircular truths. If a slug insists that this is not the case, it is only because they take 
themselves to have a better grasp than they really do on the epistemic situation of the 
superslug. 
 Our account of the case for Primitivism in Chapter 1 went beyond CA and KA. 
There we concluded that these two standard arguments should be supplemented by 
an appeal to the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps. In order to undermine the case for 
Primitivism, EV must therefore address those two conceptual gaps. The options for EV 
here are clear. Regarding the –tivity gap, the first option is to claim that there are 
unknown types of objective truth integral to the physical explanation of the 
subjectivity of conscious states. The second option is to claim that the unknown 
physical truths are subjective, so the gap between the objective and the subjective 
does not apply to the psychophysical conditional. Regarding the –trinsicality gap, 
parallel options are available. Either the unknown properties are extrinsic properties 
relevant to explaining the intrinsic properties of conscious states, or they are intrinsic 
properties and the –trinsicality gap no longer applies. I will postpone full discussion of 
this important issue until Section 3.2. 
 
SECTION 2 
WHY IS THE EPISTEMIC VIEW WORTHY OF ATTENTION? 
 
Before we evaluate whether EV can be implemented in a satisfactory way, there is 
more to say about why it is an attractive strategy. In this section I will consider the key 
virtues of EV. This discussion will also serve to clarify EV’s relationship to existing 
responses to the Problem of Consciousness. 
 
2.1. THE THREE CRITERIA OF SUCCESS 
In Chapter 2 I argued for three criteria that a satisfactory response to the Problem of 
Consciousness must meet: the Physicalist Criterion, the Phenomenal Realism Criterion 
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and the A Priori Entailment Criterion. The attractiveness of EV lies in its promise of 
satisfying all three of these criteria. EV protects the psychophysical conditional, and so 
advocates a form of Physicalism. It promises to achieve this whilst leaving our 
understanding of consciousness untouched, meaning there is no risk of it denying the 
existence of phenomenal states. Finally, it is consistent with the psychophysical 
conditional being a priori for an appropriately informed subject. This suggests that EV 
has a significant potential advantage over existing attempts to respond to the problem, 
and deserves to be taken seriously.  
Primitivism, standard Type-A positions and Type-B positions are each capable of 
satisfying two of the three criteria, but only at the expense of the remaining condition. 
This puts EV in a strong dialectical position. The three criteria are plausible conditions 
and, all things being equal, we should prefer a response that allows us to 
accommodate all of those conditions over any response that asks us to reject one or 
other of them.13 It is worth noting that this advantage does not presuppose that the 
three conditions are completely beyond question: the claim is simply that they are 
highly plausible, and that a sound methodology would suggest we only compromise 
one of them once the possibility of respecting all three has been ruled out. If EV cannot 
be ruled out, we have reason to prefer it over the more radical positions on the table. 
In light of its promise to respect all three criteria, EV has the potential to talk 
across major divisions in the debate surrounding consciousness. It is one thing for a 
response to seem plausible to a disinterested party, but quite another for it to 
persuade those who are entrenched in one or other of the pre-existing categories of 
response. Hardcastle, in her review of Stoljar, argues that we should judge a proposal 
by ‘…how well it would convince those on the other side of the ideological divide…’, 
advising that ‘[o]ne must speak across the divide, not sing platitudes to the choir’ 
(2008, p.274). She then goes on to make a somewhat uncharitable case against EV’s 
success in this respect, but on closer consideration it appears that EV shows great 
promise here. 
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 In his earlier formulation of EV, Stoljar argues that this ‘accommodationism’ is an important  virtue of 
his position, though the criteria he claims to accommodate are slightly different to ours (2001, pp.278-
9). 
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An initial benefit of EV is that it does not ask advocates of the competing 
positions to compromise on the key principles that motivate those positions. Roughly 
speaking, advocates of the standard positions are happy to sacrifice one of the three 
criteria of success because they believe that the other two criteria must be protected, 
and that protecting them requires rejecting the remaining criterion. Whichever of the 
criteria an existing position respects, EV can respect them too but without having to 
reject any of them. As such, if advocates of the competing positions defect to EV, it is 
likely they can take their driving philosophical principles with them. 
A further benefit of EV is that, though it diverges from the standard responses 
to the problem, it displays something of the spirit of each of them. Again, this helps EV 
to talk across some deep philosophical divides. First, regarding Primitivism, we should 
note Chalmers’s claim that ‘…to bring consciousness within the scope of a fundamental 
theory, we need to introduce new fundamental properties…’ (1996, p.126). EV has 
some sympathy with this claim, agreeing that the ontology provided by our current 
conception of the physical cannot account for consciousness. EV just disagrees with 
Primitivism on what the new properties must be like (Stoljar 2006, p.101). It claims 
that the new properties are physical rather than experiential properties. This link to 
Primitivism might give EV some dialectical purchase. Furthermore, it puts the burden 
of proof on the Primitivist to show why the new properties must be experiential. 
Type-A theorists who appeal to the explanatory potential of future science 
should feel at home with the related, though more sophisticated, position put forward 
by EV. There is no deep divide to talk across here. Reductionist versions of the Type-A 
view have a more subtle connection to EV. The Problem of Consciousness involves the 
physical, the phenomenal and the relation between them. EV and Reductionism agree 
that looking into the entailment relation is not what will solve the problem. Rather, 
they claim we must reflect on the relata, and that adequate reflection will undermine 
the appearance that there is an epistemic gap between them. Where Reductionists 
assume it is the phenomenal relatum that needs sorting out, EV claims that we must 
consider our understanding of the physical relatum. As Lockwood explains, ‘…in 
reflecting on the relation of consciousness to the matter of the brain, philosophers 
have been apt to take matter for granted, assuming that it is mind rather than matter 
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that is philosophically problematic’ (1989, p.ix).  EV challenges that assumption, and 
encourages Reductionists to take an alternative path to reconciling the two sides of 
the epistemic gap – a path that does not rest on a dubious analysis of consciousness or 
risk collapsing into Eliminativism. EV agrees with the Reductionist that we cannot really 
conceive of zombies and inverts, and that Mary would not really learn something new. 
It just disagrees about which side of the apparent epistemic gap is responsible for our 
confusion. Overall, EV has some potential dialectical force when addressing standard 
Type-A theorists. 
A central assertion of the Type-B view is that claims of conceivability are a 
limited guide to what is possible. EV agrees with this and holds that when we claim to 
conceive of zombies or inverts we are guilty of certain standard errors in modal 
reasoning. Some Type-B theorists claim that conceivability is never a good test for 
possibility, but EV denies this general claim. Gertler explains that according to EV ‘[a] 
local modal fallibilism is all that’s required to defuse the problem of experience, on this 
view; a global modal skepticism is unnecessary.’ (2009, p.385) Other Type-B theorists 
claim that there is something distinctive to consciousness that leads our modal 
reasoning astray. EV agrees with this, but claims that the source of the error is our 
ignorance of the physical, not the peculiarities of our phenomenal concepts. 
Nevertheless, EV has some relevant overlap with the Type-B view. 
Of course, in emphasising the various respects in which EV sympathises with 
existing positions we should not lose sight of its originality. EV offers a quite distinctive 
account of how we should respond to the problem. Where new variants on existing 
positions each attempt to plug the holes in a sinking ship, EV offers us a whole new 
boat. This is important because it is plausible that the right solution will not be 
achieved by making small adjustments to unpersuasive positions, but rather by 
pursuing an altogether different kind of strategy.14 
                                                 
14
 Stoljar emphasises that one of the respects in which EV differs from standard responses is that it does 
not assume that ‘all the relevant facts are in [and] we just need to think through those facts’ (2006, 
p.143). This is, however, misleading. EV claims we lack the information needed to explain consciousness, 
but it does not claim that we lack the information needed to respond to the Problem of Consciousness. 
We have, for instance, information about how ignorance leads modal reasoning astray. In this sense, EV 
is like other positions in claiming that a solution to the problem requires us to think through the facts we 
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2.2. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT 
 
Stoljar argues at length that there are historical cases in which our conceptual 
ignorance has led to philosophical difficulties analogous to the Problem of 
Consciousness (2006, pp.123-141). In those cases, an extension of our conceptual 
repertoire made available a new type of fact that allowed the apparent problem to be 
dissolved. Such cases illustrate that conceptual ignorance can indeed generate an 
illusion of ontic distinctness. Though this has already been illustrated by the slug 
thought experiment, finding real-life examples puts EV on firmer footing. They serve to 
show that if we are in a situation analogous to those historical cases, then we would 
wrongly believe that consciousness is onticly distinct from the physical. Of course, this 
does not give us any reason to believe that we really are in such a situation, but the 
live possibility of our being so encourages us to take EV seriously.  
 The two historical cases that Stoljar draws on are the explanation of intellectual 
abilities, as explored by Descartes, and the explanation of chemical bonding, as 
explored by C. D. Broad. The first of these has the appeal of, like the Problem of 
Consciousness, being a variant of the mind-body problem. However, Stoljar’s depiction 
of this rests on a questionable interpretation of Descartes’ positionFurthermore, it 
presents a putative case of intermediate-level ignorance. Since we have already 
concluded that the ignorance hypothesis should be understood as a claim of basic-
level ignorance, the example will not be useful to us.  
The second example, though more distant from the subject matter of the 
Problem of Consciousness, offers a more convincing example of the relevant epistemic 
situation. Broad explains that: 
Oxygen has certain properties and Hydrogen has certain other 
properties. They combine to form water, and the proportions in which 
they do this are fixed. Nothing that we know about Oxygen by itself or 
in its combinations with anything but Hydrogen would give us the least 
reason to suppose that it would combine with Hydrogen at all. Nothing 
                                                                                                                                               
already know rather than making new discoveries. We just need to be careful to distinguish the facts 
relevant to the philosophical problem from the facts relevant to the empirical problem. 
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that we know about Hydrogen by itself or in its combination with 
anything but Oxygen would give us the least reason to expect that it 
would combine with Oxygen at all...Here we have a clear instance of a 
case where, so far as we can tell, the properties of a whole composed 
of two constituents could not have been predicted from a knowledge of 
the properties of those constituents taken separately, or from this 
combined with a knowledge of other wholes which contain these 
constituents. (quoted Stoljar 2006, p.135) 15 
Broad thinks that the chemical properties of Oxygen and Hydrogen are not entailed by 
their mechanical properties. In other words, he thinks that the chemical facts are 
inexplicable in terms of the non-chemical. This leads him to the emergentist conclusion 
that the chemical facts are distinct from the non-chemical facts. Broad offers reasoning 
analogous to the knowledge argument here, observing that knowing the mechanical 
facts is not enough to infer the chemical facts.16 Broad is plausibly conceptually 
ignorant of the quantum-mechanical properties that we now know explain the 
chemical properties. Stoljar appeals to McLaughlin’s study of emergentism in which he 
states  ‘…its rise was not due to “philosophical mistakes,” nor its fall to the uncovering 
of such mistakes. ... Advances in science, not philosophical criticism, led to the fall of 
British emergentism.’ (quoted Stoljar 2006, p.140).17 
 The relevance to EV is clear. Broad’s conceptual ignorance led to the 
appearance of an ontological gap between two kinds of property that are in fact 
seamlessly connected. More specifically, it led him to support something analogous to 
KA, citing the impossibility of inferring the chemical facts from a complete knowledge 
of the constituent elements. It is also easy to imagine Broad finding an analogue of CA 
convincing too. Though Broad’s arguments seemed convincing to him and his 
contemporaries, they were mistaken. Stoljar draws the following lesson from this:  
Just as the chemical argument was plausible to him, so the knowledge 
argument is plausible to us. Just as it is mistaken to follow the chemical 
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 Interestingly, the motivation for Broad’s exploration of the metaphysics of chemistry is to establish 
analogies with the metaphysics of mind. 
16
 A few passages later Broad introduces the notion of a ‘mathematical archangel’ in an argument 
recognised as a predecessor to the Knowledge Argument (Stoljar 2006, pp.136-7). 
17
 Chomsky claims that Stoljar’s account of Broad’s ‘…is somewhat misleading.’ (2009, p.199) Chomsky 
argues that quantum-mechanical discoveries changed the meaning of ‘physical facts’. However, he fails 
to show that the discoveries really did bring about a semantic shift, rather than an epistemic shift. He 
also seems to overstate how important the concept ‘physical’ is to Broad’s metaphysical conclusions 
concerning the status of chemistry. 
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argument to its conclusion, so it is mistaken to follow the knowledge 
argument to its conclusion. Finally, just as Broad was ignorant of a type 
of nonchemical truth relevant to the nature of chemistry, so, too, we 
are ignorant of a type of nonexperiential truth relevant to the nature of 
experience. (2006, p.140) 
This historical example gives us further reason to believe that EV is worthy of serious 
consideration. 
 
SECTION 3 
WHEN SHOULD WE BELIEVE THE IGNORANCE HYPOTHESIS? 
 
In Section 1 we distinguished EV’s two claims: that if the ignorance hypothesis is true 
the Problem of Consciousness is solved, and that the ignorance hypothesis is in fact 
true. We have come far enough to see that the first of these claims is plausible. If we 
are indeed in the kind of situation that the ignorance hypothesis says we are, 
Physicalism would be true but we would be prone to thinking that there is an 
epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal. Consequently, if you believe 
that the ignorance hypothesis is true, the case for Primitivism should hold no sway for 
you. But why should we believe EV’s second claim that the ignorance hypothesis is 
actually true? EV must be able to make a case in favour of the ignorance hypothesis. 
Justifying the ignorance hypothesis raises a number of issues. In 3.1 I introduce these 
issues and draw the negative conclusion that certain existing attempts to justify the 
ignorance hypothesis are inadequate. In 3.2 and 3.3 I offer a constructive account of 
what is required of EV. Specifically, I argue that we should advocate the ignorance 
hypothesis only if two conditions can be satisfied. In 3.4 I argue that satisfying these 
conditions would give us sufficient reason to advocate the ignorance hypothesis. 
 
3.1. A METHODOLOGICAL ISSUE FOR EV 
If the ignorance hypothesis is true, it is a contingent truth. It is contingent that the 
hypothesised physical facts integral to the explanation of consciousness obtain. It is 
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also contingent that we are conceptually ignorant of those facts. As a contingent truth 
about our world, the ignorance hypothesis is not the kind of truth we can demonstrate 
through conceptual analysis alone (Stoljar 2006, p.87). The proponent of EV must 
provide evidence that the ignorance hypothesis actually holds. Without this, EV is 
merely speculative. We should not demand EV to provide proof that the ignorance 
hypothesis is true (Stoljar 2006, p.141), but we should demand plausible positive 
arguments for its truth. After all, as Hohwy explains, ‘…without such an argument, 
talking about how the problem could be resolved if we were in a certain state of 
ignorance is nothing but idle speculation.’ (2005, p.76) 
That said, we cannot expect too much of EV in this regard. Stoljar explains that 
it is impossible ‘…for us to stand outside ourselves and say, “the truths of which we are 
ignorant are…and…” where the ellipses are filled in by an articulate statement of the 
truths in question.’ (2006, p.87) To do so would clearly involve a ‘pragmatic 
contradiction’ (2006, p.87). The target for EV is to give us adequate reason to believe 
that we are in fact ignorant of a type of physical truth integral to the explanation of 
consciousness, but without reaching beyond the confines of our proposed epistemic 
situation to actually provide the truths in question. I will begin by considering Stoljar’s 
attempt to provide such a case, but will conclude that the considerations he raises are 
too general to constitute a persuasive case in favour of  the ignorance hypothesis. 
 
3.1.1. Stoljar’s Non-committal Approach 
Stoljar recommends an ‘abstract’ and ‘conservative’ formulation of EV that is not 
committed to details about the content of our ignorance (2006, p.121). Accordingly, 
the considerations he offers in favour of the ignorance hypothesis being true do not 
involve specific claims about the kind of truth of which we are ignorant, or even about 
why we are ignorant of them. One thing we can allow from the outset is that it is quite 
plausible that there are types of physical truth of which we are conceptually ignorant. 
As Rovane concedes in her critique of McGinn, ‘[i]t would be foolish to deny that we 
are subject to significant cognitive limitations’ (1994, p.157). Stoljar notes that some 
basic observations about our position in the world indicate that we should not assume 
that all physical truths fall within the scope of our conceptual repertoire. After all, our 
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cognitive abilities have an evolutionary origin and, as Jackson argues, we have no 
reason to believe that faculties generated in virtue of their survival value are able to 
penetrate all aspects of the physical universe (Stoljar 2006, p.88). Furthermore, looking 
at the epistemic limitations of other creatures suggests that we too have epistemic 
abilities limited by our biology (2006, p.89). Of course, the plausibility of our being 
ignorant of some type of physical truth or other does not give us reason to believe that 
we are specifically ignorant of truths relevant to the explanation of consciousness 
(Stoljar 2006, p.96). Stoljar makes three main points that he claims constitute indirect 
evidence for the specific conclusion that the ignorance hypothesis is true. I will 
consider each point and its limitations in turn. 
 First, Stoljar argues that the power of the ignorance hypothesis to explain our 
philosophical predicament regarding consciousness is itself a good reason to believe 
that the hypothesis is true (2006, p.97).18 Treating the Problem of Consciousness as a 
datum, and the various responses to the problem as competing explanations, Stoljar’s 
claim seems to be that an inference to the best explanation lends support to the 
ignorance hypothesis. In particular, Stoljar notes that the ignorance hypothesis 
explains our predicament in ‘…a simple and unified way…’, which gives us good reason 
to believe it is true (2006, p.97). 
 There are several problems with this argument. The main issue is that it seems 
to presuppose precisely what it is meant to show – that the ignorance hypothesis is 
plausibly true. We have already granted that if it is true it would explain our 
philosophical predicament. What we require are arguments that show it is in fact true. 
Its explanatory potential alone cannot achieve this. Imagine a Primitivist theory 
according to which God bestows consciousness upon us and intervenes in the natural 
order to make sure our physical behaviour corresponds appropriately to the 
phenomenal states we have. Despite this theory’s capacity to account for our situation 
in a simple and unified way, it is wildly implausible. As such, the fact that the ignorance 
hypothesis would explain our predicament does not in itself make that hypothesis 
plausible.  
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 A similar argument is proposed by Strawson (1994, p.50). 
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 Of course, Stoljar’s argument is not just that the ignorance hypothesis is a 
possible explanation of our predicament, but rather that it is the best explanation. 
However, the ignorance hypothesis is only preferable to the competing explanations of 
our predicament if a case can be made for its plausibility, which is precisely the issue 
under contention. To present an argument premised on EV being the best explanation 
thus begs the question against the competing positions, and puts EV in a weak 
dialectical position when addressing those sympathetic to such positions. 
Furthermore, an inference to the best explanation must be tempered by a minimal 
adequacy condition. Even if we could be sure that all the competing positions fail, we 
can only infer that the ignorance hypothesis is true if it meets that minimal adequacy 
condition. However, unless a case is made for the plausibility of the ignorance 
hypothesis it is unclear whether that condition has been satisfied. 
 Second, Stoljar argues that the ignorance hypothesis ‘…is a natural conjecture 
given the fact of our empirical ignorance of conscious experience’ (2006, p.105). The 
claim here is not merely that there are some facts about consciousness that science 
has yet to account for. It is the much deeper claim that we have ‘…no framework for 
thinking about consciousness…’ like we do for thinking about other phenomena (2006, 
p.96). Stoljar claims it is plausible that this deep empirical ignorance involves ignorance 
of a type of truth relevant to the explanation of consciousness. 
 The problem with this line of thought is that the fact of our empirical ignorance 
does not lend adequate support to the ignorance hypothesis. It lends plausibility to the 
hypothesis in the following modest sense: if we had rich empirical knowledge of a 
certain domain, it would be implausible to claim that we are conceptually ignorant of a 
type of truth in that domain. The inverse, however, does not hold: a lack of empirical 
knowledge need not indicate conceptual ignorance. Perhaps the unknown empirical 
truths about consciousness are all truths available within our current conception of the 
physical. Why should we believe that they are a different type of truth to familiar 
biological and cognitive truths? Of course, one could claim that the familiar types of 
truth are inevitably irrelevant to the explanation of consciousness, so the unknown 
truths must be beyond our current conception. This, however, would collapse into 
Stoljar’s first point that we should believe the ignorance hypothesis because it solves 
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the Problem of Consciousness. This would merely be a restatement of EV rather than 
an independent point in favour of the ignorance hypothesis. 
 Stoljar’s third consideration in favour of the ignorance hypothesis is that it has 
considerable historical precedent. We have already discussed such precedent, but 
does this really lend support to the ignorance hypothesis? The precedent shows that if 
you are in the kind of epistemic situation proposed by the ignorance hypothesis then 
you would find yourself in the kind of philosophical predicament we find ourselves in 
with consciousness. But why should this encourage us to believe that we are in fact in 
that epistemic situation with regards to consciousness? Surely it would be foolhardy to 
turn the conditional the other way and claim that if you find yourself in that kind of 
predicament then you are probably suffering from the proposed ignorance? We still 
need positive reason to believe the ignorance hypothesis is true. 
 Overall, Stoljar’s points fail to provide what is needed. In Stoljar’s defence, he 
may have had a more modest goal in mind when presenting these points. They 
plausibly succeed in achieving his stated aim of ‘rendering it [the ignorance hypothesis] 
believable’ (2006, p.87). Nevertheless, we should only advocate EV if we have 
adequate reason to believe that the ignorance hypothesis is actually true rather than 
just a live possibility. A critic of EV might concede that the hypothesis is a genuine 
option, but regard it is an unsubstantiated piece of speculation that we have 
inadequate justification for believing. We can capture this with a distinction made by 
Bennett: ‘p is weakly plausible if we are not certain that ~p [and] p is strongly plausible 
if we have positive reason to believe p.’ (2009, p.772) Stoljar’s arguments may 
undermine the critic who claims to be certain that the ignorance hypothesis is false. 
They will not, however, persuade the critic who requests positive reason to believe 
that the ignorance hypothesis is true. Unless arguments can be provided that address 
such a critic, the case for EV is incomplete. 
 
3.1.2. Overreaching 
The lesson we learn from evaluating the points raised by Stoljar is that general 
considerations about the possibility of our being ignorant are inadequate. EV needs 
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positive arguments in favour of the specific claim that there are physical properties 
beyond our current conception that are integral to the explanation of consciousness. 
However, there is a threat inevitably associated with attempts to provide such 
arguments. In trying to say something about the content of our ignorance, it is easy to 
make speculations that go beyond what we are really in an epistemic position to 
justify. If an argument overreaches in this way then a critic will still be able to object 
that EV tells a coherent story about our situation regarding consciousness, but does 
not give us adequate reason to believe that the story is true. To illustrate this issue I 
will briefly consider a position that is guilty of such overreaching: McGinn’s 
‘mysterianism’.19 First though, I will provide a framework for understanding how 
details of the ignorance hypothesis could be filled in. 
 Given that an advocate of the ignorance hypothesis cannot, without self-
contradiction, state the truths that it claims are unknown, how can it provide any 
details about the content of our ignorance? There are three dimensions along which 
information about the unknown physical properties might be provided. First, claims 
could be made about the relationship of the unknown property to the physical 
properties of which we do have a conception. Even without acquiring the hypothetical 
missing concept, we might be able to draw conclusions about the place of the 
unknown properties in the familiar physical world, and about ways in which it is like or 
unlike known physical properties. Second, claims could be made about the relationship 
of the unknown properties to our cognitive faculties. After all, we are owed an account 
of why these physical properties are currently beyond our grasp. Third, claims could be 
made about the relationship of the unknown properties to consciousness. EV is 
committed to them playing an integral role in the explanation of consciousness, but 
there is space to say more about that role. For instance, is the instantiation of the 
unknown property necessary or sufficient for the instantiation of phenomenal 
properties? 
Of course, all three of these dimensions of detail are intimately related; 
conclusions drawn regarding one dimension will have implications for the others. With 
this framework in mind, we can offer a quick outline of McGinn’s distinctive 
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 The term ‘mysterianism’ was coined by Flanagan (1992) as a label for McGinn’s position. 
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formulation of the ignorance hypothesis. McGinn argues that there is a ‘property P’ 
that is responsible for consciousness and which is permanently beyond our grasp 
(1989/2004).20 On the first dimension he suggests, for instance, that the states 
responsible for consciousness do not ‘…have the marks of full-blown objectivity…’ 
(2004, p.91) and that they go ‘…beyond the spatial properties recognised in physical 
science’ (2004, p.104). On the second dimension, he argues that our concept-forming 
procedures are incapable of producing a concept of P. The key step in his argument is 
that our theoretical concepts are based on perceptual data, so can only reveal 
properties akin to perceptible properties. Since consciousness is imperceptible, no 
property akin to perceptible properties can account for its existence. On the third 
dimension, McGinn seems to hold that property P is entirely responsible for 
consciousness rather than being an unknown piece in an otherwise accessible puzzle 
(e.g. 2004, p.59). He also suggests that the mechanism by which the unknown 
properties generate consciousness is ‘non-combinatorial’, but argues for the 
Chomskyan conclusion that we are only capable of understanding ‘combinatorial’ 
explanations in which discrete atoms combine in a law-like manner (1994 and 2004, 
Ch.8).      
 Without offering any detailed evaluation of McGinn, I will note some of the 
serious objections that have been raised against his fleshing-out of the ignorance 
hypothesis. Whiteley argues that property P being heterogeneous to familiar physical 
properties raises worries about it having physical causes or effects, which in turn raises 
worries about the causal status of consciousness (1990, p.394). The cognitive 
psychology McGinn uses to make his case for the epistemic inaccessibility of P is 
questionable. Rovane (1994) and Kukla (1995) find counter-examples to McGinn’s 
model of our concept-forming procedures. Kirk (1991) and Rovane (1994) argue that 
McGinn fails to recognise the possibility of our different cognitive capacities working 
together to overcome the limitations that they have in isolation. Stoljar (2006, pp.92-
93) challenges McGinn’s notion that theoretical concepts are restrained by perceptual 
data. On a strong reading of McGinn’s claim, it is simply false, and on a weaker 
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 McGinn does not claim that property P is a physical property, so does not technically advocate the 
ignorance hypothesis as a defence of Physicalism. His position is nevertheless close to EV, so is worthy of 
some attention. 
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reading, it fails to generate the conclusion that no theoretical concept could be 
relevant to the explanation of consciousness. Regarding McGinn’s claims about the 
explanatory role of property P, Sacks expresses doubt that it is possible for any 
property to perform the proposed explanatory task, leaving McGinn no better off than 
a standard Physicalist (1994, p.34). Furthermore, Rovane argues against the view that 
we cannot understand ‘non-combinatorial’ modes of explanation (1994). 
 The lesson we learn from this brief examination of McGinn’s position is that 
filling in the ignorance hypothesis is no mean feat. A theme in the objections to 
McGinn is that he is overreaching – that he is telling a story that might be true but for 
which we are far from having sufficient evidence. If we are going to make an adequate 
case for the ignorance hypothesis, we will have to avoid such overreaching. Another 
lesson we can take away is that detailing our epistemic situation is not always relevant 
to the plausibility of the ignorance hypothesis. Stoljar notes that McGinn’s claim that 
our ignorance is chronic is irrelevant to the philosophical problem (2006, p.93). The 
question is whether there are unknown truths that are integral to the explanation of 
consciousness, and whether or not our ignorance of them is permanent has no bearing 
on that claim. Against Stoljar, I have argued that we need focused arguments in favour 
of the ignorance hypothesis but, with Stoljar, I can conclude that we should not be 
distracted by details that are irrelevant to the plausibility of the hypothesis. In 
attempting to flesh out the ignorance hypothesis, we must be careful to avoid bells 
and whistles that distract from the real question and which increase the threat of 
overreaching. 
 We know that the plausibility of EV depends on a case being made for the 
ignorance hypothesis. So far we have reached some conclusions about what such a 
case must avoid. It should not rely on general considerations about the possibility of 
our being ignorant as they fail to lend support to the specific conclusion that we are in 
fact in the epistemic situation described by the ignorance hypothesis. Nor should it 
overreach: it should not attempt to state the truths of which we are ignorant, nor 
should it speculate about the content of our ignorance without sufficient evidence, nor 
should it embellish the ignorance hypothesis with details irrelevant to its plausibility. 
The task now is to reach some more positive conclusions about what the case for the 
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ignorance hypothesis must achieve. I will introduce two conditions that a case in 
favour of the ignorance hypothesis must satisfy. 
 
3.2. THE RELEVANCE CONDITION 
 
3.2.1. The Condition 
If EV is going to persuade us to believe that the ignorance hypothesis is true, it will 
have to address doubts about the very possibility of some unconceived physical 
property performing the proposed role in the explanation of consciousness. Advocates 
of the epistemic gap claim that all physical truths are, in principle, unable to entail the 
phenomenal truths. The burden of proof is then on EV to give us reason to believe 
otherwise. Trogden captures this challenge to EV with reference to the story of the 
slugs: 
Though the slugs aren’t in a position to perceptually detect pie piece 
shapes, as sophisticated cognizers they could see how truths about 
nondetected nontriangular tiles are the sorts of considerations that 
could render the circular truths intelligible in a world that is 
fundamentally noncircular. (2009, p.271) 
The objection to EV is that, in this respect, our situation regarding consciousness is 
quite unlike the slug’s situation regarding circles. We cannot see how any physical 
truth could be relevant to consciousness. Trogden dubs this the ‘really-not-having-a-
clue feature’ of our situation, and it is this feature that justifies resistance to the 
ignorance hypothesis (2009, p.272). The reason we really don’t have a clue about how 
a physical truth could perform the requisite explanatory role is that there are a priori 
obstacles that cast doubt on the possibility of them doing so (see Hohwy 2005, p.77). 
Before we move on to discuss those a priori obstacles, we can state the challenge 
faced by EV: 
The Relevance Condition: The ignorance hypothesis should be 
advocated only if we have adequate reason to believe that unconceived 
physical properties could evade the a priori obstacles to a physical 
explanation of consciousness. 
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Clearly the satisfaction of this condition will involve giving some details about the 
content of our ignorance – details that lend support to the possibility of the unknown 
physical properties being relevant to the explanation of consciousness. Does this 
condition unreasonably demand EV to state the truths of which we are ignorant in 
order to demonstrate their relevance? No – in principle, one could show that an a 
priori consideration does not apply to a certain kind of property without having a 
concept of that property. To do this, one would have to know something about the 
property in question, but this is consistent with conceptual ignorance. What, then, are 
the a priori challenges to the relevance of any unknown physical property? This is 
where the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps return to the stage. 
 
3.2.2. The Ignorance Hypothesis and the –tivity Gap 
The epistemic gap is not just based on a brute intuition that no physical state could 
ever entail a phenomenal state. It is based on two deeper conceptual gaps concerning 
what kind of state physical states are, and what kind of state phenomenal states are. 
Just as these conceptual gaps can be used as vetoes against the hypothesis that 
progress in science will close the epistemic gap, so too can they be used as vetoes 
against the hypothesis that acquiring new physical concepts could close the epistemic 
gap. 
 The challenge to the ignorance hypothesis presented by the –tivity gap is 
captured by Papineau: 
Stoljar is here placing strong demands on the content of our ignorance. 
It must be such that, if only we knew the relevant non-experiential 
facts, this would render zombies inconceivable.  However, it is not clear 
that any non-experiential facts could play this role.  By their nature, 
non-experiential facts would seem to be third-personal, objective, and 
non-perspectival, while experiential facts are first-personal, subjective, 
and perspectival.  It is hard to see how knowledge of the former could 
automatically render the absence of the latter inconceivable. (2007) 
The same concerns apply, mutatis mutandis, to EV’s account of KA. In response, the 
proponent of EV could claim that the unknown physical properties are actually 
subjectivity-involving. This route, however, would concede too much to Primitivism. EV 
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promises to protect the view that experiential states are entailed by non-experiential 
states, so to posit unknown experience-involving properties would be to renege on 
that promise. Alternatively, EV could argue that there is a third category of property 
that is neither fully objective nor fully subjective. If the unknown properties fall into 
this third category, they will not face the problem of accounting for subjectivity in 
objective terms, but nor will they concede to the Primitivist that subjectivity is onticly 
basic. We have already seen that McGinn sympathises with this kind of neutral claim 
(2004, p.91). However, it is doubtful that the notion of such a third category is 
coherent, and doubtful that its introduction would really help account for the 
subjectivity of phenomenal states. 
The only option for EV is to maintain that there are robustly objective truths 
beyond our current conception that are suited to bringing about subjective states. 
Indeed, this is precisely the route that Stoljar takes. To cast doubt on the –tivity gap, 
Stoljar invites us to consider the proposition ‘[i]f John is a number, then he is not in 
pain’ (2006, p.157). Stoljar’s claim is that the antecedent is an objective fact that 
entails a subjective consequent. This is intended to act as a counter-example to the 
putative principle that objective facts cannot entail subjective facts. If that general 
claim can be undermined, the objectivity of an unknown property need not count 
against its explanatory relevance to subjective phenomenal states. 
 One objection to this argument is that the epistemic gap is concerned with the 
inexplicability of positive phenomenal facts – facts that concern the presence of 
subjective states. The example provided shows, at best, that something objective can 
entail the absence of something subjective. It is not clear why this should assuage 
doubts about the possibility of physical states entailing the presence of subjective 
states (see Papineau, 2007). Furthermore, the entailment in the example holds 
because being a number conceptually excludes being in pain. Again, it is unclear how 
entailment by exclusion has any bearing on the kind of positive entailments required 
for a physical explanation of subjective states (see Hardcastle, 2008 and Robinson, 
unpublished). Overall, the –tivity gap presents a serious challenge to the ignorance 
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hypothesis.21 The Relevance Condition can only be satisfied if this challenge is 
addressed. 
 
3.2.3. The Ignorance Hypothesis and the –trinsicality Gap 
Unsurprisingly, a parallel challenge to the ignorance hypothesis is provided by the –
trinsicality gap. This challenge is captured by Alter. He first identifies the structure and 
dynamics thesis (SDT): ‘There are experiential truths that cannot be deduced from 
truths solely about structure and dynamics.’ (2009, p.760) Our reason for accepting 
SDT is that phenomenal qualities are non-structural properties. Alter then goes on to 
present the following simple argument against the ignorance hypothesis: 
1. The ignorance hypothesis undermines CA & KA only if it undermines 
SDT. 
2. The ignorance hypothesis does not undermine SDT. 
3. Therefore…the ignorance hypothesis does not undermine CA & KA. 
(2009, p.760) 
Again, Stoljar attempts to undermine the claim that there can be no entailment from 
extrinsic/structural properties to intrinsic/non-structural properties. He presents the 
example of Mr. & Mrs. Spratt. ‘Being married’ is a relational property of Mr. Spratt and 
a relational property of Mrs. Spratt. But, Stoljar claims, ‘…being married is an intrinsic 
property of the pair…’ (2006, p.152). Since this intrinsic property can be derived from 
the relational properties of each of the Spratts, it is not the case that there can be no 
entailment from extrinsic properties to intrinsic properties. 
 The key problem with Stoljar’s argument is that even if we allowed that ‘being 
married’ is an intrinsic property of the Spratts, it is not the kind of intrinsic property 
that drives the –trinsicality gap. Pereboom’s recent insights allow us to identify what’s 
wrong with Stoljar’s example. Pereboom stipulates that a property is comparatively 
intrinsic if it is an intrinsic property of X that ‘…reduces to parts of X having purely 
extrinsic properties.’ (2011, p.94) ‘Being married’ comes out as a comparatively 
intrinsic property of the Spratts. The intrinsic qualities that characterise phenomenal 
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 A complication here is that Stoljar does not follow our characterisation of subjectivity as the existence 
condition of a phenomenal state (Chapter 1). Nevertheless, the same points still hold. 
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states, on the other hand, do not appear to be comparatively intrinsic. The reason that 
qualitative redness appears to be physically inexplicable is precisely that it resists 
analysis into constituent parts, and that its essence resists any purely structural 
characterisation. In Pereboom’s terms, phenomenal qualities are absolutely intrinsic 
properties. The possibility of an entailment from extrinsic properties to comparatively 
intrinsic properties does nothing to assuage doubts about the possibility of an 
entailment from extrinsic properties to absolutely intrinsic properties. We will have 
more to say on intrinsicality and related concepts in the next chapter, but it is already 
clear that Stoljar faces a significant challenge here.22 
 Overall, Stoljar’s brief attempt to undermine worries about subjectivity and 
intrinsicality does not achieve what it should. As Hardcastle objects, ‘…Stoljar does not 
appear to take those who object to his perspective seriously enough’ (2008, p.275). 
The –tivity and –trinsicality gaps play an integral role in the Problem of Consciousness, 
and Stoljar does not show adequate concern for them. 
 
3.3. THE INTEGRATION CONDITION 
 
3.3.1. The Condition 
The Relevance Condition concerns the relationship between consciousness and the 
hypothetical unknown physical truths. The plausibility of the ignorance hypothesis also 
depends on the relationship between the hypothetical unknown physical truths and 
the known physical truths. We already have a rich picture of the physical world, and 
the ignorance hypothesis must dovetail with our existing knowledge of it. Our 
knowledge of the physical world is a posteriori, so this condition contrasts with the a 
priori challenge presented by the Relevance Condition. 
The Integration Condition: The ignorance hypothesis should be 
advocated only if we have adequate reason to believe that the holes in 
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 Stoljar also attempts to resist the –trinsicality gap by casting doubt on the intrinsicality of phenomenal 
qualities (2006, pp.149-151). As Coleman comments (2007, p.830), Stoljar’s appeal to the 
diaphanousness of experience misses the point. I will explain why this Representationalist move fails in 
Chapter 5. 
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our current conception of the physical offer a suitable place for 
properties relevant to the explanation of consciousness. 
We have already accepted the likelihood that there are types of physical truth of which 
we are ignorant. It is one thing to claim that we suffer from conceptual blind-spots, 
and quite another to claim that any such blind-spot is an appropriate home for 
properties relevant to the explanation of consciousness. The conclusion that 
unconceived properties could close the epistemic is worthless unless those properties 
can be suitably accommodated in our world-view. EV must show that there is an 
appropriate home for the proposed unknown properties within the physical world. 
What criteria determine whether or not an established blind-spot is plausibly occupied 
by properties relevant to the explanation of consciousness? 
 First, EV’s answer to the Relevance Condition will doubtless bring along 
commitments about the nature of the unknown physical properties. Once it has been 
argued that unknown physical properties could plausibly evade the –tivity gap and the 
–trinsicality gap, there remains the task of integrating these hypothetical properties 
into our understanding of the physical world. A conceptual blind-spot is only relevant if 
we have positive reason to believe that the kind of property that occupies that blind-
spot is the kind of property that could close the epistemic gap.23 
 Second, the blind-spot must integrate with what we already know about how 
consciousness fits in to the physical world. For instance, we have reason to believe that 
the properties responsible for consciousness are instantiated in the brain. As such, an 
instance of conceptual ignorance is only relevant if the unknown properties are 
instantiated by the brain. Of course, there is some flexibility here. Given our failure to 
explain consciousness in physical terms, we cannot take our presuppositions about the 
explanatory basis of consciousness for granted. That said, the onus is on EV to show 
that such presuppositions are inaccurate. For example, if our ignorance is not of 
properties instantiated by the brain, EV had better be able to tell a plausible story 
about why the brain appears to be the seat of consciousness. 
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 This criterion will be easier to appreciate in the next chapter when we attempt to specify the nature 
of the unknown properties. 
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 Third, a related concern is that the ignorance hypothesis must integrate with 
what we already know about the causal status of consciousness. We know that 
conscious states have physical effects. More specifically, we know that our conscious 
states influence our bodily states. The causal status of conscious states is fixed by the 
causal status of the properties responsible for that state. As such, a conceptual blind-
spot is only suitable if it is plausibly occupied by properties that play an appropriate 
causal role. Again, there is some room for EV to challenge our presuppositions about 
the causal characteristics of conscious states, but not a lot. After all, it is causal 
considerations like these that led us to reject Primitivism.24 
 
3.3.2. Ignorance and Knowledge 
The satisfaction of each of these criteria must work in tandem with a more 
fundamental requirement. An advocate of EV can only integrate hypothetical 
properties into our understanding of the physical world if they have first triangulated a 
clear conceptual blind-spot. We have to be sure that we are suffering from a specific 
case of conceptual ignorance before we can be sure that the properties of which we 
are ignorant are suitably placed to perform the proposed explanatory role. In 
attempting to demonstrate that we are suffering from a conceptual blind-spot, there 
are two key considerations that must be respected. 
 First, a claim of ignorance must be able to account for how we have managed 
without the proposed missing concept. Prinz makes a representative claim about our 
knowledge of the brain: 
…I think we can understand the brain quite fully. The mind–body 
problem does not stem from an inability to see the brain in all its glory. 
There is no hidden property that escapes detection when we turn on 
our magnets, implant electrodes or stain chunks of brain. (2003, p.116) 
The ignorance hypothesis is committed to Prinz being wrong, but it must be able to 
accommodate the plausibility of Prinz’s claim. A parallel point can be made in the 
context of physics. Strawson claims that physics does not ‘…seem to have any obvious 
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implications that undermine its plausibility.  
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promising gaps or valences where conceptual extension could possibly bring in 
radically new predicates …’ (1994, p.95). Why are our existing physical theories so 
good at explaining phenomena other than consciousness if they are working with an 
impoverished conceptual repertoire? Why don’t we know the proposed unknown 
properties? How have they managed to stay hidden? 
 Second, a claim of ignorance must be able to show that the proposed unknown 
properties are actual. Consider the possibility that we have no concept of certain 
divine properties. This conceptual limitation only generates ignorance if there is an 
actual divine being that instantiates the properties of which we have no conception. 
Similarly, our lacking some physical concept only generates ignorance if such 
properties are actual. EV must be able to show that our blind-spot is occupied – it must 
provide evidence of the instantiation of these unconceived properties. 
 These last two points are significant challenges, but the real trouble for EV 
comes when we consider their relationship to one another. If the unknown properties 
make a manifest difference to physical events of which we have knowledge, we have 
evidence of the presence of those properties, and so reason to believe that those 
properties are actual. However, in this situation it is hard to account for why we 
haven’t noticed our ignorance, or for how we have failed to form a conception of the 
properties in question. Alternatively, it could be held that unknown properties make 
no manifest difference to known physical events. This makes it easy to explain why we 
haven’t noticed that we suffer from a limited conceptual repertoire. However, in this 
situation it is hard to justify the conclusion that such properties are actual. What 
evidence could we have for their existence if they make no manifest difference to 
known physical events? Finding a way to respect both criteria at once thus poses a 
significant challenge to advocates of the ignorance hypothesis. 
 To summarise, the Integration Condition demands a positive account of the 
place of the hypothetical unknown properties in the physical world. This requires the 
identification of a blind-spot in our current conception of the physical, with all the 
problems that entails. It then requires positive reason to believe that the blind-spot is 
occupied by properties that a) respect any conclusions reached in response to the 
Relevance Condition, b) respect what we already know about the physical basis of 
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consciousness and c) respect what we already know about the causal status of 
consciousness. 
 
3.4. ARE THERE ANY FURTHER CONDITIONS? 
I have argued that the ignorance hypothesis should be advocated only if the two 
conditions above can be satisfied. I now want to argue that if those two conditions can 
be satisfied, we should adopt the ignorance hypothesis. In other words, if those two 
challenges can be met then EV should be advocated. To justify this claim, I will consider 
some objections that have been raised against the ignorance hypothesis. The main 
objections have already been captured by the two conditions, but there are some 
further considerations that must be addressed. I argue that these objections are either 
misguided or can be absorbed into the two established conditions. This justifies the 
conclusion that we should not place any further conditions on EV. 
 
3.4.1. The Coherence of Conceptual Ignorance 
Kriegel argues that ‘…it is incoherent to suppose that a conceptual scheme is powerful 
enough to frame a problem without being powerful enough to frame its solution’ 
(2003, p.179). Given that we can frame the Problem of Consciousness, we must, 
therefore, have the concepts with which to resolve it. Of course, one could deny that 
we can frame the problem, but this would be to shun EV in favour of Chomskyan 
skepticism. Kriegel supports his conclusion with the following example: ‘One cannot be 
said to understand the question “What is John's weight?” if one does not understand 
the meaning of “John weighs 150 pounds.” Understanding a question is thus 
necessarily coupled with understanding its possible answers.’ (2003, p.184) He goes on 
to point out that ‘…the only logic of questions we have today is founded on the 
individuation of questions in terms of their possible answers...’ (2003, p.185) He then 
asks ‘…how could we formulate the problem--the right problem--without deploying 
the missing concept?’ (2003, p.186). 
 This objection to EV is misguided. First, Kriegel moves too easily from 
‘philosophical problems’ to ‘questions’. Perhaps philosophical problems are not best 
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understood as questions, and if they are questions, they could easily be special cases 
quite disanalogous to questions about John’s weight. Assuming that philosophical 
problems are questions, Kriegel still faces difficulties. We can agree that understanding 
a question involves understanding what it would take for something to be an answer 
to that question. However, Kriegel is making the much bolder claim that we must be 
able to frame each of the possible answers. This is clearly false. Imagine someone who 
can only perceive on a slightly limited spectrum, and consequently has no concept of 
red. Such a subject would be able to understand the meaning of the question ‘what 
colour are post boxes?’, despite her inability fully to grasp the answer to this question. 
This is because she has the concept ‘colour’ (without having concepts for all the 
colours) and the meaning of the question simply concerns colour-as-such. Kriegel’s 
claim that we must be able to entertain all possible answers to a question is motivated 
by an appeal to our ‘only’ logic of questions. This move is unpersuasive, since being the 
only logic does not guarantee being a good logic.  
Dennett (1991b) raises a similar objection to Kriegel when he argues that our 
capacity to formulate the problem is itself a sign that we are not conceptually ignorant. 
He notes that a monkey has no concept of an electron, but observes that the monkey 
is in no way perplexed as a result of its ignorance. Since we are perplexed, we are not 
in an epistemic situation analogous to the monkey’s. 
 Dennett is right that an appeal to ignorance must be able to account for our 
philosophical perplexity. To say that our ignorance is just like that of the monkey 
would indeed be unhelpful. However, hopefully we have established that conceptual 
ignorance can explain our philosophical predicament. To deny this would require 
arguments to be provided against much of the work we have done so far, including the 
story of the slugs and the case of historical precedent. The claim was never that 
conceptual ignorance is sufficient to generate philosophical puzzles analogous to the 
Problem of Consciousness, so EV is not committed to the monkey’s conceptual 
ignorance being accompanied by philosophical perplexity. Overall, neither Kriegel nor 
Dennett’s objections have any force. 
 
 
[107] 
 
3.4.2. The Overgeneration Problem 
Karen Bennett (2009), in a commentary on Stoljar, argues that if EV is an appropriate 
response to the Problem of Consciousness, then parallel responses to a whole range of 
philosophical problems should also be appropriate. Since it is implausible that all such 
problems can be solved by hypothesising that we suffer from conceptual ignorance, 
we should not accept EV in the context of consciousness. She explains: 
Here is the general recipe, for a target argument that has a series of 
premises P1 through Pn: 
a) Argue that it is plausible to suppose that we are ignorant of the truth 
(and perhaps the content) of some proposition p, and  
b) argue that our ignorance of p undermines our reason for believing 
some Pi. (2009, p.772) 
Bennett then asks whether this argument requires p to be weakly or strongly 
plausible. If EV only requires our ignorance to be weakly plausible, then we have an 
absurdly easy response to any number of philosophical problems. However, if our 
ignorance has to be strongly plausible, the problem is that Stoljar’s arguments fail to 
provide strong plausibility to the ignorance hypothesis. 
 We can simply regard this objection as another reason to set our standards 
higher than Stoljar. Our two established conditions demand strong plausibility. Bennett 
is probably right that requiring only weak plausibility would mean EV overgenerates 
philosophical solutions. This just makes it all the more imperative to insist on strong 
plausibility. As such, Bennett’s concerns are already captured in our two conditions. 
 
3.4.3. Relocating the Mystery 
Some critics have worried that even if consciousness is the result of unconceived 
properties, this metaphysical entailment will still be mysterious. Sacks argues: 
…given a blind spot, we can speculate that there is no more than a 
problem of access, but since there is that problem of access, it becomes 
more difficult to establish that what is going on at that spot is not itself 
problematic. And the more extensive such cognitive closure, the more 
this difficulty will impinge. (1994, p.32) 
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In other words, in making a claim of conceptual ignorance EV cannot justify the 
conclusion that the unknown properties close the epistemic gap. If we suffer from 
conceptual ignorance, we cannot say one way or the other whether phenomenal 
properties are primitive. 
 Gertler makes the related point that ‘…to say that our own situation is a 
symptom of ignorance is not, of course, to say that we are ignorant of some fact 
incompatible with primitivism, as the ignorance hypothesis requires.’ (2009, p.383) 
Perhaps the unknown properties are phenomenal properties. Since EV cannot rule out 
this possibility, it cannot make a convincing case against Primitivism. 
 Both of these objections appear to take an inappropriate view of where the 
burden of proof lies. The plausibility of EV does not depend on it explicitly 
demonstrating that Primitivism is false. We have independent reason to doubt 
Primitivism, and basic principles of parsimony mean we should only adopt Primitivism 
if all serious non-Primitivist options are ruled out. The objections could be read as 
making the stronger claim that no non-Primitivist version of the ignorance hypothesis 
is true. But this concern is already captured by the Relevance Condition, as it demands 
positive reason to believe that the case for Primitivism cannot be wielded against EV. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We now understand what EV is, how it attempts to undermine the case for 
Primitivism, and why it is a promising and attractive proposal. We have concluded that 
if the ignorance hypothesis is true, then the Problem of Consciousness is solved. Now 
we have concluded that if the Relevance Condition and Integration Condition can be 
satisfied, then we should believe that the ignorance hypothesis is true. Therefore, if an 
account of our ignorance is provided that satisfies those two conditions, then the 
Problem of Consciousness is solved. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RUSSELLIAN IGNORANCE HYPOTHESIS 
 
This chapter explores a prominent way of filling in the ignorance hypothesis, notably 
associated with Russell (1921/1927). The Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis (RIH) 
consists of two claims: i) that we are conceptually ignorant of the intrinsic properties 
of physical entities, and ii) that these properties are integral to the physical 
explanation of consciousness. In the first three sections of the chapter I argue that a 
version of ‘i’ is true. In the fourth and final section I evaluate ‘ii’, applying the 
Relevance and Integration Conditions on EV established in the previous chapter. I 
argue that RIH goes a long way towards satisfying both conditions, but ultimately falls 
short on the Relevance Condition due to its failure to address the –tivity gap. 
Consequently, RIH does not offer a viable solution to the Problem of Consciousness. I 
also argue that since RIH is the most promising version of the ignorance hypothesis, it 
is likely that no version of the ignorance hypothesis can meet our two criteria. In the 
following chapters I will show how RIH, and with it the Epistemic View, can still be 
deployed as an essential part of a more complex response to the Problem of 
Consciousness. 
 
SECTION 1 
INTRODUCING INSCRUTABILITY 
 
A number of philosophers, including Russell, have argued that we have no conception 
of the intrinsic nature of physical entities. Foster (2008) calls this the ‘inscrutability’ of 
matter. We can refer to the proposed unknown intrinsic properties as ‘inscrutables’. 
The case for inscrutability is distinct from concerns surrounding the metaphysical 
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status of the phenomenal, so for the time being we can put consciousness aside.1 My 
argument for inscrutables – the Inscrutability Argument (IA) - runs as follows: 
IA1) We have epistemic access to physical objects only via how they 
affect us. 
IA2) Physical objects have absolutely intrinsic properties. 
IA3) If we have epistemic access to physical objects only via how they 
affect us, then we cannot form a transparent conception of the 
absolutely intrinsic properties of objects. 
IA4) Therefore we cannot form a transparent conception of the 
absolutely intrinsic properties of physical objects.2 
I will elucidate and defend this argument in several stages. In this section, I will clarify 
the intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy and expand on the notion of absolute intrinsicality 
that I introduced in Chapter 3. In Section 2 I will argue for IA’s three premises. In 
Section 3, I supplement the case for IA2 by defending it against the ‘Pure Structuralist’ 
claim that physical entities do not have absolutely intrinsic properties. Ultimately I 
conclude that we are indeed conceptually ignorant of the intrinsic nature of physical 
entities. 
 
1.1. THE INTRINSIC/EXTRINSIC DISTINCTION 
 
We have already discussed the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in 
the context of the –trinsicality gap (Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2). This distinction must be 
developed further in order to appreciate the argument for inscrutables. The distinction 
between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is a distinction between those properties a 
thing has in virtue of itself, and those that it has in virtue of how things stand in the 
world beyond itself. As Harris notes, ‘[t]he intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is generally 
taken to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the domain to which it 
applies.’ (2010, p.467) That is, it is thought that every property is either intrinsic or 
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 When Montero introduces the term ‘inscrutables’ (2010, p.74) she defines them as being responsible 
for consciousness. My use of the term leaves it open whether or not they have this explanatory role. 
2
 The contrast between transparent and opaque ways of knowing is outlined in Chapter 3 (Section 1.1.2) 
and will be re-examined later in this chapter. 
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extrinsic and no property is both. The domain in question is that of properties: 
extrinsicness and intrinsicness are properties of properties.3 
 Socrates’s height is plausibly an intrinsic property of Socrates.4 His height has 
ramifications for the relations in which he might stand and presumably has an 
explanation that involves causal relations to his parents’ genes. Nevertheless, it is a 
property that consists in something internal to Socrates. By contrast, Socrates’s 
property of ‘being shorter than Simmias’ is an extrinsic property, depending as it does 
on how things are in the world beyond Socrates. This is still a property of Socrates 
himself, but it consists in a relation to a distinct individual. This example offers a useful 
starting point for an exposition of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. Can we go further 
and offer a reductive analysis of the distinction? Attempts to provide such an analysis 
have consistently failed, but this should not make us suspicious of the distinction. As 
Seager argues, ‘…the concept of the intrinsic properties of an object seems intuitively 
intelligible, despite the difficulties philosophers have in spelling it out precisely in non-
question begging terms’ (2006, p.130). Putting the project of defining the distinction 
to one side, we can still establish some useful tools for determining whether a 
property is intrinsic or extrinsic. 
 Relationality offers an illuminating way of fleshing out the intrinsic/extrinsic 
distinction.5 Roughly, properties that depend on a relation (or relations) to a distinct 
individual (or individuals) are extrinsic, while intrinsic properties are independent of 
such relations. To test whether a property is relational, we should consider whether an 
individual would still instantiate that property if it were the only individual in the 
world. In such a ‘lonely’ world, there are no distinct individuals with which to stand in 
relations, and so no potential to possess relational properties. As such, if a property 
instantiation is compatible with the loneliness of its bearer, that indicates it is an 
intrinsic property. For instance, Socrates would plausibly still have his height in a lonely 
world, but he would not have the property of being shorter than Simmias. However, 
compatibility/incompatibility with loneliness is not quite equivalent to the 
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 A complication with this second-order property account is explored by Humberstone (1996). There is a 
‘local’ sense of intrinsic/extrinsic that describes ways of having a property rather than attributing a 
second-order property. This alternative use will not concern us. 
4
 This is an adaptation of an example from Van Cleve (2002). 
5
 Francescotti (1999) offers an interesting account in terms of what he calls ‘D-relationality’. 
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intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. For instance, ‘not being five feet from a rhododendron’ 
(Humberstone, 1996) and ‘being a lonely object’ (Lewis 1983, p.199) are compatible 
with loneliness but are extrinsic properties. Nevertheless, loneliness-compatibility 
offers a handy diagnostic tool that points us in the right direction. 
 Another useful test of intrinsicality is ‘duplicate-invariance’. Your extrinsic 
properties depend on how the world beyond you stands i.e. on which possible world 
you are in. Your intrinsic properties do not, so would remain constant regardless of 
which modal neighbourhood you occupy. In light of this Lewis proposes that ‘[i]f 
something has an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing; 
whereas duplicates situated in different surroundings will differ in their extrinsic 
properties’ (1983, p.197). This does not quite work as a definition of the distinction: it 
faces some tricky counter-examples, and the notion of a ‘duplicate’ is hard to 
characterise without circular reference back to intrinsicality (see Seager 2006, pp.129-
30 and Francescotti 1999, p.593). Nevertheless, duplicate-invariance offers another 
handy diagnostic tool. 
 If a property passes both the loneliness-compatibility and duplicate-invariance 
tests, then we should regard it as intrinsic. If it does not, we should regard it is 
intrinsic. Strictly speaking this two-part test is not infallible, but it is quite sufficient for 
our purposes. 
 The extrinsic and intrinsic properties of an individual are intimately connected. 
Drawing on Pereboom (2011), we can offer some more refined distinctions that enable 
us to map these connections. Some extrinsic properties place constraints on the 
intrinsic properties of their bearer. For instance, Socrates’s extrinsic property of being 
shorter than Simmias is constituted in part by his intrinsic property of being the height 
he is. Other extrinsic properties place no such restraints. For instance, ‘being one 
among many’ tells us nothing about the intrinsic properties of its bearer (Pereboom 
2011, p.93). To capture this, Pereboom introduces a notion of pure extrinsicality: 
P is a purely extrinsic property of X just in case P is an extrinsic property 
of X and P has no intrinsic aspects. (2011, p.93) 
Just as some extrinsic properties place demands on the intrinsic properties of their 
bearer, some intrinsic properties place demands on their bearer’s extrinsic properties. 
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As previously discussed, ‘being married’ is perhaps an intrinsic property of the pair Mr. 
and Mrs. Spratt. However, the pair instantiates this intrinsic property only in virtue of 
its constituent parts each having the extrinsic property of being married to their 
spouse. This kind of situation leads Pereboom to draw the following distinction:  
P is an absolutely intrinsic property of X just in case P is an intrinsic 
property of X, and X’s having P does not reduce to parts of X having 
purely extrinsic properties… 
P is a comparatively (or a relatively) intrinsic property of X just in case P 
is an intrinsic property of X, and X’s having P reduces to parts of X 
having purely extrinsic properties. (2011, pp.93-94)6 
These notions can also be defined in terms of whether an object’s possession of an 
intrinsic property is derivable a priori from a proposition describing the purely extrinsic 
properties of its parts (Pereboom 2011, p.94). IA – the Inscrutability Argument – 
specifically claims that we are ignorant of the absolutely intrinsic properties of physical 
objects. 
 
1.2. CLARIFYING THE DISTINCTION 
 
So far we have made some positive claims about what the intrinsic/extrinsic 
distinction is. Now I will make some negative claims about what the distinction is not. 
The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is often conflated with other conceptual dichotomies, 
so it is worth explicitly ruling those conflations out. I will briefly outline three mistakes 
that are liable to be made regarding the distinction. 
 One, the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is not equivalent to the 
essential/accidental distinction (see Humberstone 1996, p.205). For any property, its 
being intrinsic or extrinsic depends on the nature of the property itself. By contrast, its 
being accidental or essential depends on the nature of its bearer. For instance, that 
triangles possess three-sidedness essentially tells us something about triangles, not 
something about three-sidedness. Plausibly, the same property can be both accidental 
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 Pereboom (2011, p.93) attributes this distinction to Kant, and notes that attention is called to it by Van 
Cleve (1988). 
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or essential depending on what bears it. Furthermore, the essential properties of a 
thing need not be intrinsic, and its accidental properties need not be extrinsic. There is 
no equivalence here. 
 Two, the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is not equivalent to the 
categorical/dispositional distinction. Dispositions are propensities to manifest a certain 
property under certain circumstances. For instance, a vase’s property of being fragile 
is (roughly) its propensity to break under the circumstance of being struck. By 
contrast, categorical properties are not bound to triggering events (see McKitrick 
2003, p.351). Relations play an integral role in our understanding of dispositions but, 
as we will see in Section 2.3, it would be rash to claim that dispositions are extrinsic 
properties. Similarly, there are important links between being an intrinsic property and 
being a categorical property, but the two notions are not extensionally equivalent. For 
instance, the spatial relations of an object are categorical but extrinsic. Arguments akin 
to IA are often phrased in terms of our being ignorant of the categorical basis of 
physical dispositions. Stoljar, for example, characterises the Russellian position in 
terms of our conceptual ignorance of categorical properties (2006, Chapter 6). 
However, Pereboom (2011 pp.89-91) shows that it is an implicit notion of absolute 
intrinsicality that really drives those arguments, as we will see for ourselves in the next 
section. 
 Three, the distinction is between kinds of property, not kinds of predicate. It is 
tempting to say that monadic predicates correspond to intrinsic properties and 
polyadic predicates correspond to extrinsic properties. This would be a mistake since 
the same property can often be designated via both monadic and polyadic predicates, 
especially if we start introducing novel predicates. For instance, Socrates’s height 
could be designated by a two-place predicate specifying the distance relation between 
his top and his bottom. Similarly, Socrates’s property of being shorter than Simmias 
could be designated by a monadic predicate ascribed to the pair taken as a single 
complex object. We are pursuing a metaphysical distinction concerning properties, not 
a semantic distinction concerning predicates. Some reject such a distinction between 
predicates and properties, but that would be an error. Martin & Heil shed light on this:  
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Some predicates designate properties, no doubt, and, in general, 
predicates hold true of objects in virtue of properties possessed by 
those objects. But it would be a mistake to imagine that every 
predicate, even every predicate that figures in a going empirical theory, 
designates a property. (1999, p.44) 
With these terminological clarifications in place, we can now move on to evaluate the 
premises of IA. 
 
SECTION 2 
THE CASE FOR INSCRUTABILITY 
 
2.1. THE RECEPTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
How do we gain epistemic access to the properties of external objects? The obvious 
answer is that we do so through perception, but that invites the further question of 
how perception reveals those properties. Shoemaker explains that ‘…properties reveal 
their presence in the actualizations of their causal potentialities, a special case of this 
being the perception of a property’ (1997, p.242). Perceptual states are the effects of 
external objects on our senses, and are thus manifestations of dispositions belonging 
to those objects. It is highly plausible that we only gain epistemic access to physical 
objects through how they affect us because, as Kant puts it, ‘…how should our capacity 
for knowledge be awakened into action, if objects did not affect our senses, and partly 
of themselves produce representations…’ (B1).7 Kant calls this the receptivity of 
human knowledge (A26/B42). This claim - henceforth ‘Receptivity’ - is captured by IA1. 
 From how objects affect us we can infer a great deal about their relations to 
each other, including their causal relations. As Russell explains, ‘…in drawing 
inferences from percepts to their causes, we assume that the stimulus must possess 
whatever structure is possessed by the percept, though it may also have structural 
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 All Kant references are to the Critique of Pure Reason with page references for the A and/or B editions 
(1781/1787). 
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properties not possessed by the percept.’ (1927, p.400) We have epistemic access to 
causal manifestations of physical objects, and to whatever can be inferred from those 
manifestations, but nothing more. Knowing objects through how they affect us allows 
us to build up a picture of the causal structure of the physical world – of a rich web of 
dispositions in a spatio-temporal framework.8 
 Our use of increasingly sophisticated measuring instruments provides a 
window on the world that overcomes the limitations of unassisted perception. This is 
consistent with Receptivity. When we use a Geiger counter, for instance, we are 
affected indirectly by radioactive particles. The particles affect our measuring 
instrument and the instrument affects our senses. Measuring instruments are only 
epistemically relevant insofar as we are affected by them and they are affected by 
whatever it is they detect. For instance, a Geiger counter only detects radioactive 
particles through their disposition to affect it. Epistemic contact always requires a 
chain of manifestations beginning with the object of knowledge and ending with the 
perceptual faculties of the subject. As our ways of accessing physical objects become 
more advanced, it remains the case that we only have epistemic access to them 
through the manifestation of their dispositions. As Blackburn puts it, ‘…science only 
finds dispositional properties, all the way down.’ (1990, p.63) 
 Perceptual states may seem to reveal more than the dispositions of a stimulus. 
When an apple looks red, for instance, that redness appears to exceed any purely 
dispositional characterisation (see Blackburn 1990, p.65). To make sense of this, we 
must appeal to something like a secondary-property model of colours and their kin. 
Our perceptual experiences are indeed characterised by non-dispositional qualities. 
These qualities, however, are phenomenal properties of our experience, not properties 
of the stimulus. Phenomenal properties are absolutely intrinsic properties, but these 
properties do not belong to external physical objects. As such, our epistemic access to 
phenomenal properties is not a counter-example to inscrutability. Phenomenal 
qualities may reveal something about the stimuli that cause them; they reveal, for 
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 A complication I will not consider is that inscrutability may imply that we have no access to the intrinsic 
nature of time and space; that they are just the know-not-whats that cause our spatiotemporal 
experiences (Foster 2008, p.75). If this is true, it will have little bearing on IA, so there is no harm in 
putting it aside. 
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instance, the apple’s disposition to generate in us experiences with red phenomenal 
qualities. They do not, however, disclose the non-dispositional features of the 
stimulus. Phenomenal qualities may appear to belong to stimuli rather than being 
caused by them but, on this account, that appearance should not be taken at face 
value. As such, it remains plausible that perception reveals only the dispositions of 
physical objects (see Foster 2008, p.51).  
 There are other apparent counter-examples to Receptivity. Extension, solidity 
and theoretical properties such as ‘being an electron’ do not appear to be purely 
dispositional, yet they are properties to which we have epistemic access. We will deal 
with these examples in due course but, in the meantime, it should be noted that 
Receptivity is a highly plausible claim about our epistemic access to external physical 
objects. As such, we can reasonably expect that any apparent counter-examples will 
not stand up to scrutiny.  
 
2.2. THE RUSSELLIAN PICTURE 
 
Receptivity – the first premise of IA – claims that we only have epistemic access to 
physical objects via how they affect us i.e. through the manifestations of their 
dispositions. This epistemic situation only entails an epistemic limitation if we have 
reason to believe that there is more to physical objects than their causal 
manifestations disclose. This is where IA2 and IA3 come in. Intuitively, there is more to 
objects than the causal relations in which they stand and their propensities to enter 
into different causal relations in different circumstances. We will put this intuition to 
the test in Section 3, but for the time being we will take it as given. The thought is that 
accessing an object through its manifestations tells us what it does but not what it is. 
When we know the causal relations in which physical objects stand we do not thereby 
know the nature of the relata themselves. Put another way, we can access the 
structure of the physical world but not the nature of the entities that implement that 
structure. As Russell states, we can ‘…infer a great deal as to the structure of the 
physical world, but not as to its intrinsic character’ (1927, p.400). 
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 What sense of ‘intrinsic’ drives this conclusion? The key claim is that relational 
properties presuppose a foundation of non-relational properties that characterise 
their relata. These non-relational properties must be absolutely intrinsic properties 
rather than merely comparatively intrinsic properties. The comparatively intrinsic 
properties of an object reduce to the extrinsic properties of that object’s constituent 
parts. If there is a need for extrinsic properties to have a foundation of intrinsic 
properties, then an appeal to comparatively intrinsic properties merely pushes that 
need down a level. The extrinsic properties responsible for that comparatively intrinsic 
property would themselves need a foundation, and the sequence only ends when we 
have intrinsic properties that do not reduce to the purely extrinsic properties of their 
parts i.e. when we reach absolutely intrinsic properties. 
Note, Receptivity does not render comparatively intrinsic properties 
epistemically inaccessible: an object’s comparatively intrinsic properties can be 
inferred from a knowledge of the extrinsic properties of its parts. No such inference is 
available in the case of absolutely intrinsic properties. I take it that the structure of the 
physical world is the sum total of the extrinsic (and comparatively intrinsic) properties 
instantiated in the world. Sometimes philosophers have a more conservative sense of 
‘structure’ in mind that excludes certain relational properties, but inscrutability is not 
committed to our ignorance of these relational properties.9  
 We can reinforce the thought that physical entities must have absolutely 
intrinsic properties, not just structural properties, by thinking about self-subsistence. 
Plausibly, physical objects are self-subsistent entities that are capable of independent 
existence (though objections to this view will be considered in the next section). They 
could even exist in a ‘lonely’ world in which there are no other physical entities with 
which to stand in relations. In other words, physical objects are substances. This has 
clear implications for the properties of physical objects. Langton, in an argument she 
attributes to Kant, explains these implications as follows: 
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 For instance, it could be held that we only know the formal structure of the physical world. We know 
that some objects stand in some relations in a certain logical form, but do not know what they are. 
Russell leans towards this extreme view, making him vulnerable to the ‘Newman Objection’ (Newman 
1928, Demopoulos & Friedman 1989). This is the observation that any set of entities with the right 
cardinality can be construed as satisfying a formal description of the world, meaning that purely formal 
knowledge is almost entirely vacuous. Nothing in IA commits us to this extreme position: we can know 
what the relations are in which physical objects stand even if we cannot know their intrinsic nature. 
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A substance is the kind of thing that can exist on its own: it can exist 
and be lonely. But nothing can exist without having properties.  If  a 
substance can exist on its own, it must have properties that are 
compatible with its existing on its own. If a substance can be lonely, it 
must have properties compatible with loneliness. So a substance must 
have intrinsic properties. (1998, p.19) 
More specifically, physical substances must have absolutely intrinsic properties. 
Assuming that dispositions belong to substances, when we detect a disposition we can 
infer the existence of something with absolutely intrinsic properties. 
 The thought that we have no epistemic access to the intrinsic nature of objects 
appears in various forms throughout the history of philosophy. For instance, Berkeley 
writes: 
We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What 
may be the extension, figure or motion of anything really and 
absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the 
proportion or relation they bear to our senses. (quoted Lockwood 1989, 
p.155) 
Similarly, Locke argues that we have no comprehension ‘…of the internal constitution 
and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties to attain it’ (1690, II xxiii). Hume, 
in the same vein, holds that ‘…modern philosophy leaves us with no just or satisfactory 
idea of…matter.’ (1739, 1.4.4) Kant argues that ‘[w]e have no insight whatsoever into 
the intrinsic nature of things.’ (A277/B333) Indeed, his doctrine of the unknowability 
of things as they are in themselves can be understood as a variant of the inscrutability 
claim.10 
 There are also a number of more recent positions that support inscrutability. 
Feigl claims that physical entities are ‘...“triangulated” on the basis of various areas of 
observational (sensory) evidence…’ but holds that ‘[w]hat these objects are 
acquaintancewise is left completely open...’ (2002, p.71). Jackson explores what he 
calls a ‘Kantian Physicalism’ according to which we label entities by their relational 
properties but have no access to their ‘intrinsic essences’ (1998, p.23). Blackburn 
suggests that we have knowledge of dispositions located in space but not of the 
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 In making this observation I am not committing to Langton’s (1998) reading of Kant, which seems to 
strip away the idealist components of his position. The observation is just that Kant, whatever else he 
says, uses the premise of Receptivity to reach the conclusion that we cannot know the absolutely 
intrinsic properties of objects. 
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properties that ‘fill in’ space (1990). Seager states ‘…we have, it seems, absolutely no 
knowledge of the intrinsic properties of matter which underwrite their causal 
relations.’ (2006, p.135). Foster offers particularly powerful arguments for 
inscrutability, concluding that: 
...in sharp contrast with the richness of our knowledge and potential 
knowledge of the spatio-temporal and functional character of the 
material realm, properties of intrinsic content are wholly beyond the 
reach of empirical discovery—or, at least, of discovery in a form that 
reveals what these properties are. (2008, p.47) 
The claim of inscrutability has an impressive philosophical pedigree bridging a range of 
periods, areas of enquiry and philosophical persuasions. This does not show that the 
claim is true, but it does indicate that it should be taken seriously. 
 
2.3. ARE DISPOSITIONS INTRINSIC PROPERTIES? 
 
So far we have captured the thought that physical entities must have absolutely 
intrinsic properties. It is worth noting that a number of different positions can be 
taken on the connection between an object’s intrinsic nature and its dispositions. 
Obviously an object’s property of ‘causing X’ is an extrinsic property, depending as it 
does on X’s presence. Consider the hammer’s property of ‘breaking the vase’. This 
cannot be an intrinsic property of the hammer since it clearly depends on something 
beyond itself, namely the vase and the circumstances that allowed the breakage (see 
Martin & Heil 1999, p.47). The interesting question is whether the hammer’s 
disposition to break the vase is an intrinsic property. After all, the hammer’s latent 
potential to break the vase does not depend on the existence of the vase, nor on the 
occurrence of the appropriate circumstances. The question is whether that disposition 
– that potential to enter into a certain causal relation – is routed in the nature of the 
hammer itself or has some source outside it. 
 There are three main positions that can be taken on the relationship between 
an object’s intrinsic properties and its dispositions. First, an object’s intrinsic 
properties could be taken to necessitate its dispositions. On this view, all duplicates of 
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an object have the same causal powers. Of course, whether that power is manifest 
depends on the possible world the object is in, but the potential itself is invariant. 
Objects would even have their dispositions in a lonely world. On this view, an object’s 
causal powers are grounded in its intrinsic nature. 
 Second, an object’s intrinsic properties could determine its dispositions 
contingently. On this view, the powers of an object arise from a combination of its 
intrinsic properties and the laws of nature. Duplicates of that object in worlds with 
different laws of nature would then have different causal powers. Though intrinsic 
properties play an important role here, it is not the case that an object’s dispositions 
come out as intrinsic as they depend on laws that exist beyond the object itself. This 
position raises some serious problems. In particular, the notion of laws of nature being 
entities that somehow bestow causal powers on intrinsic properties is questionable. 
The first view offers a more plausible view of laws of nature: it is the causal powers of 
objects that are primary and the laws summarising those powers that are derivative, 
not the other way around. 
 Third, an object’s intrinsic properties could be regarded as causally inert. On 
this view, objects have intrinsic properties and have dispositions, but there is no 
connection between them. Intrinsic properties do not do anything.11 This position is 
implausible. Regarding its view of intrinsic properties, what does it mean for a 
property to be instantiated but to make no difference, actual or potential, to the world 
in which it is instantiated? As Heil suggests, ‘[p]roperties that make no difference to 
what their bearers do or would do are aberrations.’ (2005, p.352) Regarding its view of 
dispositions, there is an issue of parsimony. On the first view dispositions are not 
onticly distinct from the intrinsic nature of objects. Why should we adopt a view that 
instead regards dispositions as basic properties when there is a more economical 
position available? Furthermore, it is hard to make sense of an object having 
dispositions that are not grounded in its intrinsic nature, but are instead instantiated 
as primitives. 
 I will not get side-lined by the debate surrounding the metaphysical status of 
dispositions, but the most plausible view is that an object’s dispositions are 
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 Langton (1998) attributes this position to Kant, but it is not clear that Kant really thinks this. 
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necessitated by its intrinsic properties. I will continue on the assumption that this 
position is correct, though most of what I say about inscrutables could be adapted 
mutatis mutandis to match the second view. Adopting the third view would change 
things somewhat, but since this is a view that is not (and should not be) taken that 
seriously, there is no harm in putting it aside. The key conclusion here is that 
inscrutables are not causally inert. 
 Given that an object’s dispositions are grounded in its intrinsic properties, must 
grounding properties be absolutely intrinsic or could they be comparatively intrinsic? 
Comparatively intrinsic properties may well confer dispositions. For instance, a vase 
has a disposition of fragility in virtue of its molecular structure. The vase has that 
molecular structure intrinsically: it is loneliness-compatible and duplicate-invariant. 
This property reduces to the vase’s parts (its molecules) having certain extrinsic 
properties (their structure). This means that the vase’s disposition of fragility is 
conferred by a comparatively intrinsic property. However, we can then ask where the 
molecules that constitute the vase get their dispositions from. To avoid a regress, it is 
plausible that the buck must eventually stop with dispositions that are conferred by 
absolutely intrinsic properties. 
 This plausible view of dispositions seems to threaten IA3. If dispositions are 
ultimately conferred by absolutely intrinsic properties, then we should have epistemic 
access to those properties through our receptive knowledge of an object’s 
dispositions. There is a sense in which this is correct: when an object affects us, it does 
so in virtue of its absolutely intrinsic properties. As such, we can know those 
properties are present. To show what’s wrong with this line of thought, we must 
deploy the distinction between transparent and opaque ways of knowing first 
mentioned in Chapter 4 (Section 2.1.1). It is one thing to know that a property has 
certain manifestations and quite another to know what that property is. Receptivity 
provides us with, at best, an opaque knowledge of absolutely intrinsic properties. We 
can designate such a property indirectly as the ‘x’ such that it confers given 
dispositions. But this falls short of a direct transparent mode of access. In the context 
of Kant, Allais explains:  
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The claim is not that there are properties which are not powers -
causally inert properties which have no implications for how objects 
interact with other things - but rather that describing a property as a 
power does not describe it as it is in itself. (2006, p.161) 
Absolutely intrinsic properties exceed any purely relational/dispositional 
characterisation. To know such properties via their manifestations inevitably leaves 
out what those properties are like. One way of illustrating this is to consider two 
worlds W and W* occupied by entities that implement isomorphic causal structures 
but which differ with respect to the absolutely intrinsic nature of those entities. In 
light of Receptivity, those two worlds would be epistemically indistinguishable to us, 
thus we have no epistemic access to the intrinsic nature of physical entities.  
 It could be objected that it is impossible for two causally isomorphic worlds to 
differ with respect to the intrinsic nature of the entities implementing that structure. 
There are two responses to this objection. One, even if an object’s intrinsic nature 
fixes its dispositions, it remains plausible that its dispositions do not fix its intrinsic 
nature. On this view all structural characteristics are multiply realisable, so a pair of 
entities could have the same dispositions but differ intrinsically. Two, even if all 
intrinsic differences entail some dispositional difference, a pair of entities could have 
the same manifest dispositions but differ in their latent dispositions. As such, the 
entities in W and W* could differ in their latent dispositions and so – unbeknownst to 
us – differ in their intrinsic nature. 
 The claim of inscrutability is not just that we do not know the intrinsic nature of 
actual physical objects, but that we have no concepts that characterise their intrinsic 
nature (Foster 2008, p.65). We can understand in abstraction that there is a difference 
between W and W*, but we lack the conceptual tools to specify (transparently) what 
that difference consists in. What justifies this claim of conceptual ignorance? In light of 
Receptivity, it is hard to see how we could form concepts of absolutely intrinsic 
properties. However, attempting to develop a robust and uncontentious model of our 
concept-forming procedures would be over-ambitious. A more practical route is to 
look at the kind of concepts we actually have, and see whether they offer a 
transparent conception of absolutely intrinsic physical properties. 
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2.4. EXTENSION AND SOLIDITY 
 
It is tempting to claim that extension and solidity are absolutely intrinsic properties of 
which we have a transparent conception. Closer scrutiny, however, suggests that such 
a claim would be mistaken. Leibniz offers an illuminating account of extension, 
according to which it is a comparatively intrinsic property that can be resolved into the 
plurality, continuity and co-existence of its parts. As Pereboom explains, ‘[b]eing one 
of a collection of more than one thing, being continuous with other things, and 
coexisting with other things are all purely extrinsic properties of whatever has them.’ 
(2011, p.93) This position is compatible with the infinite divisibility of parts: one 
extended part may be divisible into further extended parts, and so on ad infinitum, but 
it remains the case that a part’s property of being extended is not absolutely intrinsic. 
On this view of extension, shapes come out as comparatively intrinsic. Being spherical, 
for instance, is simply a way of being extended.12 
 What about solidity? Solidity is plausibly an object’s disposition to keep other 
objects out of the space that it occupies. It could be held that solidity is the absolutely 
intrinsic property in virtue of which an object has the disposition of impenetrability. 
However, in this case we would only have an opaque conception of solidity as the 
property responsible for that disposition.13 We have no conception of solidity beyond 
its dispositional profile. 
 
2.5. THEORETICAL TERMS 
 
Do theoretical concepts, such as being an electron, characterise the intrinsic nature of 
physical entities? One might think that being an electron is something that stands 
apart from what an electron does. However, it is more plausible that ‘...the reference 
of the term ‘electron’ is fixed…by specifying the positions that electrons occupy in 
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 Leibniz proposes that extension is grounded in force. If he is right, this would not be a counter-
example to inscrutability, as we only comprehend force opaquely through its causal manifestations.   
13
 Pereboom offers an illuminating exposition of the concept of solidity with reference to Locke (2011, 
pp.97-100). Also see Foster (2008, p.59). 
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causal-structural networks’ (Maxwell 2002, p.350).14 Coleman helpfully fleshes out this 
claim:  
Physics tells us what electrons…are only by telling us how they 
interrelate with protons, forces and the like. Electrons are proton 
attractors, they are electron repulsors, they react to forces in such-and-
such ways, have a mass of 9.10938188 × 10-31 kilograms – which tells us 
about the kinds of displacements we can expect them to produce – the 
list continues.’ (2008, p.87) 
It could be held that to be an electron is to have a certain intrinsic nature – specifically, 
the intrinsic nature that the entities in fact performing the electron-role have. Even so, 
the concept ‘electron’ would only provide an opaque grasp of the intrinsic nature of 
those entities. This indirect designation of absolutely intrinsic properties provides no 
transparent characterisation of what those properties are like. 
 We do not need to go through each of our theoretical concepts before 
concluding that none of them offer a transparent characterisation of the absolutely 
intrinsic properties of physical entities? An examination of how theoretical concepts 
work indicates that it is inevitable that no theoretical concept is a counter-example to 
inscrutability. Blackburn explains that we can ‘…see the theoretical terms of science as 
defined functionally, in terms of their place in a network of laws’ (1990, p.63). On this 
view, all theoretical terms work by specifying the status of entities in a causal system, 
so could not possibly characterise their intrinsic nature.15 Lewis’s (1970) account of 
theoretical terms, which builds on the ideas of Ramsey, sheds light on this claim. 
Sometimes theories introduce new terms into our vocabulary. Lewis’s central idea is 
that any new term in a theory can be defined explicitly using the old vocabulary in that 
theory (see Cruse 2004, p.139). If we accept that our non-theoretical concepts cannot 
characterise the intrinsic nature of entities then, on this view, theoretical concepts will 
fare no better. Lewis emphasises that new theoretical terms refer to properties via 
their causal role, and that ‘[n]o amount of knowledge about what roles are occupied 
will tell us which properties occupy which roles.’ (2009, p.204) This position on the 
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 Also see Ellis & Lierse (1994, p.32). 
15
 The functional-role model of conceptual analysis discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 2.2.1) also 
complements this outlook. 
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limits of scientific representation, which Lewis dubs ‘Ramseyan Humility’, 
complements inscrutability.16 
Staying on the topic of scientific representation, Epistemic Structural Realism 
(ESR) is another view that appears to complement inscrutability. However, I argue that 
ESR is a red herring. ESR was introduced by Worrall (1989) in response to a problem 
called the ‘pessimistic meta-induction’. According to the pessimistic meta-induction 
‘…we should infer that all theories scientists ever produce are false, on the inductive 
grounds that all past theories have been found to be false.’ (Lipton 2000, p.182) 
Worrall attempts to get round this problem by distinguishing between the structural 
and the non-structural content of scientific theories. He suggests that the non-
structural content of theories has usually turned out to be false, conceding that the 
non-structural content of our current theories should therefore not be trusted. 
However, Worrall suggests that the structural content of theories is generally retained 
when new theories replace old theories. For instance, Worrall claims that when 
Maxwell’s electromagnetic field theory supplanted Fresnel’s theory of elastic solid 
aether, it preserved the structure of the older theory but rejected its non-structural 
claims about the entities grounding that structure (1989, p.117). This continuity in 
structural content means that science’s track-record presents no threat to the 
structural content of our current theories. In light of this, Worrall concludes that we 
are justified in believing what our best theories say about the structure of the physical 
world, but should not believe what they say about the intrinsic nature of entities 
occupying that structure. 
What is the relationship between ESR and inscrutability? Like inscrutability, ESR 
claims that we are ignorant of the non-structural intrinsic nature of physical entities. 
Unlike inscrutability, it claims that we possess concepts for non-structural properties. 
For instance, according to Worrall the solid elastic aether theory makes substantive 
claims about the intrinsic nature of physical entities. He just holds that we are not 
justified in believing those claims. Is Worrall right that theories have non-structural 
content? No - it is plausible that the content Worrall regards as non-structural is, on 
closer examination, structural. ‘Aether’, for instance, is simply a notion of the ‘X’ that 
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 An interesting related view of theoretical concepts is presented by Rosenberg (2004).   
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does the things that aether does (Cruse 2004, p.138). As Papineau objects, the 
‘…restriction of belief to structural claims is in fact no restriction at all’ (1996, p.12). If 
we reject ESR, are we then lumbered with the pessimistic meta-induction? Again, no. 
Many other responses to this challenge are available. Lipton, for example, argues 
persuasively that the nature of scientific enquiry is such that we should expect a string 
of false theories before we start getting things right, thus blocking the inference from 
past falsity to present falsity (2000, p.202). Overall, ESR is not an ally of inscrutability.  
 
SECTION 3 
INSCRUTABILITY VS. PURE STRUCTURALISM 
 
Pure Structuralism denies IA2 – the claim that physical entities have absolutely 
intrinsic properties. Pure Structuralism has been taken increasingly seriously, and 
presents an important threat to inscrutability. On this view, physical entities have no 
hidden aspect. It may well be that we have no concepts of absolutely intrinsic physical 
properties, but since physical entities do not possess such properties, this conceptual 
limitation does not entail ignorance of a type of actual physical truth. As Chakravartty 
explains, position aims to ‘…collapse the distinction between knowledge of structures 
and knowledge of natures.’ (2004, p.152) In Section 3.1 I will outline Pure 
Structuralism. In 3.2 and 3.3 I will discuss the two main arguments for Pure 
Structuralism. In 3.4 I will conclude that Pure Structuralism is incoherent, and that IA2 
is safe. 
 
3.1. WHAT IS PURE STRUCTURALISM? 
 
Pure Structuralism is the view that all physical entities ultimately have exclusively 
extrinsic properties. They may have comparatively intrinsic properties, since these are 
reducible to extrinsic properties. They do not, however, possess any absolutely 
intrinsic properties. The simple argument against Pure Structuralism is that extrinsic 
[128] 
 
properties must be possessed by self-subsistent objects and, as previously discussed, 
self-subsistence requires the possession of absolutely intrinsic properties. Some 
versions of Pure Structuralism deny the first of these claims and hold that the physical 
world is a network of extrinsic properties devoid of objects. Other versions deny the 
second claim and hold that extrinsic properties do presuppose objects, but those 
objects have an exclusively relational nature. On this view, objects are 
‘reconceptualised in a structuralist way’ (Psillos 2006, p.561). The difference between 
these two positions is mainly terminological: both positions deny the existence of 
objects in the sense of substances with absolutely intrinsic natures. Pure Structuralists 
adopt ‘…eliminativism about self-subsistent individuals.’ (Ladyman & Ross 2007, p.130) 
Though it is intuitive that the concept of structure presupposes the existence of 
entities that exist independently of that structure, and so ultimately the existence of 
entities with non-structural properties, Pure Structuralism simply rejects that intuition. 
To cite this conceptual dependence as an objection to Pure Structuralism would thus 
be to beg the question (see Chakravartty 2003, p.872). Even if it is true that we cannot 
think of structures without a foundation of self-subsistent objects, the Pure 
Structuralist can dismiss this as a limitation of our cognitive capacities rather than a 
metaphysical insight (see Ladyman & Ross 2007). Overall, an argument against Pure 
Structuralism will have to deploy something more than the intuition that relations 
require self-subsistent relata. 
 Different versions of Pure Structuralism involve different notions of ‘structure’. 
The most liberal form of Pure Structuralism is open to any extrinsic (or comparatively 
intrinsic property) in its ontology. If this kind of position can be defended, IA is in 
trouble. As such, there is no need for us to engage with the more conservative forms 
of Pure Structuralism according to which familiar extrinsic properties - such as spatial, 
temporal and causal relations - must be purged from our ontology along with 
absolutely intrinsic properties. Clearly, the threat to inscrutability does not rely on an 
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extreme formulation of Pure Structuralism, such as the view that the physical world is 
a purely logico-mathematical structure.17 
 The Pure Structuralist suggests that we revise our understanding of those 
entities that we take to be self-subsistent objects. When we sit on a chair, there is a 
locus of force that resists our body. There is a disposition of impenetrability in a spatio-
temporally located area, but there are no absolutely intrinsic properties ‘filling in’ that 
area. There is simply the bare power itself. This power is object-like in that it remains 
constant through time, but it is not carried by any self-subsistent entity.18 This power 
cannot be understood independently of the difference it makes to the wider world, 
just as a point on a graph is something that cannot be understood independently of its 
place in the graph as a whole.19 Foster explains the view this encourages of the nature 
of particles: 
Instead of thinking of these particles as possessors of intrinsic 
content—for example, as items of some kind of space-occupying stuff—
we should have to think of them simply as mobile items of causal 
power, with no further space occupant to form the vehicle of the power 
or cluster of powers involved, nor any non-functional properties on 
which the power or power cluster is nomologically grounded. (2008, 
p.66) 
What motivates this kind of position? In the context of the philosophy of science, 
positions of this kind have been put forward as variants on ESR. We have seen how ESR 
attempts to evade the pessimistic meta-induction by claiming that we should only 
commit to the structural content of scientific theories. Some make the same move 
against the pessimistic meta-induction, but add the Pure Structuralist claim that 
physical entities do not have any non-structural properties.20 I will dismiss this as an 
argument for Pure Structuralism for two reasons. First, as I have already suggested, the 
pessimistic meta-induction is a dubious challenge to scientific realism, so Pure 
Structuralism’s promise of evading that challenge is of little importance. Second, 
                                                 
17
 Cao (2003) offers serious objections to the logico-mathematical version of Pure Structuralism, though 
Saunders (2003) responds that the positions Cao targets do not really adopt such an abstract view of 
structure.  
18
 This view should not be confused with Dispositional Essentialism (Bigelow, Ellis and Lierse 1992) 
according to which an object’s dispositions make it the kind of object it is. Dispositional Essentialism is 
compatible with the self-subsistence of objects. 
19
 For more on this oft-cited graph analogy, see Ladyman (2007) and Bird (2007, p.534). 
20
 This position is usually labelled ‘Ontic Structural Realism’ (e.g. Ladyman and Ross, 2007). 
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epistemic considerations about the track-record of science distract from the more 
important (and less contentious) epistemic considerations concerning the receptive 
nature of knowledge. The real reason for thinking our access to the physical is limited 
to the structural comes from Receptivity, not from the history of science.  
I will consider two arguments for Pure Structuralism. The first is based on 
empirical considerations that are held to show that an ontology of self-subsistent 
objects is incompatible with certain scientific data. The second is based on 
methodological considerations that suggest Pure Structuralism should be our default 
position. On this view, positing absolutely intrinsic properties is compatible with the 
scientific data, but would be methodologically gratuitous. 
 
3.2. THE EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT FOR PURE STRUCTURALISM 
 
Some Pure Structuralists claim that empirical findings suggest that we should not 
adopt an ontology of self-subsistent individuals. Though object-hood is a perfectly 
useful notion when talking about tables and chairs, it should not be used in the context 
of fundamental physics. Consider, for instance, the question of whether quantum 
fields should be seen as a collection of particles or as a single entity with particle-like 
manifestations. Ladyman & Ross (2007) argue that the evidence ‘underdetermines’ the 
answer to this question. In some contexts, it looks like the field is simply an aggregate 
of particles. However, other findings suggest that the field is somehow primary and 
exceeds the features of the particles. As such, we can justify neither the view that 
particles are individuals, nor the view that the field is an individual.  
 Pure Structuralism can accommodate the scientific data here. It can hold that 
these different contexts encourage two illuminating but inconsistent object-based 
interpretations of a reality that is in fact purely structural. The world is neither one way 
nor the other qua individual, since it does not contain self-subsistent individuals. 
Notions like ‘object’ and ‘individual’ are merely useful tools. Some contexts encourage 
those tools to be deployed one way, other contexts encourage a different use, but in 
neither case do we capture the real nature of the phenomena in question. French & 
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Ladyman argue that ‘…the metaphysical packages of individuality and non-individuality 
would then be viewed in a similar way to that of particle and field in [Quantum Field 
Theory], namely as two different (metaphysical) representations of the same structure’ 
(2003, p.37). But if there is no place for a notion of individuality in our metaphysics, 
there is no longer a place for the absolutely intrinsic properties of individuals. 
 This argument against self-subsistent individuals is unconvincing. It is not clear 
that there is indeterminacy between the particle-based and field-based positions. Cao, 
among others, argues that we have good reason to take fields as primary (2003, p.63). 
As such, fields are the self-subsistent individuals and bearers of absolutely intrinsic 
properties, not particles. This may be a strange discovery about the nature of 
fundamental entities, but that should not cast doubt on the applicability of a concept 
of self-subsistent objects. As Esfeld & Lam state, ‘…what is challenging about quantum 
physics is not that there are no objects, but that the properties of objects are 
remarkably different from the properties that classical physics considers.’ (2008, p.34)  
 
3.3. THE METHODOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR PURE STRUCTURALISM 
 
The more interesting argument for Pure Structuralism concerns the application of 
methodological principles. The object-based view and Pure Structuralism offer 
competing ontologies. It is fair to conclude that empirical considerations alone will not 
show us that Pure Structuralism is true. Instead, the decision must be made on the 
basis of methodological considerations. Given a choice between the two positions, 
which is the default position? Pure Structuralists claim that the onus is on their 
opponents to show that an ontology free of absolutely intrinsic properties is not viable. 
Since such an ontology is viable, we should adopt Pure Structuralism. I distinguish 
between two related arguments that can be made in favour of Pure Structuralism 
being the default choice: parsimony and epistemic accessibility. 
 The first point in favour of Pure Structuralism is that given a choice between 
two viable positions we should generally advocate the one that is most economical 
ontologically. Following Occam’s Razor, we should never posit more entities than are 
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needed to account for the evidence. Pure Structuralists claim that we can make sense 
of the world without positing absolutely intrinsic properties. If we can do without 
these extra properties then, applying Occam’s Razor, we should do without them. The 
theory that physical entities have absolutely intrinsic properties is underdetermined by 
the evidence. In light of Receptivity, our evidence only ever warrants positing extrinsic 
physical properties. Positing absolutely intrinsic properties as well would thus be 
methodologically unsound. One might try to reject Pure Structuralism on the basis that 
we do have epistemic access to absolutely intrinsic properties after all, but this is not 
an option for the inscrutability view. The conclusion of IA is precisely that we lack 
epistemic access to the intrinsic nature of physical entities. 
 The second consideration in favour of Pure Structuralism is that it is 
methodologically unsound to posit unknowable properties. Pure Structuralism and the 
inscrutability position agree that our epistemic access to the physical world is limited 
to its structure. In claiming that absolutely intrinsic properties are unknown, 
inscrutability is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, it could posit inscrutables 
despite our lack of knowledge of them. But how could we possibly justify positing 
inscrutables if we cannot know that they exist? On the other hand, it could claim that 
we do have knowledge of inscrutables after all. But then the position becomes 
incoherent, claiming that we have knowledge of unknown properties.21 Pure 
Structuralism does not posit unknown properties, so avoids this methodological issue. 
Another way of making this point is to consider what purpose the notion of 
inscrutables could possibly play in our intellectual practice. If there is no use in talking 
about inscrutables, surely we should prefer a position that excludes them from its 
ontology? Ladyman & Ross put this in stronger terms, arguing that ‘…no hypothesis 
that the approximately consensual current scientific picture declares to be beyond our 
capacity to investigate should be taken seriously’ (2007, p.29).22 
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 This is a familiar objection to Kant’s doctrine of the unknowability of things-in-themselves. 
22
 Ladyman & Ross go as far as adopting a kind of neo-verificationism (2007, p.130). However, the point 
under discussion can be made without committing to this bold position. 
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3.4. THE INCOHERENCE OF PURE STRUCTURALISM 
 
The considerations above plausibly show that if Pure Structuralism is a viable ontology 
then we should prefer it to a position that posits absolutely intrinsic properties. 
However, a strong case can made against the antecedent of this conditional. Pure 
Structuralism cannot be true. The thought that relations require relata can be 
reinforced in a way that casts serious doubt on the coherence of Pure Structuralism. 
Though Pure Structuralism denies the existence of self-subsistent objects, it affirms the 
existence of distinguishable extrinsic properties. The physical world-structure must 
consist in a plurality of extrinsic properties. The challenge to Pure Structuralism is this: 
how are these extrinsic properties to be individuated? What makes one instantiation 
of a spatio-temporal or causal property distinct from any other? Lowe elucidates this 
challenge as follows: 
The problem ... is that no property can get its identity fixed, because 
each property owes its identity to another, which, in turn owes its 
identity to another – and so on, in a way that, very plausibly, generates 
either a vicious infinite regress or a vicious circle. (quoted Bird 2007, 
p.523) 
According to Pure Structuralism, the identity of a property is determined by its 
relations. But such relations presuppose the existence of properties that stand in those 
relations. Ladyman paraphrases this objection: ‘Relations presuppose numerical 
diversity and so cannot account for it.’ (2007, p.23) Interestingly, this objection to Pure 
Structuralism is an application of the motto that relations require relata, but avoids a 
question-begging presupposition that the physical world contains self-subsistent 
objects. 
This problem of individuation becomes more obvious in the context of the Pure 
Structuralist’s view of causal powers. Keith Campbell asks ‘[w]hen one point moves 
another, all that has been shifted is a power to shift powers to shift.... But powers to 
shift what?’ (quoted Bird 2007, p.520). Similarly, Ellis states:  
If all of the properties and relations that are supposed to be real are 
causal powers, then their effects can only be characterized by their 
causal powers, and so on. So causal powers are never manifested. They 
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just produce other causal powers in endless sequence. (quoted Bird 
2007, p.520)  
In order to make sense of powers, we need entities with absolutely intrinsic properties 
that can stand in causal relations, but which are not reducible to such relations. As Ellis 
& Lierse argue, ‘[r]eal dispositions involve real changes to the object in question. For 
example, solubility is a real disposition, for a soluble substance undergoes a genuine 
change when the disposition is manifested.’ (1994, p.36)23 
 Bird responds to this line of attack by considering the identity of points on a 
graph, arguing that the identity of those points depends on the graph as a whole and 
cannot be discerned in isolation from it. Extrinsic properties, he claims, similarly rely 
upon the world-structure as a whole.24 This line of thought is unconvincing. The 
identity of mathematical objects may well be relational, but concrete objects are a 
different matter. After all, to be concrete is essentially to be capable of existing apart 
from other things (Seager 2006, p.142). In a similar vein, Strawson holds that ‘…there is 
nothing more to a thing’s being than its intrinsic, non-relational propertiedness.’ (2006, 
p.28) In other words, abstract entities might have exclusively relational properties, but 
concrete entities cannot. We may well be able to define concrete entities in terms of 
their relations, but it does not follow that those entities could consist in nothing but 
relations. As Russell himself observes, defining something in terms of its relations 
‘…always indicates some class of entities having…a genuine nature of their own.’ 
(quoted Ladyman 2007, p.31) Van Fraassen captures this objection to Pure 
Structuralism succinctly: ‘Structure of nothing is nothing…’ (2007, p.60). The difference 
between a real concrete structure and an abstract structure is that real structures have 
some non-structural foundation. As such, Pure Structuralism does not offer a viable 
picture of the real world. 
 If a Pure Structuralist ontology is impossible, how exactly should we respond to 
the arguments in favour of Pure Structuralism? Regarding any putative empirical 
evidence in favour of Pure Structuralism, we can simply respond that there can never 
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 A possible view is that all powers are ultimately powers to effect spacetime. Spatiotemporal 
properties would be non-power properties that halt the problematic regress, but are not absolutely 
intrinsic properties. However, this position is successfully undermined by Foster (2008, pp.69-72).  
24
 Also see Holton (1999). 
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be empirical evidence for an impossible ontology. Regarding parsimony, given a choice 
between two possible positions we should indeed adopt the more economical 
position. However, Pure Structuralism is not a possible position, so its apparent 
parsimony is irrelevant.25 To paraphrase Einstein, we should make our ontology as 
simple as possible, but not one bit simpler. Positing absolutely intrinsic properties is 
not underdetermined by the evidence. We can verify the presence of certain causal 
properties and, since causal properties cannot exist without absolutely intrinsic 
properties, we can infer the existence of absolutely intrinsic properties. As such, our 
evidence reveals – albeit indirectly – the presence of absolutely intrinsic properties. Of 
course, this inference from observations to the existence of inscrutables involves a 
significant element of conceptual analysis. Some proponents of Pure Structuralism 
‘…deny that a priori inquiry can reveal what is metaphysically possible’ (Ladyman & 
Ross 2007, p.16), so will not be convinced by this inference. However, this view of a 
priori inquiry is dubious, and it is already a commitment of this thesis that conceptual 
analysis can reveal modal truths. 
 Regarding the unknowability consideration, the inscrutability view should 
concede that positing totally unknowable properties is unsound. As Cao puts it, ‘…if 
something is cognitively “utterly inaccessible” in principle, then there is no point in 
talking about its empirical existence.’  (2003, p.65) It should also be conceded that ‘[i]f 
it is claimed that there is something that exists but that we cannot know, we need an 
argument why we should accept that there is any such thing’ (Esfeld & Lam 2008 p.29). 
However, if Pure Structuralism is impossible, these principles can be satisfied. We have 
evidence of absolutely intrinsic properties every time we are affected by an object. The 
existence of inscrutables is not a fanciful speculation; it is something we can infer 
through a combination of empirical evidence and a priori reflection. As such, we do 
know that there are absolutely intrinsic properties – we just don’t have any conception 
of what they are.26 Maxwell explains that:  
                                                 
25
 Furthermore, Chakravartty (2003) makes the interesting point that Pure Structuralism is not actually 
more economical than its competitors. Pure Structuralism is forced to posit clusters of primitive 
dispositions that could be better accounted for as the manifestation of a smaller set of fundamental 
intrinsic property. 
26
 Langton (1998, p.13) uses an argument along these lines to defend Kant against the threat that the 
doctrine of the unknowability of things-in-themselves is self-defeating. In response, Cowling (2010) has 
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…science does assert the existence of instances of a variety of intrinsic 
properties; moreover, it provides information about the various causal-
structural roles that such instances play. However, it does leave us 
completely ignorant as to what these intrinsic properties are. (2002, 
p.350). 
Talking about such properties may be of no use to scientific inquiry but, as our 
discussion shows, we may nevertheless have reason to posit their existence. In 
summation, Pure Structuralism does not present a serious threat to the Inscrutability 
Argument. 
 
SECTION 4 
INSCRUTABLES AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I explained that the Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis 
(RIH) consists in two claims: that we have no conception of the (absolutely) intrinsic 
properties of physical entities, and that those properties are integral to the 
explanation of consciousness. We have come far enough to conclude that the first of 
these claims is plausibly true. Now we must return to the matter of consciousness to 
assess whether an equally strong case can be made for the second claim. The 
fundamental thought is that the intrinsicality of inscrutables makes them plausible 
candidates for the explanation of intrinsic phenomenal properties. Though there is 
something valuable in this line of thought, we will see that it faces severe limitations. 
 
4.1. RIH AND TYPE-F MONISM 
 
The ignorance hypothesis asserts that we are conceptually ignorant of properties 
integral to the physical explanation of consciousness. The Russellian version of the 
                                                                                                                                               
objected that ‘categorial properties’ such as ‘having intrinsic properties’ are intrinsic properties. As such, 
knowledge that physical objects have such properties is itself a counter-example to inscrutability. I 
respond (McClelland, 2012) with three objections to Cowling’s argument, the most important of which is 
that categorial properties are not the kind of property knowledge of which is excluded by inscrutability. 
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ignorance hypothesis makes the more specific claim that those unknown properties 
are inscrutables. This qualifies RIH as a member of the ‘Type-F Monist’ family of 
positions on consciousness. Chalmers introduces this label as follows: ‘Type-F Monism 
is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental 
physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.’ 
(2002, p.265). Though RIH plausibly qualifies as a form of Type-F Monism, it diverges 
significantly from other Type-F Monist positions. There are three possible positions 
that Type-F Monists can take on the relationship between fundamental intrinsic 
properties and phenomenal properties: 
1) The fundamental intrinsic properties of physical entities are 
phenomenal properties that combine to form our phenomenal states. 
2) The fundamental intrinsic properties of physical entities are qualities 
of which we are directly aware in consciousness, but which exist 
independently of such awareness. 
3) The fundamental intrinsic properties of physical entities are robustly 
non-phenomenal properties and are integral to the physical explanation 
of phenomenal states. 
According to ‘1’ the intrinsic nature of fundamental physical entities is inherently 
experiential. Since fundamental physical entities are ubiquitous, this position is 
committed to panphenomenalism. Some proponents of this stance emphasise that 
fundamental physical entities have only a highly attenuated degree of consciousness. 
However, admitting any degree of phenomenal awareness puts you in category 1. 
According to ‘2’, consciousness need not be ubiquitous, but the qualities of which we 
are aware in conscious experience are ubiquitous. We can call this position 
panqualitativism. A number of different views can be taken on which qualities are 
instantiated fundamentally and which (if any) are derivative.27 Different positions can 
also be taken on the explanation of our awareness of these qualities. I will not discuss 
these variations here.  
According to both 1 and 2, we do have concepts of the intrinsic nature of 
fundamental physical entities: our phenomenal concepts characterise the absolutely 
                                                 
27
 A terminological clarification is needed here: I will call a quality a phenomenal quality only when it is a 
property of a phenomenal state. One and the same quality can be both non-phenomenal or 
phenomenal depending on whether it is being experienced. 
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intrinsic properties of physical entities, or at least give us some grasp of those 
properties.28 As such, neither 1 nor 2 are consistent with the ignorance hypothesis. 
Proponents of these positions do not respond to the Problem of Consciousness with 
anything like EV. Consequently, RIH must fall under category 3. This is the view that 
though inscrutables are integral to the explanation of the phenomenal, they are not 
themselves phenomenal properties or qualities i.e. they are robustly non-phenomenal. 
 Though RIH must not be conflated with other forms of Type-F Monism, it 
obviously has a lot in common with these positions. Type-F Monism has an interesting 
history, though it is not always clear which of the three categories a proposal falls 
under. Locke suggests that, in light of our ignorance of the intrinsic nature of physical 
objects, we cannot conclude that mind and matter are incompatible (see Megill, 2005). 
Similarly, Kant argues:  
…if we compare the thinking ‘I’ not with matter but with the intelligible 
which lies at the ground of the external appearance we call matter, we 
cannot say that the soul is intrinsically any different from it, since we 
know nothing at all of it. (A360)  
Though Kant resists this mentalistic route, he does interpret Leibniz as adopting such a 
view  (A274/B330). Moving forward a few centuries, thinkers such as Clifford adopted 
the explicitly panphenomenalist view that ‘…the reality external to our minds which is 
represented in our minds as matter, is in itself mind-stuff.’ (1878, p.67) 
Russell took the view that ‘…the ultimate constituents of matter are not atoms 
or electrons, but sensations…’ (1921, Lecture VI) It is plausible that Russell’s notion of 
‘sensation’ is roughly equivalent to our notion of ‘qualitative character’. As such, he 
seems to fall into category 2, holding that physical entities have a qualitative nature 
that is not inherently experiential, but with which we are directly acquainted in 
experience. As I have already argued, this is not the route that RIH takes. Though RIH is 
clearly ‘Russellian’ in spirit, it is not strictly Russell’s own position. Feigl takes a similar 
view to Russell, holding that ‘…I am directly acquainted with the qualia of my own 
immediate experience, I happen to know (by acquaintance) what the 
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 I take it that any grasp we have on unexperienced qualitative redness is based on our concept of 
experienced phenomenal redness. 
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neurophysiologist refers to when he talks about certain configurational aspects of my 
cerebral processes.’ (2002, p.71). Lockwood adopts a related position: 
Consciousness…provides us with a kind of ‘window’ on to our brains, 
making possible a transparent grasp of a tiny corner of a material reality 
that is in general opaque to us, knowable only at one remove. The 
qualities of which we are immediately aware, in consciousness, 
precisely are some at least of the intrinsic qualities of the states and 
processes that go to make up the material world - more specifically, 
states and processes within our own brains. (1989, p.159) 
Similarly, Maxwell holds that ‘[i]f we recognize that C-fibre activity is a complex causal 
network…the way is left open for the neurophysiologist to theorize that some of the 
events in the network just are pains (in all of their qualitative, experiential, mentalistic 
richness).’ (2002, p.347). Other proponents of category 2 positions include Unger 
(1998), Banks (2010) and Coleman (2006/2008). 
The most prominent category 1 view is Strawson’s panphenomenalist position 
(1994/2006). We have mentioned his view already and will consider it again shortly. 
Chalmers (1996) and Seager (1995, 2006) sympathise with the category 1 stance. 
Rosenberg (2004) offers a position that builds the experiential nature of fundamental 
intrinsic properties into a distinctive metaphysics of causation.29 Category 3 versions of 
Type-F Monism have received less attention. As discussed, Stoljar (2001) originally 
adopted such a position and still takes it seriously in his reformed work (2006). Holman 
(2008), Montero (2010) and Pereboom (2011, p.197) all show sympathy with this kind 
of view. 
 Not all versions of the ignorance hypothesis adopt Type-F Monism and not all 
versions of Type-F Monism advocate the ignorance hypothesis. RIH lies in the 
intersection of these two groups. Though RIH must be carefully distinguished from 
other Type-F Monist positions, in Chapter 6 we will see that it is has something to learn 
from these existing proposals. 
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 Rosenberg’s views on causation are criticised persuasively by McKitrick (2006). 
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4.2. RIH AND THE –TRINSICALITY GAP 
 
The Relevance Condition on EV states that we should only adopt the ignorance 
hypothesis if we have reason to believe that unknown physical properties could evade 
the a priori obstacles to closing the epistemic gap. These obstacles are the –trinsicality 
and –tivity gaps, each of which indicate that no physical property could allow the 
epistemic gap to be closed. I will discuss how RIH addresses the –trinsicality gap here, 
and postpone discussion of the –tivity gap until Section 4.4. 
 
4.2.1. Inscrutables and Phenomenal Qualities 
Our discussion of the Inscrutability Argument has provided us with conceptual tools 
that can shed light on the –trinsicality gap. We can refine the four step argument for 
the  –trinsicality gap from Chapter 1 (Section 3.2.2) as follows: 
TRIN1’) All physical properties are structural properties i.e. extrinsic 
properties or comparatively intrinsic properties. 
TRIN2’) All phenomenal states involve the instantiation of non-
structural properties i.e. absolutely intrinsic properties.30 
TRIN3’) There can be no epistemic entailment from extrinsic properties 
or comparatively intrinsic properties to absolutely intrinsic properties. 
TRIN4’) Therefore, there can be no epistemic entailment from the 
physical to the phenomenal. 
Clearly, RIH denies TRIN1’. It is not the case that all physical properties are structural 
properties. Some physical properties are absolutely intrinsic properties, though we 
have no concepts for them. Furthermore, RIH can account for the prima facie 
plausibility of TRIN1’. At present, we can only characterise physical entities in terms of 
their structural properties. We even have reason to believe that this a permanent 
feature of our epistemic situation. As such, it is natural for us to conclude that all 
physical properties are structural, but RIH seeks to cast doubt on this conclusion. On 
this view, the apparent plausibility of the –trinsicality gap is symptomatic of our limited 
conception of the physical. 
                                                 
30
 Note, the non-structural properties of phenomenal states are its phenomenal qualities. I will discuss 
the view that the subjectivity of phenomenal states is also non-structural in the next sub-section. 
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Can RIH defensibly maintain that inscrutables are robustly non-phenomenal? 
Since being an intrinsic property is not a sufficient condition of being a phenomenal 
property, or of being qualitative, it is permissible to claim that inscrutables are non-
phenomenal. But if inscrutables are non-phenomenal, is it plausible that they are 
responsible for the intrinsic qualities of our conscious states? For instance, how could 
an intrinsic property that is not itself a property of qualitative redness be responsible 
for the red-quality of a conscious state? If the fundamental intrinsic properties of 
physical entities were straightforwardly qualitative, as they can be on the 
panphenomenal or panqualitative accounts, this problem would not arise. But RIH 
must hold that inscrutables are not themselves phenomenal or qualitative, yet are 
nevertheless integral to their explanation.    
 RIH can be defended against this kind of worry. To claim that phenomenal 
qualities cannot be accounted for by anything more basic than themselves is to adopt 
Primitivism about phenomenal qualities. As such, it begs the question against RIH. RIH 
claims that the intuition that phenomenal qualities are inexplicable in more basic 
terms is symptomatic of our limited conception of the physical. Because of our 
ignorance, RIH cannot demonstrate that phenomenal qualities are explicable in terms 
of inscrutables, but the onus is on the Primitivist to show that such an explanation is 
impossible. The Primitivist could argue that inscrutables are the wrong kind of property 
to explain phenomenal qualities, but how would such an argument go?31 This is 
normally where the –trinsicality gap would come in, but this clearly has no force 
against RIH. 
 An attractive feature of the way RIH undermines the –trinsicality gap is that it 
respects TRIN 3’. The conceptual insight that there can be no epistemic entailment 
from the structural to the non-structural is all the more compelling when rephrased in 
terms of there being no entailment from extrinsic properties to absolutely intrinsic 
properties. This is a difficult claim to deny, and it would be ill-advised for EV to take the 
route of maintaining TRIN 1’ and instead denying TRIN 3’. Contra Stoljar, it is deeply 
implausible that there could be unknown extrinsic physical properties that bridge the 
apparent conceptual gap between the extrinsic and the absolutely intrinsic. In fact, the 
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 This question will be considered further in Chapter 6 (Section 2.3). 
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very concept of absolute intrinsicality makes such a bridge impossible. This is 
important to our evaluation of EV: EV is defensible only if it undermines the                             
–trinsicality gap, and EV can only undermine the –trinsicality gap by holding that the 
properties of which we are ignorant are absolutely intrinsic properties. Therefore the 
plausibility of EV depends on the plausibility of RIH. 
 
4.2.2. Is Subjectivity Non-structural? 
Now that we have the refined formulation of the –trinsicality gap offered by TRIN’,  a 
brief tangent is in order. In Chapter 1 (Section 3.3.1) I explained that the –trinsicality 
gap pertains to the qualitative character of phenomenal states rather than to their 
subjectivity (that is, to their being phenomenal states at all). I also explained that some 
take a different view on this and claim that there is a conceptual gap between the 
structural and the subjective (e.g. Chalmers 1996). According to this kind of position, it 
would be misleading to claim, as I have, that the –trinsicality gap pertains only to the 
qualitative character of conscious states. We are now in a better position to 
understand that view and explain why it is mistaken. There are two senses in which 
subjectivity may indeed be regarded as ‘non-structural’, but neither presents a serious 
obstacle to Physicalism. 
First, we have mentioned that on some views physical facts are ‘structural’ in a 
conservative sense; that they are purely abstract and formal. According to this kind of 
position, there is nothing more to the physical world than the mathematical structures 
captured by physics. Plausibly, such formal facts can only entail more formal facts, but 
subjective awareness is not an abstract formal property of a state. It is true that 
subjectivity is a substantive non-formal characteristic. However, the problem with 
formulating the –trinsicality gap in this way is that it is implausible that all physical 
facts are ‘structural’ in this conservative sense. Though many Physicalist ontologies 
reject inscrutables, they generally admit substantive relational properties into their 
ontology. As such, this line of thought does not present any serious obstacle to 
Physicalism, so is not a serious pillar on which to rest the case for Primitivism. 
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 Second, there is a further sense in which subjectivity is non-structural. Seager, 
for instance, claims that ‘[t]he realization that states of consciousness are intrinsic 
properties is of great significance.’ (2006, p.136) Applying our two diagnostic tests of 
intrinsicality, he goes on to suggest that ‘…my duplicates — even if the only thing in 
the world — would share all my states of consciousness.’ (2006, p.136). However, 
though Seager and others are plausibly correct that properties such as ‘being in a 
subjective state’ are intrinsic to us, they would be wrong to make the bolder claim that 
they are absolutely intrinsic. Why should we rule out consciousness being a 
comparatively intrinsic property of an individual? Phenomenal qualities cannot be 
reduced to the extrinsic properties of their parts, but it is not immediately implausible 
to claim that the property of ‘being in a subjective state’ is reducible in this way. In this 
sense, subjectivity might be a structural property, so the (apparently) structural nature 
of physical facts presents no special obstacle to explaining subjectivity in physical 
terms. Comparatively intrinsic properties are derivable from extrinsic properties, so 
even if all basic physical properties are extrinsic properties there is no a priori obstacle 
to the entailment. The objectivity of those physical properties may present a problem, 
but that is a different matter. Overall, we can maintain the conclusion that the 
apparently structural nature of physical facts presents an obstacle to the physical 
explanation of the qualitative character of phenomenal states, but not to their 
subjectivity. 
To conclude, RIH evades the first a priori obstacle to the explicability of 
consciousness in physical terms. As such, it goes at least half way to satisfying the 
Relevance Condition.  
 
4.3. RIH AND THE INTEGRATION CONDITION 
 
The ignorance hypothesis is only plausible if it can be integrated with what we already 
know about the physical world. There are two layers to the satisfaction of the 
integration condition: finding a blind-spot in our current conception of the physical, 
and showing that the properties occupying that blind-spot are suited to performing the 
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proposed explanatory role. I will consider how RIH fares with respect to these two 
layers in turn. 
 
4.3.1. The Epistemic Status of Inscrutables 
In Chapter 4 (Section 3.3.2) I established a challenge for any version of the ignorance 
hypothesis. We need positive evidence that the proposed unknown properties are 
actual. We also need an account of why it is we are conceptually ignorant of the 
proposed properties, and how we have managed to get by despite our ignorance. 
These criteria seem to pull in opposite directions – positing the unknown properties 
seems to require them to be manifest to us, but our ignorance of them seems to 
require them not to be. RIH manages to overcome this worry. 
 Despite our conceptual ignorance of inscrutables, we must posit their 
existence. A critic cannot hold that though we have no concepts of absolutely intrinsic 
properties, such properties are not actually instantiated. This would be to adopt an 
incoherent Pure Structuralist stance. We know that physical entities must have 
absolutely intrinsic properties, but also know that we have no concepts of what those 
properties are. Adopting Donald Rumsfeld’s infamous phrase, we might call 
inscrutables a known unknown. 
 If inscrutables play an ineliminable role in the physical world, how have our 
explanatory practices been so successful despite our ignorance? Why does it appear to 
thinkers such as Prinz (2003) that the brain has no hidden properties? Foster provides 
an answer to these questions: 
…the limitation on what physical science can reveal…is not perceived as 
a practical limitation from the viewpoint of the scientist. He never finds 
himself wanting to evaluate hypotheses about the nature of particle 
content, since the possibilities for content are not scientifically 
specifiable. The point where the nature of the physical situation falls 
beyond the scope of empirical tests is the point where he runs out of 
vocabulary with which to formulate the options, and concepts by which 
to conceive of them. (2008, p.65) 
Inscrutables are not the kind of property that we need to worry about when trying to 
explain phenomena (with the possible exception of consciousness). We want causal 
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explanations for things, and such explanations can be provided in terms of dispositions 
and the relations in which entities stand without having to specify the intrinsic ground 
of those dispositions. Worlds can differ with respect to the intrinsic properties of 
physical entities but, for almost all of our explanatory projects, this is not a difference 
that makes a difference. So long as our conception of the physical world’s structure is 
adequate, we will not notice our conceptual ignorance. Nevertheless, philosophical 
reflection suggests that inscrutables still have an indispensable part to play in our 
ontology. 
 It is a significant virtue of RIH that it evades this epistemic quandary with such 
ease. It is hard to imagine other versions of the ignorance hypothesis that could offer 
compelling arguments for the existence of a conceptual blind-spot whilst also 
explaining how that blind-spot could generally go unnoticed. Though it would be rash 
to conclude that RIH is the only possible way of meeting this challenge, this does lend 
further support to the claim that RIH is EV’s best hope. 
 On the topic of the epistemic status of inscrutables, it is worth noting that RIH 
indicates that our ignorance is permanent. I have already argued that whether or not 
our ignorance is chronic has no bearing on the evaluation of EV one way or the other. 
Nevertheless, it is worth recognising that RIH entails that the explanation of 
consciousness is permanently beyond our grasp. Montero adopts a more optimistic 
view of the Russellian approach:  
…given that physics has changed in ways that would have been 
inconceivable to earlier generations, it seems we should leave open the 
possibility that physics could, someday in the unforeseeable future, 
explain both structural [and] non-structural features of the world.’ 
(2010, p.79)  
In other words, Montero thinks it is premature to conclude that science will never 
provide us with a conception of inscrutables. This argument, however, seems to miss 
the point. It is not a contingent feature of science that it only describes structural 
properties – rather, the receptive nature of knowledge plausibly makes this limitation 
inevitable. Though some may find this commitment of RIH unpalatable, it should not 
be regarded as a defect of the position. 
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4.3.2. The Suitability of the Blind-Spot 
RIH designates a specific blind-spot in our current conception of the physical. Given 
what we already know about the place of consciousness in the physical world, is that 
blind-spot a suitable home for properties that are integral to the explanation of 
consciousness? In connection with this question I introduced three criteria (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.1). RIH meets all of them. 
 First, what we know about the occupants of the conceptual blind-spot must 
tally with our conclusions about what kind of physical property can satisfy the 
Relevance Condition. So far, in response to the Relevance Condition I have argued that 
the unknown physical properties are absolutely intrinsic properties, and that their 
being so is what undermines the –trinsicality gap. The conceptual blind-spot revealed 
by the Inscrutability Argument must be occupied by absolutely intrinsic properties. As 
such, there can be no doubt that the proposed conceptual blind-spot is a suitable 
home for physical properties that evade the –trinsicality gap. 
 Second, we must be able to integrate RIH with what we already know about 
the physical basis of consciousness. For instance, we have reason to believe that the 
brain is the seat of consciousness. This suggests that if inscrutables are to play a role in 
the explanation of consciousness, they should be located in the brain. Since 
inscrutables are ubiquitous, they will indeed be instantiated in the brain. In fact, if any 
physical state is discovered to be a correlate of consciousness, that state will inevitably 
be grounded in inscrutables. Consequently, there is no risk of inscrutables being 
unsuitably located to play a role in the explanation of consciousness. 
 Third, RIH must integrate with what we know about the physical efficacy of 
conscious states. If inscrutables are integral to the explanation of consciousness, then 
the causal status of inscrutables will place restraints on the causal status of 
consciousness. The key point here is that inscrutables fall within the causally closed 
system of the physical. If they stood outside that system, RIH might have had trouble 
respecting the physical efficacy of conscious states. Interestingly, inscrutables are not 
extra components in the causally closed system, but rather the ground of components 
with which we are already familiar. We represent physical causes and effects 
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structurally, but now have reason to believe that these causal processes are founded 
on the intrinsic nature of physical entities.32 
 There is one remaining consideration that should be addressed in the context 
of the Integration Condition. Given what we understand about the physical world, is it 
acceptable to claim that inscrutables qualify as physical properties? EV is meant to 
defend Physicalism, so if inscrutables turn out to be non-physical, RIH fails. According 
to some strict standards of physicality, inscrutables are not physical because they do 
not figure in physical theory. As previously discussed though, this is not the sense of 
‘physical’ relevant to the Problem of Consciousness. Inscrutables satisfy our two 
conditions of physicality: being non-phenomenal, and falling within the causally closed 
system of the physical. Of course, some Type-F Monist positions claim that the intrinsic 
properties of physical entities are phenomenal. In our terms, such positions are not 
Physicalist. However, we have been explicit that RIH is committed to inscrutables being 
non-phenomenal. It could be argued that we are in no position to rule out the 
suggestion that the intrinsic properties of physical entities are themselves phenomenal 
(see Megill, 2005), but this would be asking too much of RIH. The burden of proof lies 
with the anti-Physicalist, so RIH only needs to show that a viable Physicalist account of 
consciousness is available, not that all anti-Physicalist positions are demonstrably false. 
Overall, RIH has no trouble satisfying the Integration Condition. Furthermore, 
any alternative version of the ignorance hypothesis would have its work cut out 
meeting the condition so successfully. Again, it seems likely that RIH is the best hope 
for EV. 
 
4.4. RIH AND THE –TIVITY GAP 
 
RIH has gone a long way towards satisfying both conditions on EV, and so towards 
offering a viable defence of Physicalism. However, this is as far as it goes. In order to 
satisfy the Relevance Condition, RIH must undermine both the –trinsicality and –tivity 
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 I will discuss concerns surrounding the causal status of inscrutables further in Chapter 6 (Section 2.5). 
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gaps. Though it succeeds with respect to the former, I will argue that it fails with 
respect to the latter. 
 
4.4.1. The Objectivity of Inscrutables  
The –tivity gap is based on three claims: that physical states are always objective, that 
phenomenal states are always subjective and that there is no epistemic entailment 
from the objective to the subjective. As we discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2), 
there are three different ways in which unconceived physical properties might close 
this gap. The unknown properties may be a kind of objective property, knowledge of 
which would reveal an entailment from the objective to the subjective. Alternatively, 
the unknown properties may themselves be subjective, rendering the gap between the 
objective and the subjective irrelevant. Finally, the unknown properties might fall into 
a third category between the objective and the subjective, and be suited to explaining 
subjective states. 
 Since inscrutables are objective properties, RIH is committed to the first route. 
The instantiation of inscrutables does not, in and of itself, mean the instantiation of 
subjective awareness. Why, then, should we believe that these objective properties 
are any more suited to the explanation of subjectivity than familiar objective 
properties are? There is nothing special about inscrutables that would cast doubt on 
the conclusion that they leave the gap untouched. It could be held that since we do 
not have concepts of inscrutables, we cannot rule out their being relevant to the 
explanation of subjectivity. But, as we concluded in Chapter 3, the burden of proof lies 
with EV to provide positive evidence for their relevance. Sheer optimism is not enough. 
 It could be held that the reason Physicalists have difficulty accounting for 
subjectivity is that it is an intrinsic property, so cannot be explained in structural terms. 
On this view, the intrinsicality of inscrutables might make them good candidates for 
undermining that threat. However, as we have discussed, it would be a mistake to 
formulate the threat to Physicalism in this way. It is the objectivity of physical 
properties that underwrites the –tivity gap, and inscrutables do nothing to cast doubt 
on that gap. 
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4.4.2. Alternative Strategies 
Maybe the best way to undermine the –tivity gap is to deny that inscrutables are 
objective. Perhaps, as Strawson argues, the intrinsic nature of fundamental physical 
entities is inherently subjectivity-involving. To say that inscrutables are inherently 
subjectivity-involving is to say that they are phenomenal properties: unlike 
intrinsicality, subjectivity is a sufficient condition of phenomenality. On this view, there 
is something it’s like to be an entity with absolutely intrinsic properties. Physical 
structures are grounded on experiential properties. There are a number of problems 
with this position. 
Claiming that inscrutables are phenomenal properties is at odds with the 
central claims of EV. The purpose of EV is to undermine the Primitivist position that 
phenomenal properties are fundamental. After all, EV is meant to defend Physicalism, 
and Physicalism requires all fundamental properties to be non-phenomenal properties. 
The panphenomenalist route concedes to Primitivism that there are basic phenomenal 
properties. It merely supplements Primitivism with the claim that our phenomenal 
states are not basic, but are instead the upshot of lower-level phenomenal goings-on 
that are beyond our immediate comprehension. 
The panphenomenalist view does not qualify as a version of EV, but it might still 
be regarded as a promising account of the metaphysical status of consciousness. After 
all, we have already granted the inscrutability of the physical, so have opened the way 
for this position. However, there are at least two further considerations that count 
against this view. 
First, we do not have positive reason to believe that inscrutables are 
phenomenal properties. We do have positive reason to believe that inscrutables are 
absolutely intrinsic properties, but not that they are subjective.33 It could be argued 
that since our only concepts of absolutely intrinsic properties are phenomenal 
concepts, we should prefer the hypothesis that inscrutables are phenomenal over 
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 This is related to an objection to panphenomenalism that Seager (1995) labels the ‘no-signs 
objection’. The idea is that basic physical entities do not display outward signs of being phenomenally 
conscious, so we should not attribute them phenomenal properties. 
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obscure claims of conceptual ignorance. This argument is unpersuasive. It is 
inappropriate to believe that inscrutables are phenomenal properties just because, as 
Coleman puts it, ‘…we can’t be bothered to think any further than the ends of our 
minds.’ (2008, p.89) This would reflect a deep lack of imagination and be highly 
anthropocentric. There is simply no need, independent of a desire to evade the –tivity 
gap, to regard inscrutables as subjectivity-involving. This speculation does not 
integrate with our existing understanding of the physical world. 
 Second, it is not clear that regarding inscrutables as phenomenal would 
successfully undermine the –tivity gap. Stoljar argues that ‘…it seems just as hard to 
see how one experiential truth can entail another as it is to see how a nonexperiential 
truth can entail an experiential truth’ (2006, p.120). Block captures this in a thought-
experiment. Imagine miniature conscious beings who ‘…build hordes of space ships of 
different varieties about the size of our electrons, protons, and other elementary 
particles, and fly the ships in such a way as to mimic the behaviour of these elementary 
particles’ (1980, p.280). If our brains were constituted by such an alien horde, our 
brain would involve the instantiation of phenomenal properties, but our conscious 
experience would remain inexplicable. In other words, regarding inscrutables as 
inherently subjectivity-involving may not help account for the subjectivity of our 
conscious states.34  
 A last resort would be to take the ‘neutral’ route, and claim that inscrutables 
are neither objective nor subjective.35 On this view, the principle that there is no 
entailment from the objective to the subjective becomes irrelevant. However, since 
inscrutables are not regarded as inherently subjectivity-involving, there is also no 
problematic commitment to them being phenomenal. Even if we permit the dubious 
notion of properties that are neither subjective nor objective, this position offers us 
the worst of both worlds. We have no reason to believe that neutral properties are any 
more suited to explaining subjectivity than objective properties are. Furthermore, if 
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 A more detailed objection to the idea of phenomenal ‘atoms’ explaining unified conscious states is 
offered by William James (1890). Chalmers describes this as ‘…easily the most serious objection…’ to this 
kind of account (2002, p.267). We will consider James’s argument further in Chapter 6 (Section 2.4). 
35
 Such a position should not be confused with the ‘neutral monism’ of Mach (1886), James (1904), 
Russell (1910) and others. 
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neutral properties are to any degree ‘…tainted with the phenomenal…’ (Montero 2010, 
p.77), all the objections against the panphenomenalist route arise once more. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Where does this leave RIH and EV? EV is defensible only if it offers a version of the 
ignorance hypothesis that satisfies the Relevance Condition and the Integration 
Condition. RIH goes a long way towards achieving this. The Inscrutability Argument 
makes a strong case for our being conceptually ignorant of the absolutely intrinsic 
properties of physical objects. Once we factor this ignorance into our reflections on 
consciousness, the –trinsicality gap loses its force. The hypothesis that inscrutables 
play a key role in the explanation of consciousness also satisfies the Integration 
Condition with ease. However, RIH has no force against the –tivity gap, so fails to 
satisfy half of the Relevance Condition. Consequently, RIH is not defensible. 
 Should the advocate of EV scrap RIH and pursue an alternative version of the 
ignorance hypothesis? We have learned two lessons from our examination of RIH that 
strongly suggest such a project would fail. One, it seems that EV can only evade the      
–trinsicality gap if the physical properties of which we are conceptually ignorant are 
absolutely intrinsic properties. RIH is the only version, or at least the only promising 
version, of the ignorance hypothesis that posits such properties. We thus have reason 
to doubt that any alternative version of the ignorance hypothesis could undermine the 
–trinsicality gap. Two, the considerations that cast doubt on RIH’s ability to evade the  
–tivity gap will apply to any version of the ignorance hypothesis. Any proposed 
unconceived physical properties had better be objective, but it is doubtful that positing 
any kind of unknown objective property would undermine the principle that there is 
no entailment from the objective to the subjective.  
Overall, our conclusion should not just be that RIH fails, but that EV is 
implausible. Though EV had a number of attractive characteristics, its success depends 
on whether it can deal with both the –trinsicality and –tivity gaps. We now have strong 
reason to believe that no version of the ignorance hypothesis will allow EV to achieve 
this.
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CHAPTER 5 
REPRESENTATIONALIST ACCOUNTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
As of yet we have not found an adequate response to the Problem of Consciousness. 
EV showed great promise, but was ultimately found to be inadequate. The purpose of 
this chapter is to explore an alternative approach to overcoming the problem. 
Representationalists (or Intentionalists) assert that phenomenal states are intentional 
states. In having a conscious experience, necessarily we represent things to be some 
way or another. This relatively uncontroversial claim starts to have implications for the 
metaphysics of consciousness when two further claims are added. First, that the 
phenomenal properties of conscious states are exhaustively determined by their 
intentional properties (Strong Representationalism). Second, that the intentional 
properties of conscious states can be fully accounted for in physical terms (Physicalist 
Representationalism).1 If these further claims can be defended, then the notion of 
representation would provide a bridge between the physical and the phenomenal, 
thus accommodating conscious experience in a Physicalist ontology.   
 Representationalism is a common position in the current debate over the 
Problem of Consciousness. In Chapter 2 I argued that standard responses to the 
problem are unsatisfactory, which motivated us to explore the non-standard response 
offered by EV. Why, then, are we now putting EV aside to reconsider an established 
position? I will ultimately conclude that the Representationalist strategy is indeed 
unsatisfactory. However, I will also argue that, like RIH, it succeeds in going some way 
towards addressing the epistemic gap, and so solving the Problem of Consciousness. 
RIH and the best form of Representationalism each deal with one half of the epistemic 
gap but not the other. This conclusion will allow me to develop a hybrid account in 
Chapter 6 that combines elements of RIH and of Representationalism to form a 
complex view of the phenomenal that overcomes the Problem of Consciousness. 
Nevertheless, in order to avoid prejudging the matter, the prospect of such a hybrid 
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 Physicalist Representationalism entails Strong Representationalism, but not vice versa. 
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will have no bearing on this chapter’s assessment of Representationalism. I will 
evaluate Representationalism over three sections. 
 Section 1 will outline the Representationalist strategy and explain what is 
required for it to vindicate Physicalism. As will now be familiar, I distinguish two 
challenges: accounting for the qualitative character of a phenomenal state and 
accounting for the subjectivity of that state. In Section 2 I assess the prospects of 
Representationalism regarding the first challenge. I conclude that our old enemy, the  
–trinsicality gap, cannot be overcome by an appeal to intentional properties, so 
Representationalism cannot meet the first challenge. In Section 3 I consider whether 
the second challenge is more tractable. I argue that an appeal to the meta-intentional 
content of phenomenal states may indeed be able to account for the subjectivity of 
consciousness. A Self-Representationalist theory based on the work of Kriegel 
(2005/2009) addresses the –tivity gap. I conclude that Representationalism makes it 
plausible that being a phenomenal state is explicable in physical terms, but does not 
make it plausible that the qualitative character of phenomenal states is also explicable 
in physical terms. 
 
SECTION 1  
THE VARIETIES OF REPRESENTATIONALISM 
 
In 1.1 I elucidate and support the view that all phenomenal states are 
representational. In 1.2 I distinguish between Weak and Strong Representationalism, 
and in 1.3 I distinguish between Physicalist and Nonphysicalist forms of Strong 
Representationalism. Only a Physicalist form of Strong Representationalism has the 
potential to offer an answer to the Problem of Consciousness. In 1.4 I outline how we 
should evaluate Representationalism’s prospects of overcoming the anti-Physicalist 
arguments offered by Primitivists. 
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1.1. THE INTENTIONALITY OF CONSCIOUS STATES 
 
What does it mean to say that phenomenal states are representations i.e. that they 
are intentional states? To be an intentional state is to be directed at the world – to be 
of or about something. Mental states are intentional states. Believing that you are 
sitting in a chair is directed at the state of affairs of your sitting in the chair. It 
represents the world as being a certain way. An intentional state and what it is about 
stand in an intentional relation. A special characteristic of intentional relations is that 
the represented thing need not obtain: there is a possibility of misrepresentation. For 
instance, one can believe that they are sitting in a chair when they are not. Non-
intentional relations do not have this special feature. Sitting in a chair is a relation 
between you and the chair that can only hold if the chair exists. 
What goes for mental states in general goes for phenomenal mental states in 
particular. Just as a state cannot be a belief unless it is a belief about something, a 
state cannot be a conscious experience unless it is an experience of something. It may 
not be of something actual, but it will always have intentional directedness. There is 
no such thing as an experience without intentional properties. As Tye claims, ‘All states 
that are phenomenally conscious - all feelings and experiences - have intentional 
content.’ (1995, p.93). This claim is relatively uncontroversial, and several compelling 
arguments can be deployed in its favour. 
First, the plausibility of the claim that all mental states are representations – 
that intentionality is the ‘mark of the mental’ – strongly suggests that all phenomenal 
states are representations (see Crane, 2007). Second, the terms with which we 
describe consciousness are representational terms. Phenomenal states are essentially 
states of awareness, and being aware is an intentional notion. Similarly, your 
experiential state is how things seem to you, how they feel or how they appear. 
Seeming, feeling and appearing are representational notions (see e.g. Byrne 2001, 
p.207). Furthermore, the transitive use of the word ‘conscious’ indicates that 
consciousness involves representation. Transitive consciousness is consciousness of – 
such as being conscious of your hunger – and consciousness of is a representational 
matter.  Third, conscious states are the kind of thing that can be assessed for accuracy 
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– they can be veridical or non-veridical. It is only possible to assess something as being 
accurate or inaccurate if it has content i.e. if it is a representation. Overall, it is highly 
plausible that being an intentional state is a necessary condition of being a conscious 
state. Unsurprisingly, very few positions on consciousness deny this. 
 
1.2. WEAK AND STRONG REPRESENTATIONALISM 
 
We have concluded already that being an intentional state is a necessary condition of 
being a phenomenal state i.e. that all phenomenal states have intentional properties. 
Weak and Strong Representationalists both agree with this conclusion. Where they 
diverge is on the sufficient conditions of phenomenal property-instantiations. The 
difference between the two positions is as follows: 
Weak Representationalism: The phenomenal nature of a state is not 
exhaustively determined by the intentional properties of that state. 
Strong Representationalism: The phenomenal nature of a state is 
exhaustively determined by the intentional properties of that state. 
In other words, only Strong Representationalists claim that whether a state is 
phenomenal, and what qualitative character that state has, is determined entirely by 
the intentional properties of that state. Only Weak Representationalists claim that 
non-intentional properties also contribute to whether a state is phenomenal and/or to 
the qualitative character of that state. 
 If Representationalism is going to overcome the Problem of Consciousness, it 
had better be Strong Representationalism. The promise of explaining intentional 
properties in physical terms only provides a vindication of Physicalism if conscious 
states can be fully explained in terms of intentional properties. As such, Weak 
Representationalism is not a strong enough thesis to provide what is needed. We will 
evaluate the prospects of Strong Representationalism over the course of the chapter. 
From here on, by ‘Representationalism’ I will mean specifically Strong 
Representationalism unless otherwise stated. 
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 To appreciate the Representationalist claim that intentional properties 
determine phenomenal properties, we should distinguish between pure and impure 
intentional properties. Pure intentional properties are those that characterise the 
content of a representation. Impure intentional properties are those that characterise 
the manner in which that content is given. The content of a representation is what it 
says about the world – the conditions under which it is accurate. For example, your 
perceptual state might have the content that your leg is damaged. This perceptual 
state is accurate iff your leg is in fact damaged. According to some, two states with 
precisely the same content may nevertheless differ in another intentional respect; 
they might have the same content in a different manner. For instance, feeling that 
your leg is damaged and seeing that your leg is damaged might be mental states with 
the same content, but which have that content in different modes. Crane, for example, 
proposes that ‘…the difference between feeling one’s leg to be damaged and seeing it 
to be damaged is just the difference between feeling and seeing…’ (2007, p.12). The 
claim is that these two states have the same pure intentional properties, but differ 
with respect to their impure intentional properties. 
 This distinction between pure and impure intentional properties has 
ramifications for the evaluation of Representationalism. Say it transpires that the pure 
intentional properties of a state do not determine its phenomenal properties. In this 
case, one might still defend Representationalism by holding that a state’s phenomenal 
properties are determined by its pure and impure intentional properties. 
 
1.3. PHYSICALIST AND NONPHYSICALIST REPRESENTATIONALISM 
 
If (Strong) Representationalism is true, then phenomenal properties are nothing over 
and above intentional properties. But are intentional properties nothing over and 
above physical properties? That is, can the intentional properties constitutive of a 
state’s phenomenal nature be accounted for in physical terms? The two options are 
clear: 
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Physicalist Representationalism: The intentional properties that 
determine a state’s phenomenal nature can be accounted for in 
physical terms. 
Nonphysicalist Representationalism: The intentional properties that 
determine a state’s phenomenal nature cannot be accounted for in 
physical terms. 
The main reason for adopting Physicalist Representationalism is the thought that all 
intentional properties can be accounted for in physical terms. Here the philosophical 
debate surrounding consciousness coincides with that surrounding mental 
representation (see Hellie 2007, p.290). If we have reason to believe that all 
intentional properties of mental states are not onticly distinct from the physical, and 
we have reason to believe that conscious mental states are simply those with certain 
intentional properties, then we can conclude that consciousness is not onticly distinct 
from the physical. The reducibility of intentional properties in general motivates the 
reducibility of phenomenal intentional properties in particular. 
 Jackson, after his move away from Primitivism, captures the general outlook of 
Physicalist Representationalism: 
The project of finding an analysis of representation is not an easy one – 
to put it mildly. But...the answers that have been, or are likely to be, 
canvassed are all answers that would allow the fact of representation  
to follow a priori from the physical account of what our world is like. 
(quoted Davies 2008, p.27) 
There is a widespread view that intentional properties can be accounted for in physical 
terms, but that precisely what those terms are has not yet been uncovered. As I have 
already argued (e.g. Chapter 3, Section 1.1.2), undermining the apparent inexplicability 
of consciousness in physical terms need not involve offering a positive physical 
explanation. It would suffice to argue that there is such an explanation even if we 
cannot specify what that explanation is. As such, it is acceptable to argue that 
consciousness can be explained in intentional terms amenable to Physicalism without 
offering a specific physical account of those intentional properties. 
As an illustration of how intentional properties might be accounted for in 
physical terms, consider Tye’s claim that ‘S represents that P =df If optimal conditions 
obtain, S is tokened in x if and only if P and because P’ (1995, p.101). Here S is the 
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vehicle of representation i.e. the state that represents, and P is the content of the 
representation i.e. what is represented by the state.2 The formula describes the 
relation that must obtain between S and P in order for the former to represent the 
latter. Other theories offer more complex accounts of this representational relation, 
but the central idea remains the same: S and P, and the relation between them, need 
not involve the instantiation of any non-physical properties.3 
 Nonphysicalist Representationalists reject this reductive strategy. On this view, 
phenomenal states can be accounted for in intentional terms, but those intentional 
properties cannot be accounted for in physical terms (e.g. Chalmers, 2004). One route 
here is to claim that no intentional properties can be accounted for in physical terms. 
One might adopt this position if they believed that all intentionality is derivative of 
phenomenal intentionality (e.g. Searle, 1990). The irreducibility of phenomenal 
properties would then entail the irreducibility of all intentional properties. The more 
common route, however, is to accept that most intentional properties can be 
accounted for in physical terms, but claim that conscious states involve special 
intentional properties that are irreducible. The difference between non-phenomenal 
and phenomenal representations is that the latter involve onticly primitive 
phenomenal properties. 
 
1.4. REPRESENTATIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
If Physicalist Representationalism can be defended, we would have a physical account 
of phenomenal consciousness. Since this position denies that there is an epistemic gap 
between the physical and the phenomenal, it qualifies as a Type-A position.4 But how 
would such a position address the anti-Physicalist arguments for Primitivism that drive 
the Problem of Consciousness? When we first discussed Representationalism in 
Chapter 2, we noted the threat that the arguments against Physicalism can simply be 
                                                 
2
 On the vehicle/content distinction, see Dretske (2003 p.68) and Hutton (2009, p.21). 
3
 Physical accounts of impure intentional properties have also been offered, often in functional terms. 
4
 There are a number of Type-B versions of Representationalism (e.g. Tye 1995, p.180). However, such 
positions do not respect the A Priori Entailment Criterion established in Chapter 2, so will be 
disregarded. 
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re-applied to Physicalist Representationalism. As Alter puts it, ‘…bringing 
representationalism to bear on the debate over whether consciousness is physical 
leaves everything more or less as it was.’ (2007, p.74) This worry applies to both CA 
and KA. 
Regarding CA, Representationalism must claim that zombies and inverts are 
ultimately inconceivable. Once we realise that our physical duplicates have the same 
intentional properties as us, and that intentional properties fix phenomenal 
properties, it will be inconceivable that they should differ from us phenomenally. 
However, as Crane argues ‘…if the worry was that zombies seem to be possible, then 
(given the manifest possibility of non-conscious intentionality) this worry will arise 
even on [an] intentionalist approach.’ (2007, p.24). The same goes for qualia inverts. 
 Regarding KA, Jackson (2007) has come to adopt Representationalism as a 
response to his own argument. The property of representing red in the manner 
required for a red-experience is, he claims, a property of which Mary has full 
knowledge in her monochromatic room. When she leaves the room, she comes to 
instantiate that property herself, but learns nothing new. However, here a critic can 
simply re-affirm the intuition that Mary does learn something new on leaving her 
room, indicating that the relevant representational property is not physical (see Alter, 
2007). 
 How should we determine whether Physicalist Representationalism is refuted 
by the anti-Physicalist arguments, or overcomes them? We have established already 
that the plausibility of those arguments depends on the plausibility of the –trinsicality 
gap and the –tivity gap. The best way to assess the prospects of Physicalist 
Representationalism is to see how it fares with each of these gaps. Fortunately, the 
Representationalist literature generally distinguishes between accounting for the 
qualitative character and subjective character of consciousness, so facilitates this 
methodological division. We will evaluate whether a Representationalist account of 
qualitative character can address the –trinsicality gap, and whether a 
Representationalist account of subjective character can address the –tivity gap. If 
Representationalism succeeds in both tasks, then we can conclude that it overcomes 
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the epistemic gap at the heart of the Problem of Consciousness, and so undermines CA 
and KA. 
 
SECTION 2  
REPRESENTATIONALISM AND QUALITATIVE CHARACTER 
 
In order to assess the prospects of a Physicalist Representationalist account of the  
qualitative character of conscious state, we must put aside the question of what 
makes a state one of subjective awareness. We will assume that a state meets 
whatever conditions (representational or otherwise) are required for it be a 
phenomenal state as such, and ask whether the intentional properties of that state 
plausibly determine what it is like to be in that state for its subject. The first step will 
be to consider whether a good case can be made for Strong Representationalism 
about qualitative character. I argue that it can. The second step will be to consider 
whether the intentional properties constitutive of qualitative character can be 
accounted for in terms amenable to Physicalism. I argue that no such account is 
available. 
 
2.1. STRONG REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT QUALITATIVE CHARACTER 
 
To take a Strong Representationalist view of qualitative character is to hold that the 
intentional properties of a phenomenal state fully determine the qualitative character 
of that state. What it is like for a subject to be in a conscious state is exhausted by the 
intentional properties of that state. What reasons are there to affirm this claim? 
Various arguments have been made, but the most compelling is the argument from 
transparency. A striking feature of the qualities of experience is their ‘diaphanous’ 
nature. Tye describes this feature: ‘In turning one’s mind inward to attend 
to…experience, one seems to end up concentrating on what is outside again, on 
external features or properties.’ (1995, p.30) For instance, when we try to focus on the 
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qualitative redness of our experience as we perceive a postbox, we inevitably attend to 
the redness of the postbox. This plausibly applies to all phenomenal qualities. 
Whenever we introspect our phenomenal states, we only find the properties 
represented by that state rather than some property of the experiential state itself 
(Tye 1995, p.136). 
The phenomenon of transparency invites a representational view of qualitative 
character. Our experience represents the postbox as red, and the properties that 
characterise our experience are represented properties rather than properties of the 
representation itself (see e.g. Dretske 2003, p.72). We see through our conscious 
states to their content. Even if we are imagining or hallucinating a red postbox, it 
remains the case that the redness is something our experience represents (albeit non-
veridically), rather than something it instantiates. As Dretske proposes, ‘…experienced 
qualities, the way things phenomenally seem to be…are - all of them - properties the 
experience represents things as having.’ (2003, p.67) In other words, the intentional 
properties of conscious states determine their qualitative character. Overall, the 
transparency of phenomenal qualities lends substantial support to Strong 
Representationalism about qualitative character. 
Are there any plausible counter-examples to Strong Representationalism about 
qualitative character? A number of cases have been put forward in which pairs of 
experiences are claimed to have the same content, but to differ in their qualitative 
character.5 For instance, believing that the cookie monster is blue and having a mental 
image of him as blue have the same content, but differ qualitatively since only the 
latter involves qualitative blueness (Kind 2007, p.406). Similarly, seeing something 
overhead and hearing something overhead are perceptual states with the same 
content, but what it is like to be in those states differs (Block 1995). Furthermore, 
one’s visual experience before and after removing one’s glasses could have the same 
content, but differ in qualitative character because the second experience is blurry 
(e.g. Crane 2007). 
                                                 
5
 There are also putative cases of experiences with qualitative character and no content, and 
experiences with the same qualitative character but which differ in their content. These examples are 
unpersuasive (see Kriegel 2009, Ch. 3). 
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One response to cases such as these is to claim that impure intentional 
properties contribute to qualitative character, and that the experience-pairs differ with 
respect to their impure properties. For instance, representing blurrily is a property of 
your experience that contributes to what it is like to be in that intentional state, as is 
representing visually (e.g. Crane 2007). Since such impure properties are still 
intentional properties, it remains the case that the intentional properties of a state fix 
its qualitative character. There are a number of serious objections to this ‘adverbial’ 
move (some of which we will consider in Section 2.2) but the most important objection 
is that it is unnecessary. The putative counter-examples can be dealt with by showing 
that there is in fact a difference in the pure intentional properties of the experience-
pairs, so there is no need to confuse things with an appeal to impure properties. 
The experience-pairs all have overlapping content, but it is not the case that 
they have the same overall content.6 The mental image of the cookie monster 
represents him as having some fully specific shade of blue, where the belief that he is 
blue does not. This difference in content could plausibly account for the difference in 
qualitative character of the two representations. Seeing and hearing something 
overhead have some content in common - they each represent that an object is 
overhead. But the visual representation will inevitably contain very different 
information about that object than does the auditory representation. Finally, the 
‘glasses-on’ experience represents things as having sharp edges while the ‘glasses-off’ 
experience represents them as having fuzzy edges (Dretske 2003, p.77). In the second 
experience, one might also be representing that the represented fuzziness is non-
veridical; that the world is as the first experience represents it to be. But this would 
not mean that the overall content of both experiences is the same. 
Though we have not dealt explicitly with all of the counter-examples raised 
against Strong Representationalism, we can tentatively conclude that it is accurate. 
Moreover, it is plausible that the pure intentional properties of a phenomenal state are 
sufficient to determine its qualitative character. The qualitative character of 
experience is simply how it represents things as being – how things seem to the 
subject of experience. 
                                                 
6
 This point is made with particular force by Dretske (2003, pp.75-80) and Kriegel (2009, pp.80-82) 
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2.2. PHYSICALIST REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT QUALITATIVE CHARACTER 
 
Assuming that the qualitative character of conscious states is determined by their 
content, can the possession of such content plausibly be accounted for in exclusively 
physical terms? There are three components to a Physicalist account of qualitative 
content: the vehicle, the content, and the relation in virtue of which the vehicle has 
that content. Physicalism requires all three components to be explicable in physical 
terms. I will argue that though there are no specific problems pertaining to the vehicle 
component or relation component, there can be no physical account of the content of 
phenomenal representations. I will then deal with potential objections to this 
conclusion. 
 
2.2.1. The Problem With Qualitative Content 
Plausibly, there need be nothing special about the vehicle of a representation with 
qualitative content. If it is credible that physical states of the brain can act as vehicles 
of mental representation at all, then it should be credible that they can carry 
qualitative representations. Once we accept that phenomenal qualities are 
represented properties, the fact that brain states do not themselves have phenomenal 
qualities is not problematic. Something can represent a property without having that 
property itself. When we look into a subject’s brain, we only see the vehicles of 
phenomenal representation. We should not expect knowledge of these vehicles to 
reveal the content of the representations they carry (see Dretske 2003, p.71). 
Conversely, the subject’s experiential state will not reveal properties of the vehicle of 
that experience. They may be aware of qualitative redness, but it would be a mistake 
for them to infer that their brain instantiates red-qualities. Importantly, the                   
–trinsicality gap presents no problem here. The fact that all properties of brain states 
are structural properties is compatible with their representing the non-structural 
properties that characterise our phenomenal states. Overall, there is no reason to 
think that the vehicles of qualitative content must be non-physical. 
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The relational properties that give a physical vehicle its content are a little 
more complex. We do not yet know what that relation involves. The causal covariance 
account outlined in Section 1, for instance, is clearly far too liberal. However, I have 
suggested it is plausible that the representation relation is ultimately explicable in 
physical terms. We cannot specify what relational properties are required to give brain 
states qualitative content, but they are presumably the same as the relational 
properties involved in an intentional state having non-qualitative content. The 
possession of qualitative content thus entails no special problem for 
Representationalism – only the same challenge of naturalising intentionality that 
applies to all mental representation. There are no compelling reasons to believe that 
the relation between a physical vehicle and its qualitative content is a non-physical 
relation. 
 This just leaves us with the content distinctive to qualitative representations. 
Presumably the Physicalist Representationalist must hold that the properties 
represented by our conscious states are physical properties of external objects. When 
our physical brain states stand in the right physical relation to these physical 
properties, they have qualitative content. The qualitative character of our experience 
is determined entirely by which physical properties the experience represents. In a 
veridical experience of the red post-box, the post-box bears the physical property of 
redness. In a non-veridical experience, it might be that no red-quality is instantiated, 
but it is nevertheless a physical property that the experience misrepresents as 
occurring. 
 On this model, Representationalism is committed to realism about all of the 
qualities that characterise experience. If a brain state represents qualitative redness by 
standing in an appropriate relation to instances of qualitative redness, those instances 
had better be real mind-independent properties. Physical objects must literally be 
qualitatively red, in and of themselves. Of course, we might misrepresent the 
occurrence of such properties, but these properties must sometimes be instantiated in 
order for us to be able to represent them at all. Since Strong Representationalism must 
account for every aspect of qualitative character, this applies to all the qualities that 
contribute to our experience. Sounds, tactile feels, smells, tastes must all belong to 
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physical objects. Even pains must be physical features of our bodies rather than 
properties of experience. The list also extends to emotions, moods and perhaps 
intellectual experience. 
For the sake of argument, assume that all phenomenal qualities are indeed real 
properties of external objects represented by conscious states. The problem for 
Physicalist Representationalism is that such qualities are not physical properties. We 
can motivate this conclusion by deploying the –trinsicality gap. Physical properties are 
exclusively structural, phenomenal qualities are non-structural, and there is no 
entailment from the structural to the non-structural. We originally formulated the        
–trinsicality gap on the assumption that phenomenal qualities are properties of 
experience rather than properties represented in experience. However, when 
Representationalists relocate those qualities outside the head, the –trinsicality gap 
loses none of its force. It applies to qualities-of-objects in just the same way as it 
applies to qualities-of-experience. For instance, a complete physical description of a 
post-box will not mention qualitative redness. Furthermore, the structural properties 
instantiated by the post-box cannot entail the instantiation of qualitative redness, as 
structural properties cannot entail non-structural properties. As such, the qualitative 
content of experience cannot be accounted for in purely physical terms. 
 
2.2.2. Responses and Rebuttals 
There are a number of possible responses to this objection to Physicalist 
Representationalism about qualitative character. I will outline some of these responses 
and show why each of them is unsatisfactory. 
 
A) Qualities As Intrinsic Physical Properties: It could be maintained that the qualities of 
which we are aware in experience are actually physical properties. On this view, it is 
false that all physical properties are structural properties. The non-structural 
properties responsible for qualitative character are all physical non-structural 
properties. It may well be that science only describes the structural properties of 
physical objects, but consciousness reveals their non-structural features. As we saw in 
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Chapter 1, being mentioned in physical theory, whether current or ideal, is not a 
necessary condition of being a physical property (at least not on the sense of ‘physical’ 
that drives the Problem of Consciousness). Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter 4, being 
an extrinsic property is not plausibly a necessary condition of being a physical 
property. Of course, being non-phenomenal is a necessary condition of being physical, 
but the view in question does not posit qualities that are themselves phenomenal. 
After all, to attribute qualitative redness to a post-box is not to attribute it 
phenomenal consciousness. 
 The main problem with this view is that there is no plausible account of the 
causal status of such properties. Qualities simply do not figure in our causal 
explanations of physical events. It could be argued that such explanations are 
mistaken, or at least seriously incomplete, but this would be implausible. The redness 
of the post-box does not do anything; the post-box could be qualitatively green and 
have precisely the same causal profile. Physical events can be explained in purely 
structural terms.7 One option is to concede that qualities are inefficacious. On this 
view, science describes the causal structure of the physical world, but conscious 
experience reveals some of the world’s inefficacious physical properties. The problem 
here is that it is implausible that we could come to represent inefficacious properties. 
We may not have a complete theory of the representation relation, but causation is 
clearly going to play a major role. How could we come to represent qualitative redness 
if that property never had any affect upon us? 
  
B) Qualities as Structural Physical Properties: An alternative strategy is to concede that 
all physical properties are structural (with the possible exception of inscrutables) but 
hold that properties represented by phenomenal states are actually structural physical 
properties. For example, Tye (2000) suggests that red experiences represent objects as 
belonging to a certain ‘spectral reflectance class’ and Hill (2004) argues that pain 
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 A qualification is needed here. In Chapter 4 I argued that there is a sense in which scientific 
explanations are incomplete; they describe the causal structure of events but not the absolutely intrinsic 
properties that ground that structure. However, inscrutables can be integrated into our existing 
understanding of causation in a way that sensory qualities cannot. For instance, attributing qualitative 
redness to a post-box would not fill a hole in our metaphysical understanding of its causal properties. 
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experiences represent bodily disturbances. In both cases, the represented property is a 
robustly physical structural property. On this view, the properties responsible for 
qualitative character are all properties that can be accommodated within physical 
theory. 
Spectral reflectances are indeed physical properties, but they are not the kind 
of property representation of which could constitute a red experience. Qualitative 
redness simply has nothing to do with that physical property. If red experiences do 
represent this physical property, we are left with the mystery of why states that 
represent that property have the qualitative character they have. In other words, it 
becomes implausible that the content of a phenomenal representation determines its 
qualitative character. The same goes for the bodily disturbance view of pain – the 
qualitative feel of pain is simply ignored. There is an inevitable gap between an 
experience representing some structural physical property and its having some 
qualitative character.8 
It could be held that we are mistaken that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic 
properties. After all, there are cases of properties that seemed to be intrinsic 
properties but transpired not to be. For instance, the property ‘weight’ seemed 
intrinsic but turned out to be relational. Maybe it will transpire that qualitative redness 
is a structural property, which would remove the apparent obstacle to its being a 
physical property of external objects.9 It is implausible, however, that phenomenal 
qualities can be analysed in structural terms. When apparently intrinsic properties turn 
out not to be intrinsic, their analysis usually leaves an intrinsic ‘residue’. In the case of 
‘weight’, we are left with the intrinsic property of ‘mass’. The prospects of analysing an 
apparently (absolutely) intrinsic property into purely structural terms are poor (see 
Levine 2001, p.101). 
A possible response here is to make an appeal to impure intentional properties. 
On this view, part of what determines qualitative character is the manner in which our 
                                                 
8
 Such a gap may be acceptable for Type-B theorists, but we are pursuing a Type-A version of 
Representationalism. 
9
 For a more sophisticated version of this claim of misrepresentation, see Pereboom (2011). His account 
faces objections similar to those discussed presently and which I consider more closely in McClelland 
(forthcoming). 
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phenomenal states represent. The thought is that phenomenal states represent 
robustly physical properties, such as spectral reflectances and bodily disturbances, but 
their qualitative character is fixed by the way in which those properties are 
represented. For instance, red experiences represent the relevant spectral property 
‘redly’. It is this adverbial property that gives a red experience its distinctive qualitative 
feel. This deeply implausible position fails for a number of reasons. One, it ignores 
transparency. Redness appears to us as a property of the object we represent, but this 
view makes it a property of the representation. If we do not take transparency 
seriously, the whole case for Representationalism falls apart. Two, when we perceive a 
red post-box next to a black bin, the adverbial account says we are representing ‘redly’ 
and ‘blackly’. But no account can be provided of the fact that it is the post-box that 
appears red and the bin that appears black (see Crane, 2005). Third, we are left with 
the mystery of how representing redly can be explained in physical terms. Redness 
again becomes a property of experience, and we are faced with the problem that this 
property cannot be accounted for in terms of the exclusively structural physical 
properties of brain states. 
 
C) Qualities as Non-Actual: A final radical option is to claim that phenomenal states 
represent non-physical properties, but that those properties are not instantiated in the 
real world. Our red experience represents qualitative redness, and that intrinsic 
property is non-physical. But since that property is non-actual, this is consistent with all 
actual properties being physical. Qualitative content is never veridical – all 
phenomenal states misattribute qualities to physical objects. The property of 
representing some phenomenal quality can be accounted for in physical terms, and 
this is enough to accommodate qualitative character into a Physicalist ontology. 
The main problem with this line of thought is that there is no plausible account 
of how we could come to represent properties that are never instantiated.10 Non-
actual properties are inefficacious, so if the representation relation has a causal 
component, we cannot represent them. Of course, sometimes we represent things 
that are not really there. But it is one thing to sometimes misrepresent the occurrence 
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 See Shoemaker, quoted Pereboom (2011, pp.41-42). 
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of a property, and quite another to never represent it accurately. Remember, 
Physicalist Representationalism requires that the representation relation can be 
accounted for in physical terms. There is plausibly a physical account of how we 
represent properties that are sometimes actually instantiated, but it is implausible that 
there could be a physical account of how we represent non-physical properties that 
are never instantiated. 
 
Overall, Physicalist Representationalism about qualitative character is implausible. The 
major threat to Physicalist Representationalism is that its reconceptualisation of 
consciousness leaves the anti-Physicalist arguments exactly as they are. We can now 
see how a Representationalist view of qualitative character asks us to reconceive 
phenomenal qualities as represented properties, but still falls victim to the –trinsicality 
gap. The intrinsic properties that characterise our phenomenal states cannot be 
accounted for in structural physical terms, even if those intrinsic properties belong to 
represented objects rather than to the phenomenal state itself. 
 
SECTION 3 
REPRESENTATIONALISM AND SUBJECTIVE CHARACTER 
 
A state has subjectivity iff there is something it’s like to be in that state for its subject. 
Is there a representational account of subjectivity amenable to Physicalism? To answer 
this question, we must put the issue of qualitative character aside. The question here is 
whether a Physicalist Representationalist account can be given of what makes 
something a conscious state at all, not of what makes it the kind of conscious state it 
is. All my mental states occur in me, but only my conscious mental states occur for me 
(Levine 2001, pp.6-7). They have a distinctive presentedness that must be accounted 
for. In the previous section I tentatively concluded that the qualitative character of 
phenomenal states is determined by their intentional properties, though those 
intentional properties cannot be accounted for in standard physical terms. Presumably 
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the intentional properties responsible for qualitative character can also be instantiated 
by non-conscious mental states. Our task is thus to discern whether the difference 
between conscious qualitative representations and non-conscious qualitative 
representations is a representational difference. 
Interestingly, many Representationalist theories attempt to account for 
qualitative character in intentional terms, but do not attempt to account for 
subjectivity in intentional terms. Tye (1995), for instance, claims that a key difference 
between conscious and non-conscious states with qualitative content, is that conscious 
states are poised for cognitive processing. Similarly, Jackson (2007) cites the special 
role that conscious states play in belief-formation. There are two things to note about 
accounts of this kind. One, they are not representational accounts of subjectivity. They 
claim that phenomenal states are representations and that their qualitative character 
is determined by their content, but the feature that makes them phenomenal is not an 
intentional property. Tye and Jackson, for instance, are citing the functional status of a 
qualitative representation to account for its subjectivity. Two, this kind of account has 
dim prospects of defending Physicalism about subjectivity (see Kriegel 2002, pp.62-63 
and 2009, p.72). We have already concluded in Chapter 2 that functionalist accounts of 
consciousness fail: the fact that the positions under discussion only try to explain the 
subjective aspect of phenomenal states in functional terms does not make them any 
more plausible. We will still, for instance, be able to conceive of a being whose 
qualitative representation performs the proposed functional role, but who lacks 
subjective awareness. This is another case in which anti-Physicalist arguments can 
simply be re-applied to a (so-called) Representationalist theory. 
 We are not concerned with the modest claim that subjective states are 
representational states. We are concerned with the bolder claim that it is the 
intentional properties of a state that make it a subjective state at all i.e. Strong 
Representationalism about subjectivity. If those intentional properties can plausibly be 
accounted for in physical terms, we would then have a Physicalist Representationalist 
view of subjectivity. Of course, the litmus test for such a position is whether it can 
successfully undermine the apparent conceptual gap between the objective and the 
subjective. I will consider the prospects for Physicalist Representationalism about 
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subjective character in three stages. In 3.1 I evaluate Higher-Order Representation 
(HOR) theory, arguing that it has significant promise but ultimately fails. In 3.2 I 
advocate Kriegel’s Self-Representationalist account, which retains the virtues of HOR 
theory but avoids its weaknesses. In 3.3, I argue that this kind of Self-
Representationalist account of subjectivity is plausibly amenable to a Physicalist 
ontology. 
 
3.1. HIGHER-ORDER REPRESENTATION (HOR) THEORY  
 
3.1.1. The Case for HOR Theory 
The HOR theorist claims that a state is conscious iff it is the object of a distinct higher-
order representation that one is in that state.11 For instance, the perceptual 
representation of a post-box becomes a conscious state when it is appropriately 
represented by some further mental state – a representation with that first-order 
representation (FOR) as its object. A terminological clarification is needed: a subject is 
transitively conscious of their FOR in virtue of their HOR and, on the other side of the 
conceptual coin, their FOR is thereby an intransitively conscious state. When I talk of 
‘the conscious state’, I will be referring to the intransitively conscious first-order state. 
 The motivation behind HOR theory is compelling. The difference between 
conscious and non-conscious states is that we are aware of our conscious states, and 
unaware of the non-conscious representations that occur within us (see e.g. Lycan 
2004, p.93). Since awareness is a representational notion, to be aware of a mental 
state is to represent that mental state in some way. This encourages a straight-forward 
argument for HOR theory, usefully captured by Lycan: 
(1) A conscious state is a mental state whose subject is aware of being 
in it. [Definition]  
(2) The 'of' in (1) is the 'of' of intentionality; what one is aware of is an 
intentional object of the awareness.  
                                                 
11
 Often HOR theories are presented as ‘theories of consciousness’ rather than theories of the subjective 
aspect of phenomenal states. However, it is clear that those theories are best read as accounts of 
subjective awareness specifically (see Kriegel 2009, pp.114-115). 
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(3) Intentionality is representation; a state has a thing as its intentional 
object only if it represents that thing.  
Therefore, 
(4) Awareness of a mental state is a representation of that state. [2,3]  
And therefore, 
(5) A conscious state is a state that is itself represented by another of 
the subject's mental states. [1,4] (2001, pp.3-4) 
This argument is quite persuasive, and offers a clear account of the difference between 
conscious and non-conscious mental states. Subjective awareness involves intentional 
properties, though it does not involve intentional properties internal to the mental 
state of which we are aware. Rather, it is the HOR’s intentional property of 
representing the first-order mental state that is responsible for our subjective 
awareness. When a mental state M makes the transition from non-conscious to 
conscious, its internal properties remain the same, but it acquires the relational 
property of being represented by some distinct mental state M*. 
 The argument above indicates that being the object of an HOR is a necessary 
condition of being conscious, but does not show that it is a sufficient condition. Indeed, 
all versions of HOR theory offer extra conditions that must be met for a state to be 
conscious. Chief among these are a condition of (rough) simultaneity between M and 
M*; M cannot be made conscious by you representing it after its occurrence, and of 
non-inferentiality; if you infer the presence of M, say through psychotherapy, that does 
not make M a conscious state.12 Nevertheless, it is the condition that M is represented 
by M* that is meant to be doing most of the explanatory work. The task of 
supplementing that condition with further conditions that rule-out potential counter-
examples is not of primary philosophical importance. 
There are two prominent controversies that can be put aside for current 
purposes. First, there is some disagreement between HOR theorists about the nature 
of the HOR states responsible for consciousness. Higher-Order Thought theorists, such 
as Rosenthal (1986/2004), claim that M* is thought-like where Higher-Order 
Perception theorists, such as Lycan (1996/2004), claim that M* is more akin to a 
                                                 
12
 These further properties could be regarded as non-intentional properties or as impure intentional 
properties. Little seems to hang on this decision, though Van Gulick (2004) argues that these properties 
are non-intentional, and that their being so goes against the spirit of HOR theory. 
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perceptual representation. Closer scrutiny suggests that the difference between these 
two camps may not be as substantive as the debate would suggest, so there is no need 
to adjudicate between them (see Gennaro 1996). 
Second, there is also disagreement about how qualitative character fits into the 
story. On one view, the qualitative character of a conscious state is determined by the 
intentional properties of M. On the alternative view, it is fixed by the intentional 
properties that M* represents M to have. Levine (2001, p.108) and others have argued 
that neither route is defensible.13 However, this need not concern us. We want to 
know whether HOR theory can provide a plausible account of the subjective character 
of phenomenal states. Whether and how it can then be integrated with an account of 
qualitative character is important in the limit, but should not distract us here. 
 
3.1.2. The Case Against HOR Theory 
Despite HOR theory’s initial appeal, it faces a number of objections. I will not address 
the various objections that pertain to how qualitative character fits into the account 
since, as I explained above, this is not our primary concern in evaluating HOR theory. 
Nevertheless, there are at least three serious objections to HOR theory as an account 
of subjective character: the targetless HOR problem, the generality problem and the 
self-intimation problem. In light of these, I conclude that HOR theory is implausible. 
 
A) The Targetless HOR Problem: Sometimes representations misrepresent.14 More 
specifically, sometimes they represent something to exist when, in reality, there is no 
such thing. What goes for representations in general also goes for higher-order mental 
representations. This means it should be possible for a subject S to have a second-
order state M* that represents the occurrence of M, even though S is not actually in 
                                                 
13
 The issue is also discussed informatively by Neander (1998). 
14
 Indeed, the possibility of misrepresentation is often taken to be a necessary condition of something’s 
being a representation at all (see Dretske, 1986). 
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M. Take it that S has no higher-order representations besides M*. The question is this: 
is S in a conscious state or not?15 This question generates a dilemma for HOR theory. 
On the one hand, it could be claimed that S is conscious. On this view, 
possessing an HOR is sufficient for being in a state of subjective awareness. But then 
which of S’s mental states is a conscious state? Since S is not actually in M, it cannot be 
M that has the property of being a conscious state. Since M* is not the object of an 
HOR then, according to the theory, M* cannot be a conscious state either. To say that 
some other mental state of S is conscious would be wildly ad hoc, and could be ruled 
out by stipulating that S has no mental states besides M*. Overall, it is implausible that 
targetless HORs are sufficient for subjective awareness. 
On the other hand, it could be claimed that S is not conscious. On this view, 
possessing an HOR is not sufficient for being in a state of subjective awareness: the 
HOR must also have a target. This approach holds, as it should, that S is not conscious, 
but does so at the expense of a central tenet of the theory. If HORs are meant to be 
responsible for subjective awareness, then S’s possession of the HOR should be 
sufficient for her being in a phenomenal state. HOR theory does not attribute first-
order states any role in explaining subjectivity, so why should M’s absence prevent S 
from being in a state of subjective awareness? Overall, if targetless HORs are not 
sufficient for subjective awareness, HOR theory reneges on its promise of explaining 
subjectivity in terms of higher-order representation. This dilemma casts serious doubt 
on HOR theory. A number of responses to this objection have been put forward, but 
none are persuasive.16 
B) The Generality Problem:17 According to HOR theory, M is conscious in virtue of its 
relational property of being represented by M*. The problem here is that the relational 
property of being represented by a mental state is possessed by any number of non-
                                                 
15
 Standardly, this objection is phrased in terms of whether what it is like to be S is the same as what it is 
like to be a subject in the same higher-order state as S, but who is also in M (e.g. Kriegel 2009, pp.129-
139). This formulation muddies the waters as it brings qualitative character into the discussion. My 
version focuses on subjective character. Furthermore, there is another objection to HOR theory 
involving M* misrepresenting the qualitative character of the (actual) mental state M (e.g. Levine, 
2001). Again, this pertains to qualitative character rather than subjectivity, so will not concern us. 
16
 Kriegel (2009, pp.132-135) reviews and criticises a number of such responses. 
17
 Proponents of this objection include Goldman (1993), Van Gulick (2004), Gennaro (2004) and Kriegel 
(2009, pp.143-4). 
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mental states. Presumably the HOR theorist will not hold that a rock becomes 
conscious when represented by a mental state (see Goldman, 1993). But if that 
relational property does not make the rock conscious, why should it make the mental 
state conscious? Claiming that only mental states can be conscious won’t do. As I 
noted in the previous objection, according to HOR theory the represented state plays 
no role in the explanation of subjectivity. As such, its being non-mental should not 
make a difference to whether or not it is conscious. We need a non-ad hoc reason to 
limit consciousness to mental states, but HOR theory provides none. 
C) The Self-Intimation Problem: The final objection to HOR theory I will consider is that 
it fails to do justice to an aspect of our phenomenology. The innocuous claim that 
drives HOR theory is that for all conscious states, we are aware of those states. The 
problem at hand concerns the further claim that for all conscious states, we are also 
aware of our awareness. To have a subjective state involves being conscious of our 
consciousness. On this view, subjectivity is not just the property responsible for 
subjective awareness; it also falls within the scope of that awareness. Call this the Self-
Intimation thesis. It is hard to offer philosophical arguments for a phenomenological 
claim, but this thesis should be plausible on reflection.18 
The Self-Intimation thesis is widely accepted within the phenomenological 
tradition, and is referred to as pre-reflective self-awareness.19 The thesis also has a 
number of adherents in the analytic tradition. Strawson holds that ‘…all awareness 
comports awareness of itself…’ (2011, p.282) and goes on to quote an illuminating 
passage from Frankfurt: ‘…what would it be like to be conscious of something without 
being aware of this consciousness? It would mean having an experience with no 
awareness whatever of its occurrence. This would be, precisely, a case of unconscious 
experience.’ (quoted Strawson 2011, p.285) Note, the claim is not that all 
consciousness requires introspection. Nor that consciousness requires a rich 
‘egological’ awareness of ourselves as persons (see Kriegel 2009, p.178). Nor that this 
                                                 
18
 Kriegel (2009, pp.113-129) makes the interesting argument that HOR theory presupposes that 
awareness is always phenomenally manifest, since this is the only plausible source of evidence for its 
central claim that all conscious states are represented states. However, Kriegel’s case against non-
phenomenal evidence that conscious states are always represented is unpersuasive (see Van Gulick, 
2011). 
19
 For a summary see Kriegel (2009, p.176). 
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self-awareness is a focal feature of our experience (see Kriegel 2009, p.190). Rather, 
the claim is just that the awareness constitutive of M’s being conscious is itself 
phenomenally manifest to the subject. 
 Assuming that the Self-Intimation thesis is true, why should it present a 
problem for HOR theory? According to HOR theory, to be aware of M requires a 
distinct state M* in virtue of which we are aware. To be aware of our awareness of M, 
we would need some third state M** that represents M*. Such higher-order 
representation would then make M* a conscious state. But, according to the Self-
Intimation thesis, in all conscious states we are aware of our awareness. For our 
awareness of M* to be phenomenally manifest, we would need a fourth state. Now an 
infinite regress looms, or perhaps a vicious circle.20 Overall, HOR theory cannot 
account for the self-intimation of subjective states. 
 
3.2. SELF-REPRESENTATIONALISM 
 
3.2.1. Self-Representationalism About Subjectivity 
Various positions are available that retain the central insight of HOR theory whilst 
avoiding the three objections above. HOR theory is right to claim that to be aware of a 
mental state is to represent that state in some way. However, we can challenge its 
presupposition that the representing and represented states are distinct states. 
Looking back at Lycan’s argument for HOR theory in Section 3.1.1, the conclusion that 
the FOR and HOR states are distinct does not follow from the premises. Van Gulick 
(2006) labels this the distinctness assumption, and it is plausibly this assumption that 
makes HOR theory vulnerable to the three objections discussed. ‘One-state’ theories 
reject the distinctness assumption. They claim that conscious states have first-order 
content and have the meta-intentional content required for subjective awareness. No 
distinct higher-order representation is involved. 
                                                 
20
 See Kriegel (2009, pp.124-125). 
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 One-state theories are offered by Gennaro (2004), Van Gulick (2004, 2006) and 
Kriegel (2005, 2009). We will focus on Kriegel’s position as the strongest and most 
thoroughly-developed, though there may well be some respects in which the 
competing positions have advantages. Kriegel’s core claim is that  ‘…what makes 
something a conscious state at all, what constitutes its subjective character, is a certain 
kind of self-representation…’ (2009, p.13). Call this ‘Self-Representationalism’.21 On this 
view, a mental state has subjectivity in virtue of suitably representing itself. How does 
an account along these lines avoid the three objections to HOR theory? 
 
A) The Targetless HOR Problem: This problem rests on the possibility of an HOR 
representing a mental state to occur when no such mental state exists. This kind of 
misrepresentation is impossible on the self-representational account. If M is a self-
representational state, then it is an actual state. M cannot represent itself to exist and 
be wrong. It might misrepresent itself in other ways, but that’s beside the point.22 By 
denying the distinctness assumption, Self-Representationalism excludes the possibility 
of targetless HORs. When meta-intentional content is reflexive, it cannot fail to have a 
target. 
B) The Generality Problem: This problem rests on HOR theory’s commitment to 
consciousness being a relational property that, it seems, is easily possessed by non-
mental states. According to Self-Representationalism, being a conscious state does not 
consist in standing in some relation to a distinct state. Rather, it is a property internal 
to conscious states. Being self-representing is much more demanding than simply 
being represented. Rocks and other non-mental entities simply cannot self-represent 
(or at least cannot do so in the right way). As such, Self-Representationalism avoids any 
commitment to non-mental states being states of subjective awareness (Kriegel 2009, 
p.145). 
                                                 
21
 Kriegel reserves the label ‘Self-Representationalism’ for a position that combines this account of 
subjective character with his distinctive account of qualitative character (2009, p.165). My use of the 
term does not involve this second commitment.  
22
 M might represent itself to have one qualitative character when in fact it has another. This will not 
concern us, though for further discussion see Kriegel (2009, pp.137-8) and, for an alternative position, 
Van Gulick (2006). 
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C) The Self-Intimation Problem: When HOR theory attempts to account for the self-
intimation of conscious states, it generates an infinite regress (or vicious circle). Self-
Representationalism halts that regress before it starts. All awareness comports 
awareness of itself because all states of awareness are self-representing states. That is, 
the awareness is internal to the conscious state itself. On this view, no extra state is 
required to account for our self-awareness, so no regress looms. Self-
Representationalism respects the thesis that all conscious states are self-intimating 
(Kriegel 2009, pp.197). 
 
In summation, Self-Representationalism overcomes the three objections raised against 
HOR theory. Moreover, it does so in a particularly straightforward way. This is 
important dialectically: the challenge for the HOR theorist is not just to respond to the 
three objections, but to do so in a way that is preferable to the clear and simple 
solution offered by Self-Representationalism. 
Self-representation is plausibly a necessary condition of being a conscious 
state. Can we build up to a sufficient condition? Kriegel claims that a state is conscious 
if it suitably represents itself, and offers three criteria that flesh out this suitability 
clause. These criteria rule out a number of potential counter-examples to Self-
Representationalism. 
First, a subjective state must be non-derivatively self-representing (2009, 
p.158). That is, the state must have its content independently of interpretation. The 
sentence ‘this very sentence is in English’ is self-representational, but its meaning is 
derivative from interpretation, so does not entail consciousness. Second, a subjective 
state must be specifically self-representing (2009, p.159). An unconscious belief that all 
beliefs are neurophysiologically realised is self-representing in the sense that it is part 
of its own extension. Subjective awareness requires that the self-representation 
purports to represent a specific particular. Third, a subjective state must be essentially 
self-representing (2009, p.161). Rather than just happening to have itself as a referent, 
it must represent itself as itself. The contrast here is analogous to Perry’s (1979) 
famous contrast between thinking ‘the person with the torn bag is making a mess’ and 
thinking ‘I am making a mess’. 
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With these three conditions, a serious proposal can be made about the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of subjective awareness. Self-Representationalism 
about the subjective character of phenomenal states is the following thesis: 
Necessarily, for any mental state M, M has subjective character iff M is 
non-derivatively, specifically, and essentially self-representing. (Kriegel 
2009, p.164) 
The central thought behind this account is that subjectivity is awareness, that 
awareness requires representation, and that this representation had better be 
reflexive representation. There are also a number of further motivations for Self-
Representationalism that I will not discuss. Overall, Self-Representationalism has 
significant promise, and is the best candidate available for a representational account 
of subjectivity. 
 
3.2.2. Self-Representationalism and the Anti-Physicalist Arguments 
Physicalist Representationalism about subjective character requires subjectivity to be 
explicable in intentional terms, and those intentional properties to be explicable in 
physical terms. The second step is unlikely to generate any special problems for Self-
Representationalism. If it is accepted that mental representation in general is 
explicable in physical terms, it should be accepted that non-derivative, specific, and 
essential self-representation is explicable in physical terms.23 The challenge for Self-
Representationalism is to defend the claim that subjectivity requires nothing more 
than the instantiation of those physically-realisable intentional properties. 
 Levine (2006) maintains that there is an epistemic gap between being in a 
suitable self-representing state and being in a state of subjective awareness. This gap is 
evident in the fact that we can conceive of a being who has the proposed self-
representing mental states, but who is nevertheless not conscious (see Van Gulick 
2011). This simply re-applies the zombie version of CA to Self-Representationalism. 
                                                 
23
 One potential objection to this claim is that physical accounts of representation cannot plausibly 
accommodate reflexive representation. This worry is dealt with by Kriegel (2009, Ch. 6), and it would 
take us too far astray to discuss it here. 
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None of this is to say that self-representation is not necessary to subjectivity, but it 
does cast doubt on the sufficiency claim needed to vindicate Physicalism. 
 One option for the Self-Representationalist is to suggest that the epistemic gap 
would disappear under ideal epistemic circumstances and, accordingly, that zombies 
are not ideally conceivable. After all, we do not yet have the right physical theory of 
representation. Perhaps our intuitions about the epistemic gap will change once we do 
have the right theory and see precisely how physical properties can carry subjective 
representations.24 Perhaps we cannot really conceive of zombies with the relevant 
self-representing states. Without a theory of representation, how do we even know 
what to imagine? 
Of course, anti-Physicalists can simply respond that any future discovery will 
offer the wrong kind of information to account for subjectivity. This is where the –tivity 
gap comes in: all physical properties are objective, and there is no entailment from the 
objective to the subjective. The intentional properties carried by physical states are 
just more objective properties - properties the instantiation of which does not entail 
consciousness. Perhaps there is a special kind of representation that does suffice for 
subjective awareness, but this is not the kind of representation that could ever fully be 
accounted for in terms of objective properties. 
 Here we see that the crux of the anti-Physicalist position is the –tivity gap. If 
Self-Representationalism can cast doubt on that apparent conceptual gap, Physicalism 
can be protected. Remember, the task is to undermine the claim that subjective 
awareness is inexplicable in physical terms, not to actually offer a complete physical 
explanation of subjectivity. The core of Self-Representationalism’s challenge to the –
tivity gap is that once we understand subjectivity representationally, the objectivity of 
physical properties no longer rules out the possibility of physical explanation. 
It is highly plausible that subjective states are representational states. This 
much is clear from the simple fact that consciousness involves awareness, and 
awareness is representational. All representations have vehicles, and we know that 
vehicles can be quite unlike the representations that they carry. Just as a vehicle need 
                                                 
24
 Note, since this response does not involve conceptual ignorance, it is a version of the ‘rudimentary 
response’ to Primitivism discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 3.1) rather than a version of EV. 
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not be red to carry the intentional property of representing redness, it need not be 
inherently subjectivity-involving to carry the intentional properties responsible for 
subjectivity. Does the –tivity gap really cast any doubt on this? It is implausible that 
undergoing a subjective representation gives us some deep insight into what kind of 
vehicle that representation must have. It may seem to us that the state we are in is not 
constituted by objective properties, but this is just a run-of-the-mill case of confusing 
intentional properties for vehicular properties. When we reflect on the redness of our 
experience, it is sometimes hard to believe that the state we are in is fully 
implemented by properties that do not involve qualitative redness. Similarly, when we 
reflect on the subjectivity of experience, it is sometimes hard to believe that the state 
we are in is fully implemented by properties that do not themselves involve subjective 
awareness. We should not trust our intuitions in either case. 
There are no compelling reasons to believe that subjective states can only be 
implemented by properties that are not objective. It is plausible that the physical 
vehicles of self-representation are robustly objective and carry the intentional 
properties constitutive of subjective awareness without the addition of any onticly 
primitive subjective ingredient. Given an appropriate theory of representation, there 
would be an a priori entailment from the relevant objective properties of the vehicle to 
the subjectivity of the representation it carries.  
This casts significant doubt on the –tivity gap, but is unlikely to persuade the 
anti-Physicalist. The intuition that there is no entailment from the objective to the 
subjective is bound to persist. To reinforce my case against the –tivity gap, I will try to 
explain away that intuition: to show why the –tivity gap seems plausible despite being 
false. To do this, I adapt an argument offered by Kriegel (2009, pp.289-298). 
Self-Representationalism claims that objective properties can constitute 
subjective awareness by performing a particular role. Specifically, the vehicular role of 
carrying the right kind of mental representation. To advocate the –tivity gap is to deny 
that there is any role the performance of which is sufficient for the instantiation of 
subjectivity. Water is reducible to H2O because there is a role – ‘the water role’ – 
performance of which is sufficient for being water, and which is in fact performed by 
H2O (as discussed Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1). By contrast, subjectivity appears 
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irreducible to objective properties because no matter what role is performed by an 
objective state, it remains an open question whether it constitutes a state of subjective 
awareness.  
This appearance is at the heart of the Problem of Consciousness, and was 
explored in Chapter 1. The key questions is this: why does subjectivity appear to be 
something over and above the performance of some role? A natural suggestion is that 
it appears so because it is so. However, an alternative suggestion is that it only appears 
so because of the distinctive epistemic status of subjectivity. On this view, even if the 
performance of some role is sufficient for subjectivity, it would still appear to us that it 
is not. 
Due to the Receptivity of knowledge, as discussed in Chapter 4, we generally 
know properties via their causal role. If our epistemic access to a property F is limited 
to its causal manifestations, then our criteria for being F are inevitably limited to the 
performance of some causal role. This makes F appear open for reduction to whatever 
property performs that role. Unlike other properties, subjectivity is not something we 
know via its causal role. Because conscious states are self-representing, our epistemic 
access to consciousness is built into the very instantiation of consciousness. As Kriegel 
puts it, ‘…knowledge of consciousness, and of consciousness alone, does not require 
causal contact with the known.’ (2009, p.295)  
Now, given that we do not access subjectivity via its causal role, we are liable to 
think that subjectivity consists in something more than the performance of some role. 
Subjectivity is the one property that we know supra-causally, which makes it appear to 
be a supra-causal property. But things would seem this way even if subjectivity did in 
fact consist in the performance of some appropriate role – a role performed by 
objective properties. As such, the appearance cannot be taken at face value. It does 
not follow from the fact that our criteria of subjectivity are role-transcendent, that 
subjectivity itself is metaphysically role-transcendent.   
Self-Representationalism thus offers an explanation of why subjectivity appears 
inexplicable in objective terms that is compatible with it in fact being explicable in 
objective terms. This alone does not show that subjectivity is nothing over and above 
certain objective properties, but it removes the main reason to doubt that this is so. It 
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is defensible to reject the apparent –tivity gap and claim that subjectivity requires 
nothing more than the performance of the right role by objective properties; 
specifically, the role of carrying a suitable self-representing mental state. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Where has this brief foray into Representationalism left us? Representationalism offers 
a solution to the Problem of Consciousness only if phenomenal consciousness can be 
accounted for in terms of intentional properties, and those intentional properties can 
be accounted for in terms of physical properties. The qualitative character of 
phenomenal states might be intentionally determined, but attempts to account for the 
relevant intentional properties are vulnerable to the –trinsicality gap. The subjective 
character of phenomenal states is plausibly the upshot of those states suitably 
representing themselves. Moreover, this Self-Representationalist account casts serious 
doubt on the –tivity gap. Overall, Representationalism can only go half way to 
undermining the epistemic gap that drives the case for Primitivism. Consequently it 
fails to offer a comprehensive response to the Problem of Consciousness. 
[184] 
 
CHAPTER 6 
THE NEO-RUSSELLIAN IGNORANCE HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
In Chapter 1 we saw that at the heart of the Problem of Consciousness is the apparent 
epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, which breaks down into the 
–trinsicality and –tivity gaps. In Chapters 3 and 4 we explored the Epistemic View (EV). 
We saw that the Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis (RIH), according to which we have no 
conception of the inscrutable intrinsic nature of physical entities, undermined the        
–trinsicality gap but fell victim to the –tivity gap. In Chapter 5 we considered a 
Representationalist approach to the problem. We found that no version of 
Representationalism could avoid the –trinsicality gap, but suggested that a plausible 
Self-Representationalist account of subjectivity could confront the –tivity gap. From 
this, our next line of enquiry should be clear: is there a way of combining RIH and Self-
Representationalism to form a hybrid account of phenomenal consciousness? If so, we 
should be able to address both of the two apparent conceptual gaps, and so overcome 
the Problem of Consciousness. 
In this chapter I will present and defend just such a hybrid position, which I call 
the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis (NRIH). In Section 1 I will present the 
fundamentals of NRIH, and consider the dialectical situation in which we find 
ourselves. In Section 2, which constitutes the bulk of the chapter, I consider a range of 
potential objections. NRIH entails a number of commitments about the explanatory 
basis of consciousness. The five problems I consider all threaten to show that there 
remains an epistemic gap between the proposed explanatory base and consciousness. 
I argue that these problems can be overcome and, in the process, fill in some details of 
NRIH. In Section 3 I explain precisely how NRIH responds to the Problem of 
Consciousness, and how it addresses the two arguments for Primitivism: CA and KA. I 
conclude that NRIH is a plausible account of the metaphysical status of phenomenal 
consciousness, and a viable response to the Problem of Consciousness. 
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SECTION 1 
A HYBRID ACCOUNT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
The view that the so-called Problem of Consciousness is not a singular problem, but 
rather an amalgam of problems, is acknowledged by many.1 It is reasonable to hold 
that searching for a single solution to the complex Problem of Consciousness is 
misguided. As I have already argued, the apparent metaphysical gap between the 
physical and the phenomenal is underwritten by two explanatory obstacles: the            
–trinsicality gap and the –tivity gap. These two gaps are connected intimately, but 
must ultimately be regarded as distinct challenges to Physicalism. 
We have seen that neither EV nor a Representationalist strategy are capable of 
dealing with both problems single-handedly. This should not be much of a surprise. If 
the two gaps are distinct, it would be odd for both gaps to be a result of our limited 
conception of the physical, or for both gaps to be bound to the representational status 
of consciousness. If the claim that we have two distinct problems on our hands is 
plausible, which it is, then we should expect them to have distinct solutions.2 In other 
words, we should adopt a divide and conquer strategy of splitting the epistemic gap in 
two then confronting each half separately. 
The first step in implementing this strategy is to clarify the scope of the two 
components of the hybrid account. Self-Representationalism is a proposal about only 
the subjective character of phenomenal states. Against Kriegel, we are not offering a 
straight-forward representational account of qualitative character. Similarly, RIH now 
pertains only to the qualitative character of phenomenal states. Against the bolder 
form of this hypothesis evaluated in Chapter 4, we are not attributing inscrutables an 
integral role in the explanation of subjectivity. Combining the two gives us the 
following core thesis: 
                                                 
1
 See Metzinger (1995, p.7) and Van Gulick (2004, p.91). 
2
 I discuss this further in Section 3.2 where I suggest that the two apparent explanatory obstacles have a 
common source. 
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Core Thesis: A mental state is a phenomenal state in virtue of suitably 
representing itself, and is the type of phenomenal state it is in virtue of 
the unconceived inscrutable properties that implement it. 
I call this account the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis (NRIH).3 Interestingly, as I 
noted in Chapter 4, Russell himself held that inscrutables were integral to qualitative 
character but not to subjective character. As such, it seems fitting to regard this hybrid 
proposal as a neo-Russellian position. Of course, Russell did not hold anything like a 
Self-Representationalist theory of subjectivity, but NRIH reflects the spirit of his 
position. 
Even before we extend NRIH beyond the Core Thesis, we have reason to 
believe that it can undermine the two conceptual gaps. Phenomenal states, qua their 
subjective nature, seem to be onticly distinct from physical states because the self-
representational nature of phenomenal states generates the illusion that they are 
distinct from any objective state. Furthermore, phenomenal states, qua their 
qualitative nature, seem to be onticly distinct from physical states because our limited 
conception of the physical leaves us conceptually ignorant of the intrinsic physical 
properties essential to their explanation. Both appearances, however, are deceptive. 
These central claims of NRIH look very promising, but there remains some work to be 
done. 
If NRIH is to be taken seriously, clearly it must provide something more than 
the Core Thesis. But how much more? Obviously we are under no obligation to reveal 
the proposed inscrutable properties and offer a theory of qualitative character, nor to 
give the full physical story of how self-representational states come about. The 
epistemic gap is the appearance that it is impossible to account for phenomenal states 
in physical terms. NRIH has the resources with which to undermine that appearance of 
impossibility without having to provide a full theory of the phenomenal. The 
explanation of consciousness is beyond the scope of the problem at hand, plausibly 
beyond the proper limits of philosophy and, in light of our proposed ignorance, 
beyond the reach of our current conceptual repertoire. As such, it would be 
inappropriate to ask for too much detail from NRIH. 
                                                 
3
 For pronunciation, think ‘Henry’ without the ‘H’. 
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 Nevertheless, there is a key respect in which NRIH does need to give us 
something more than the Core Thesis. There must be a plausible integration of the 
two components of the account. Inscrutables do not just need to be plausibly 
responsible for qualitative character – they need to be plausibly responsible for the 
qualitative character of self-representational states. Similarly, the Self-
Representationalist account of phenomenal states now has to tell a story that 
attributes an appropriate role to the inscrutable intrinsic properties involved in the 
implementation of that representation. The explanatory goal-posts have been moved 
a little, and we must acknowledge the possibility that the plausibility of the two 
component positions does not survive this shift. 
 How do we go about showing that the two components can be integrated 
without indulging in unwarranted speculation? I propose a negative strategy. In the 
next section, I will identify a series of problems for NRIH. These problems take the 
form of potential new conceptual gaps. The threat is that despite facing up to the        
–trinsicality and –tivity gaps, NRIH opens up new gaps, each of which indicates that it 
is impossible to get conscious experiences out of the proposed physical base. Driven 
by these threats, we can start to flesh out the metaphysical proposal in a way that 
shows how those apparent gaps can be overcome. Effectively, I will be aiming to 
provide enough detail to capture the logical space of plausibly possible physical 
explanations of consciousness without foolishly trying to provide the actual physical 
explanation of consciousness. 
 
SECTION 2 
CHALLENGES TO NRIH 
 
The problems I will consider each ask how it is possible for conscious experience as we 
know it to arise from the relevant physical states – that is, from self-representational 
states implemented by exclusively physical properties, among which are inscrutable 
intrinsic properties. As we will see, some of these problems are adaptations of 
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objections raised against competing accounts of consciousness. This will help us to 
determine whether or not NRIH overcomes the very objections that led us to rule out 
those competitors. Of course, the plausibility of NRIH depends not just on the negative 
project of avoiding problems, but on the positive project of offering a harmonious 
integration of its two elements. Over the course of this section it should emerge that 
RIH and Self-Representationalism, far from being an arbitrary pairing, are natural 
partners. 
 There are five problems in total. The first two are broadly epistemic, and are 
concerned with NRIH’s ability to accommodate our knowledge of qualitative character. 
The third and fourth problems are better characterised as metaphysical, and challenge 
NRIH’s ability to give us structured qualitative experience from an explanatory base 
with a divergent structure and a divergent intrinsic nature. The fifth and final problem 
has metaphysical and epistemic elements, but is fundamentally a practical problem. It 
suggests that if phenomenal states were as NRIH describes them, they would have no 
utility, so there is no plausible account of why they would come about. I conclude that 
all five problems, though worthy of discussion, do not constitute serious objections to 
NRIH. 
 
2.1. THE RECEPTIVITY PROBLEM 
 
2.1.1. The Problem 
In conscious experience, we are aware of the qualitative character of our experience. 
As such, we have some kind of knowledge of absolutely intrinsic properties such as 
red-qualities, pain-qualities and sweet-qualities. Our having such knowledge is 
essential to the Problem of Consciousness as we have formulated it. If we did not have 
such knowledge, we would have no justification for talking of the intrinsic qualities of 
experience. Without the intrinsic qualities of experience, there would be no                   
–trinsicality gap. Without the –trinsicality gap, the epistemic gap would be much less 
formidable, and the Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis would be of little value. In 
summation, whatever else we say about consciousness, NRIH had better be 
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compatible with our having knowledge of the intrinsic qualities that characterise 
conscious experience. 
 When evaluating RIH, I defended an argument for the existence of inscrutables 
(Chapter 4, Section 1). Within NRIH, those inscrutables are now claimed to be integral 
to the explanation of the intrinsic qualities of experience. The appeal to inscrutables is 
only justified if we have a persuasive argument for their existence isolated from any 
concerns about consciousness.4 A key premise in that argument was an 
epistemological thesis: the receptivity of human knowledge. This is the claim that we 
have knowledge of things only insofar as they affect us, and it is this feature of our 
knowledge that renders the absolutely intrinsic properties of physical objects 
epistemically inaccessible. 
 The problem for NRIH is this: how could our knowledge of the intrinsic 
properties that characterise conscious experience be compatible with Receptivity? If 
we know the properties of our mental states only through how they affect us, we 
should not have epistemic access to any intrinsic properties involved in that state. Yet 
we clearly do have such knowledge in qualitative awareness, and our having such 
knowledge is an integral premise of NRIH. There is thus a tension within NRIH. 
 We have already seen that Receptivity, and its implications for our access to 
the intrinsic properties of objects, were central themes in Kant’s epistemology. 
Interestingly, Kant held that what goes for knowledge of external objects also goes for 
knowledge of ourselves. He argues: 
If…we admit that we know objects only in so far as we are externally 
affected, we must also recognise, as regards inner sense, that by means 
of it we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by ourselves. 
(B156) 
Any intrinsic properties involved in mental states are thus unknowable, since the mind 
‘…intuits itself, as it is affected  by itself, therefore as it appears to itself, not as it is.’ 
(B69) If Receptivity entails that we have no transparent grasp of the absolutely intrinsic 
properties of external objects, it entails the same ignorance of the absolutely intrinsic 
properties of experiential states (see Van Cleve 2002, p.232). If this line of thought is 
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 This is captured by the Integration Condition on EV. 
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correct, NRIH is committed to denying the possibility of the very knowledge of 
qualitative character on which it is founded. We can summarise this problem as 
follows: 
The Receptivity Problem (RP): 
RP1) Conscious states are states in which we have knowledge of 
absolutely intrinsic properties. 
RP2) If we have any knowledge of absolutely intrinsic properties, 
Receptivity is false. 
RP3) If Receptivity is false, NRIH is not defensible. 
RP4) Therefore, NRIH is not defensible. 
I previously indicated that the problems explored in this section will each take the form 
of a conceptual gap between NRIH’s proposed explanatory base and phenomenal 
consciousness. The argument above does not look like it takes the form of a 
conceptual gap, but it can easily be translated into such terms: the proposed 
explanatory base involves intrinsic properties to which we have no epistemic access, 
the explanandum involves intrinsic properties to which we have intimate epistemic 
access, and there is no possible explanation of known intrinsic properties in terms of 
unknowable intrinsic properties.  
 
2.1.2. Response 
Where is the weak point in this argument? The inference to RP4 is clearly valid. RP1, as 
discussed, is hard to deny and is integral to NRIH. RP3 is difficult to resist – we cannot 
give an argument for inscrutables without recourse to Receptivity, and we cannot 
defend NRIH without an argument for inscrutables. That leaves RP2. Perhaps we could 
argue that Receptivity is compatible with knowledge of intrinsic properties. In that 
case, however, the argument for inscrutables would surely collapse. 
Alternatively, we could argue for a qualified version of Receptivity. Most of the 
time our epistemic situation leaves us ignorant of the intrinsic properties of things, but 
the knowledge we gain in conscious experience is an exception to the rule. The 
intrinsic properties of external objects are inscrutable, but the intrinsic properties of 
internal experience are not. This qualified claim is perfectly compatible with the 
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defensibility of NRIH: it is specifically our conceptual ignorance of non-experiential 
intrinsic properties that is held to make experiential intrinsic properties appear 
physically inexplicable. However, this qualified version of Receptivity looks ad hoc. 
How could we possibly justify the claim that the knowledge we gain in phenomenal 
awareness is an exception to the unknowability of intrinsic properties? I suggest that 
the solution to the Receptivity Problem is indeed to adopt a qualified version of 
Receptivity, but that this proposal need not be ad hoc. On the contrary, NRIH predicts 
that we can have epistemic access to absolutely intrinsic properties in conscious 
experience, and that this is the only possible context in which we can have such 
epistemic access. 
 Van Cleve seeks to challenge the Kantian view of self-knowledge. He suggests 
that though we know external objects via a causal chain from the object to ourselves, if 
we could have knowledge of the terminus of a causal chain, we would not be limited to 
knowledge of causal powers. He concludes that ‘…there can be no argument against 
the possibility of acquaintance sheerly from the causal nature of perception.’ (2002, 
p.229) The idea is that if there is a kind of knowledge that is not causally mediated, 
there is no reason why such knowledge could not disclose intrinsic properties rather 
than merely causal dispositions. 
This opens up a promising logical space, but does not finish the job. Why should 
it be the case that knowledge of qualitative character is a case of unmediated 
epistemic access? Where we represent external objects, there is causal mediation. 
Where we represent that representation of the world, there is plausibly a distinct 
mental state representing the first, and so another case of causal mediation. The chain 
can continue with us having further higher-order mental states representing lower-
order states, but at every step a state is known only through how it affects some 
distinct state. Being ‘in the head’ does not mean we can magically have knowledge of 
something without causal mediation. The Receptivity of human knowledge plausibly 
still applies. The challenge is thus to understand how consciousness could possibly 
provide epistemic access without causal mediation. 
Fortunately, Self-Representationalism provides us with precisely what we need. 
We have considered strong arguments for the conclusion that all phenomenally 
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conscious states are self-representing states (Chapter 5, Section 3). We have also 
considered the distinctive epistemic situation that such self-representation generates. 
As Kriegel proposes, ‘…knowledge of consciousness, and of consciousness alone, does 
not require causal contact with the known.’ (2009, p.295)5 Causal contact is required if 
a mental state is to constitute knowledge of some state or object distinct from it. 
Receptivity thus applies to all cases in which the represented object of knowledge is 
distinct from the representing ‘knowing’ state. In self-representation, however, the 
representation and the represented are identical. As such, causal contact with our 
conscious states is not necessary for knowledge of our conscious states. Consequently, 
there is no reason to deny that in consciousness we can have transparent knowledge 
of intrinsic properties. The qualitative character of a conscious experience is 
epistemically accessible precisely because the state with that character and the 
representation of that state are one and the same state. 
We do not yet have a full account of how such knowledge works, nor of the 
metaphysical status of the phenomenal qualities, but the self-representational nature 
of conscious states provides NRIH with a satisfactory way out of the Receptivity 
Problem. Importantly, we have not had to contrive any implausible ad hoc epistemic 
story in order to achieve this. The non-causal nature of our knowledge of 
consciousness was built into Self-Representationalism from the outset, and preceded 
any attempt to combine it with EV. This is a clear case of the two components of NRIH 
complementing one another rather than being an awkward conjunction. Self-
Representationalism solves the mystery of how we could have knowledge of 
qualitative character. 
The response we have offered to the Receptivity Problem has an interesting 
relationship with certain historical positions. As we have seen, the Receptivity of self-
knowledge was advocated by Kant. Some followers of Kant, however, agreed that our 
knowledge of external objects is mediated, with all the epistemic limitations that 
entails, but proposed that our self-knowledge is of a very different kind. Schopenhauer 
famously proposes that ‘…a way from within stands open to us to that real inner 
                                                 
5
 The epistemic implications of target states being ‘embedded’ or ‘contained’ within the state that 
represents them have been explored by a number of figures. For instance, Burge (1988) argues that such 
containment is responsible for the distinctive epistemic authority of self-knowledge. 
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nature of things to which we cannot penetrate from without’ (1819/1844, 2.195). The 
metaphor of knowledge from within and knowledge from without is intriguing and has 
been echoed by many other thinkers. However, this metaphor must be cashed out in a 
rigorous way if it is to be taken seriously. NRIH can do just this. Knowledge ‘from 
without’ is the epistemic contact a subject has with entities distinct from themselves 
through how those entities affect them. Knowledge ‘from within’ is the reflexive non-
causal epistemic contact provided by self-representational mental states. 
It is interesting that Schopenhauer’s manoeuvre here leads him close to 
panpsychism: a view into which NRIH must not collapse. The driving thought seems to 
be that our ‘inside’ knowledge must be analogous to that ‘inner’ nature of external 
objects which perception fails to penetrate. Since our ‘inner’ nature involves 
awareness, so too does that of inanimate objects. NRIH maintains the spirit of this 
thought whilst avoiding any threat of panpsychism. The intrinsic properties of 
experience are in some way bound to the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical 
entities. Exactly how close that association is we will discuss later, but since NRIH 
claims that phenomenal qualities are the upshot of inscrutables, this surely gives us 
some kind of epistemic contact with intrinsic physical properties. Panpsychism, 
however, is avoided since it is not held that all physical entities have the kind of 
internal awareness that we have. Remember, according to NRIH our ‘inside view’ only 
exists thanks to our complex self-representational mental architecture. The external 
objects we perceive do not generally have such self-representational states, so we 
need not attribute them anything even analogous to consciousness. Everything has an 
‘inner nature’ constituted by their intrinsic properties, but only minded creatures like 
us have an ‘inner awareness’. 
The Receptivity Problem constitutes a prima facie tension within NRIH, but it is 
clear that the position has the resources with which to overcome it. Furthermore, the 
suggested solution reveals how the components of NRIH complement each other: a 
problem associated with the EV component was solved thanks to the Self-
Representationalist component. The proposal taps into a line of thought that goes 
back at least to Schopenhauer, but cashes out an idea that was previously expressed 
only as metaphor, and avoids the unwanted threat of panpsychism. 
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2.2. THE CONTENT PROBLEM 
 
2.2.1. The Problem 
The Receptivity Problem is based on epistemic concerns. NRIH does not just have to 
accommodate the existence of qualitative character; it must also accommodate our 
awareness of qualitative character. After all, what makes a quality a phenomenal 
quality is that it characterises a state of subjective awareness. The previous problem 
threatened to show that NRIH was incompatible with such awareness. Though that 
problem was overcome, there is a further problem that presents a similar threat. A 
consideration of the nature of self-representational states suggests that it is impossible 
to get awareness of intrinsic qualities from the proposed explanatory base. The worry 
here is not to do with the Receptivity of knowledge, but with the role of inscrutables in 
phenomenal representations. 
 According to Self-Representationalism, phenomenal states involve two layers 
of content. There is a first-order layer that represents features of the world beyond us, 
and a second-order layer that represents that very representation. NRIH adds 
something to the story here by suggesting that the physical states that implement 
phenomenal representations involve intrinsic properties of which we have no 
conception – that the vehicle of a phenomenal representation includes inscrutable 
properties. But how could introducing intrinsic properties into the vehicle of 
representation account for our awareness of phenomenal qualities? In representation 
we are, at best, aware of the content of that representation, not of the properties that 
implement it. We can summarise the problem as follows: 
The Content Problem (CP): 
CP1) By being in a self-representational mental state M, we are aware 
only of the content of M. 
CP2) Inscrutables have a vehicular role in M, but are not responsible for 
the content of M. 
CP3) Therefore, inscrutables are not responsible for what we are aware 
of by being in M. 
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CP4) In M, we are aware of phenomenal qualities. 
CP5) Therefore inscrutables are not responsible for the phenomenal 
qualities that characterise M. 
I use the phrase ‘responsible for’ as a minimal commitment of NRIH. Exactly what the 
relationship between inscrutables and phenomenal qualities is needs further 
discussion, but whatever it is, a state had better have its qualitative character in virtue 
of the inscrutables involved in its implementation. That much is entailed by the Core 
Thesis of NRIH. 
 
2.2.2. Response 
I will ultimately challenge CP2, but first it is worth noting a potential challenge to CP1. 
Perhaps it is not the case that everything of which we are aware in virtue of M is part 
of the content of M. In Chapter 5 I mentioned impure intentional properties. These are 
ways of representing that can vary between states with the same content. It could be 
held that qualitative character is fixed not just by the content of a conscious state, but 
by its manner of representation. If the inscrutable properties that implement M make 
a difference to the impure intentional properties of M, the path may be open for us to 
have some kind of awareness of inscrutables or, more precisely, have a state of 
awareness to which M’s inscrutables make a phenomenally manifest difference. 
 There are at least two reasons to disregard this line of thought. One, the 
‘adverbial’ view of qualitative character it proposes is deeply implausible (as discussed 
in Chapter 5, Section 2.2.2). Two, even if qualitative character was determined by 
impure intentional properties, it is unclear why and how inscrutables would be 
responsible for those impure properties. Of all the vehicular properties that carry a 
phenomenal representation, why would it be inscrutables that determine the manner 
of representation, and how would their doing so explain the qualitative character of 
experience? 
 A more promising route for NRIH is to challenge CP2. Perhaps the inscrutable 
properties that contribute to M do not only perform a vehicular role. Perhaps they are 
part of M’s content. That is, our phenomenal representations represent their own 
intrinsic physical properties. M represents both properties in the external world and 
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properties of itself. After all, NRIH already claims that M is self-representing, so why 
not say that it represents its own intrinsic properties? As Lockwood proposes, ‘[w]hy 
should one not think of awareness precisely as disclosing certain intrinsic attributes of 
states of…our brains…?’ (1989, p.162) The qualitative redness of a phenomenal state 
would then be both a constituent of that state and something represented by that 
state: both vehicle and content. Of course, this raises questions about how a state 
could instantiate qualitative redness in virtue of its inscrutables. I will address this 
concern in the next section, but here we at least have a promising proposal about the 
representational status of inscrutables. 
 A potential problem for this proposal is that it fails to respect the 
phenomenology of qualitative awareness. It is not the case that we are aware of the 
world and separately aware of properties of the representing state. Experience does 
not have this two-level structure. We do not have a first-order component that 
represents the colour of the post-box, and a higher-order component that represents a 
red-quality of that representation. Instead, we are transparently aware of the redness 
as a property of the post-box. The redness we find in experience is indeed part of the 
content of our experience, but it is not represented as a feature of our mental states, it 
is represented as a feature of the external world. As such, the proposal that M 
represents its own inscrutable properties does not give a defensible account of the 
qualitative character of experience. 
 There is a way out of this problem for NRIH. In line with CP1, phenomenal 
qualities had better be represented by phenomenal states, for how else could we be 
aware of them? In line with our phenomenology, those qualities must be represented 
in a way that accounts for their appearing as external properties of the world, rather 
than internal features of our representations of the world. To reconcile these two 
commitments, the approach I have in mind is projectivist. Projectivism is the view that 
certain features attributed to the world by our mental representations are actually 
features of our selves. Our representations project their own properties on to the 
world that they represent. 
 In a sense, M represents its own qualities, which it has in virtue of the 
inscrutable properties involved in its implementation. However, it represents them as 
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properties of external objects. The qualities are thus part of the content of M, and M’s 
capacity to represent them is bound up with its self-representational nature. But we 
are not thereby committed to a two-level phenomenology. The perceived red-quality 
of the post-box is, in an important sense, a property instantiated by a state of our 
brain. We are aware of it because we represent it, but we are aware of it as an 
external quality because we represent it as an external quality. There is nothing 
incoherent about suggesting that our access to phenomenal qualities is misleading in 
this way. It might be counter-intuitive and it might need further explanation, but that 
should not worry us.6 The key point is that inscrutables are given a status in 
representation that is not at odds with what our experience of phenomenal qualities is 
like. To overcome the Content Problem I have rejected CP2. Inscrutables are not just 
vehicular properties, they are represented by our phenomenal states. However, the 
way in which those properties are represented is such that they are projected on to 
the external objects of experience, rather than being represented as features of the 
representation itself.  
When responding to the Receptivity Problem I cited some historical precedent 
to illuminate my proposal. We can do the same here. The idea of projection has a 
strong philosophical history. It is plausibly integral to Locke’s familiar notion of 
secondary properties (see Egan 2010). Hume proposes that ‘…the mind has a great 
propensity to spread itself on external objects…’ (quoted Egan 2010, p.69). Kant, to 
whom we have turned at many points, can also be understood as advocating a kind of 
Projectivism.7  More recently, Lockwood has presented a position not dissimilar to 
NRIH. He suggests that phenomenal qualities are instantiated within the brain, but are 
‘taken as’ external properties by our representations. He argues that ‘…there is no 
consciousness, no sentience, without taking as.’ (1989, p.312)8 Since any awareness of 
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 For some useful work on why and how we project properties see Jakab (2003). This paper includes 
responses to some prominent objections to Projectivism. 
7
 Kant’s examination of the self-world duality in the Transcendental Deduction could be taken to show 
that it is only possible to experience something if it is presented as distinct from the self. As such, the 
notion of experiencing phenomenal qualities as features of one’s representations is deemed impossible. 
A kind of projection is thus necessary to their being experienced at all.  
8
 Note, Lockwood’s position is a form of Type-F Monism as discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1). Unlike 
Lockwood though, NRIH does not regard qualities as onticly primitive. 
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qualities must involve taking them as something or other, their being taken as external 
properties is no more mysterious than their being taken as features of the brain.9 
 More recently still, the notion that conscious experience is a ‘virtual reality’ has 
gained respect among cognitive psychologists and their philosophical allies.10 The idea 
is that our mind constructs a kind of model of reality, but this virtual model is taken as 
real. Our awareness of the world is mediated by an awareness of this mental model, 
but we take this to be direct access to the external world. The same idea can be 
applied to our awareness of phenomenal qualities: they are internal properties taken 
as external properties. Obviously there is a lot more to be said about how such 
projection works and why it would occur, but we have come far enough to undermine 
the Content Problem. Inscrutables can be integral to the content of M, so are suitably 
positioned to be responsible for the qualitative character of M. 
 
2.3. THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTER PROBLEM 
 
2.3.1. The Problem 
Our responses to the previous two problems have helped us to flesh out NRIH. The 
proposal is now that phenomenal qualities are the result of the inscrutable intrinsic 
properties that implement our phenomenal representations, that those qualities are 
epistemically accessible in virtue of the self-representational structure of those states, 
and that the representation of those qualities involves a projection of them onto the 
external world. The next problem is perhaps the most serious, and is one around which 
I have been circling. In the original discussion of RIH, I was keen to emphasise that 
inscrutables are not simply unexperienced phenomenal qualities (Chapter 4, Section 
4.1). It is not the case that the dispositions of entities such as electrons are grounded 
in qualities such as redness. The question is this: how can M’s access to its own 
inscrutable properties give rise to an experience of qualitative redness if those 
properties are not themselves red-qualities? According to NRIH we have no concepts 
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 See Boghossian & Velleman (1991), Wright (2003) and Coates (2009). The current proposal also has 
echoes of indirect realism and sense-datum theory. 
10
 See Metzinger (2003, Ch.8). 
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with which to characterise inscrutables. Nevertheless, the account makes a claim 
about what inscrutables are not. They are not instantiations of the qualities with which 
we are familiar in conscious experience. To say that inscrutables have a non-red nature 
may be enough to cast doubt on the possibility of qualitative redness arising from 
inscrutables. The same worry applies to all phenomenal qualities. 
  Perhaps NRIH can just re-apply EV’s main strategy here: it only appears that 
you cannot get red-qualities out of non-red intrinsic properties because we have a 
limited conception of non-red properties. Neural properties are indeed non-red 
properties from which you can never get qualitative redness, but this is because they 
are of the wrong metaphysical category: these structural properties cannot be 
responsible for intrinsic properties like redness. Inscrutables, by contrast, are intrinsic 
properties. We cannot apply what we know about familiar non-red properties to 
inscrutable non-red properties. The central thought behind EV is that the properties of 
which we do have a conception present a skewed picture of the physical world, so we 
cannot assume that what we know of familiar properties also applies to the unfamiliar 
ones. Yet this is just what we are doing if we insist that you cannot get red-qualities 
out of non-red inscrutables. 
 How might a critic of NRIH respond to this manoeuvre? They would need to be 
able to show that it is not just a shaky intuition that motivates the claim that non-red 
inscrutables cannot be responsible for the qualitative redness of an experience. They 
must appeal to some genuine conceptual gap. I think the most plausible route here is 
to consider the various possible relations of ontic dependence that might hold 
between inscrutables and phenomenal qualities, and cast doubt on each of them 
individually. I will consider identity, composition and implementation. 
First, identity can be ruled out immediately. Identity requires that phenomenal 
qualities and the relevant inscrutables are not different in any respect. Since we are 
discussing NRIH’s commitment to non-red inscrutables being responsible for red-
qualities, it is clear that a straight-forward identity relation is not available. 
Second, the relation could be one of composition. For instance, a wall with the 
property of being 6m high might have that property thanks to a collection of bricks 
each with the property of being 3cm high. There is nothing mysterious about how the 
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higher-level property comes about in virtue of quite different lower-level properties. 
However, in the case of phenomenal qualities, this kind of model cannot apply. We 
know from experience that phenomenal qualities are simple. They are non-composite, 
they have no parts, they are not a sum. Consequently, it cannot be the case that red-
qualities are made of non-red-qualities, because red-qualities are not made of 
anything. 
 Third, it could be held that inscrutables implement phenomenal qualities, 
where implementation is a relation of ontic dependence in which a higher-level 
property is realised by a lower-level property. This need not be a part-whole relation, 
so is distinct from the notion of constitution. The problem for NRIH here is that 
phenomenal qualities do not look like the kind of properties that can be implemented 
by anything. The implementation of a higher-level property involves a lower-level 
property performing a role. For instance, where a person performs the role 
constitutive of being a King, they implement King-hood. Phenomenal qualities, 
however, exceed any characterisation in terms of causal role. In fact, it is precisely 
their non-structural nature that has driven our whole discussion of them. Absolutely 
intrinsic properties are, by their very nature, non-structural properties, and only 
structural properties can be implemented. The claim that an instantiation of 
qualitative redness requires nothing more than the performance of a certain role 
amounts to functionalism about phenomenal qualities, and we have already 
established that this not a viable proposal. Phenomenal qualities are simply not the 
kind of property that can be implemented by more basic properties – inscrutable or 
otherwise – performing a particular role. 
 Identity, composition and implementation plausibly constitute an exhaustive 
list of the relations of reductive ontic dependence. We can summarise the problem for 
NRIH as follows: 
The Qualitative Character Problem (QCP): 
QCP1) If non-qualitative inscrutables are responsible for phenomenal 
qualities, they are either identical to phenomenal qualities, constitute 
phenomenal qualities or implement phenomenal qualities. 
QCP2) If non-qualitative inscrutables are identical to phenomenal 
qualities, then they are not really non-qualitative. 
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QCP3) Phenomenal qualities are not the kind of property that can be 
constituted by anything more basic than themselves. 
QCP4) Phenomenal qualities are not the kind of property that can be 
implemented by anything. 
QCP5) Therefore non-qualitative inscrutables are not responsible for 
phenomenal qualities. 
 
2.3.2. Response 
How can NRIH escape this problem? QCP2 and QCP4 should be conceded, but both 
QCP1 and QCP3 can be challenged. Against QCP1, we are not in a position to conclude 
that identity, composition and implementation are the only relevant relations of ontic 
dependence. There is the possibility of unknown relations of dependence. Consider, 
for instance, the proposal put forward by McGinn (1994, 2004 Ch.8). McGinn suggests 
that we are only capable of understanding explanations that involve ‘combinatorial 
atomism with law-like mappings’ (‘CALM’ principles for short). He proposes that the 
explanation of consciousness involves non-CALM explanatory principles beyond our 
cognitive reach. Without committing to McGinn’s specific hypothesis, we can take 
seriously the general possibility of unknown relations of ontic dependence.  
 A related proposal is that the relevant form of ontic dependence involves 
‘fusion’. Two entities ‘fuse’ when they form a whole but, unlike in cases of 
composition, the parts do not persist when the whole is formed. Entities have certain 
propensities such that, in appropriate circumstances, they necessitate the introduction 
of a new entity with different properties to its predecessors. This entity could not have 
existed without its predecessors, but it replaces them rather than being a mere 
aggregate of them. This notion has been explored in the context of panphenomenalist 
accounts of consciousness, but could also be used to support NRIH.11 Perhaps 
inscrutables ‘blend’ to form phenomenal qualities. When the right inscrutables come 
together in the right circumstances, they entail the occurrence of qualitative redness. 
This quality is a new property with no constituent parts, but its occurrence is entailed 
a priori by the occurrence of properties that are not red in and of themselves. On this 
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 See Seager (2010) and Coleman (2012) for more on combinatorial infusion. 
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view, inscrutables have unknown fusion-propensities that are responsible for the 
occurrence of phenomenal qualities. 
 This appeal to unknown forms of dependence casts serious doubt on QCP1, but 
it is a speculation that pushes at the limits of our understanding. It would be 
preferable to undermine the Qualitative Character Problem in a more straight-forward 
way. We can do this by challenging QCP3. Perhaps phenomenal qualities are 
constituted by inscrutables, but the apparently non-composite nature of those 
qualities is illusory. A red-quality in our experience plainly seems to be non-composite, 
but why infer that it is non-composite? According to the picture offered by NRIH, 
qualitative awareness involves us accessing the inscrutable properties of our 
representational states. We are not committed to a full disclosure of those properties. 
We have already said that they appear to us as external properties even though they 
are really internal features of our representation. Here we can suggest that our 
experience is misleading in a further respect. The qualitative character of our 
experience appears to involve non-composite qualities, but in reality those qualities 
each have a number of inscrutable constituents. 
 Yet again, we can cite some weighty historical precedent to help put this 
proposal in focus. Leibniz proposes that ‘…sensible ideas appear simple because they 
are confused and thus do not provide the mind with any way of making 
discriminations within what they contain.’ (quoted Puryear 2005) ‘Confusion’ is simply 
a failure to represent the constituent parts of something, making it appear simple 
when it is not.12 The access we have to our own inscrutables in consciousness could 
thus be a ‘confused’ kind of access. Leibniz considers the idea of confusion in the 
context of colours: ‘We now have a complete analysis of green into blue and 
yellow…yet we are quite unable to discern the ideas of blue and yellow within our 
sensory idea of green, simply because it is a confused idea.’ (quoted Puryear, 2005) 
This claim is disputable, but if apparently simple colour qualities are plausibly 
composites of other colour qualities, why not take the next step and say that basic 
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 Pereboom (2011) has recently explored the possibility that we misrepresent phenomenal qualities as 
simple. However, unlike the current proposal, he blames that misrepresentation on our introspections of 
phenomenal states, rather than on the content of the phenomenal state itself. 
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colour qualities are themselves composites of non-colour properties beyond our 
current comprehension? 
It could be objected that deploying the notion of ‘confused’ epistemic access 
entails that we are not really aware of our inscrutables at all, which contravenes the 
response to the Content Problem above. How can it be the case that the properties of 
which we are phenomenally aware are non-red inscrutables, but for our awareness to 
be characterised by simple red-qualities? Again, Leibniz can clear things up for us. 
Leibniz claims that the human mind is made up of countless perceptions, but we 
experience the overall ‘roar’ of these parts:  
To hear this noise as we do…we must hear the parts which make up this 
whole, that is the noise of each wave, although each of these little 
noises makes itself known only when combined confusedly with all the 
others, and would not be noticed if the wave which made it were by 
itself. (quoted Look, 2008) 
Though Leibniz is talking about a vast collection of petites perceptions constituting our 
experience, NRIH does not attribute any mental features to inscrutables.13 
Nevertheless, the status of inscrutables could be analogous. The relevant inscrutables 
could each play a role in the qualitative character of our awareness, even though we 
cannot make out those properties individually. Since we are relatively high-level 
entities, there could be an enormous number of inscrutables in play in our qualitative 
awareness. Just as the noise of the sea can differ greatly from the noise of each drop 
of water, so too the qualitative upshot of this field of inscrutables could differ greatly 
from the nature of those inscrutables taken in isolation. 
Overall, NRIH can evade the Qualitative Character Problem. It is hard to get our 
heads round non-red inscrutables being responsible for red phenomenal qualities, but 
this much is to be expected given our proposed limited epistemic position. The 
relation between inscrutables and phenomenal qualities might itself be a kind of 
relation beyond our current conception, perhaps involving something like ‘fusion’. 
Alternatively, if we make the Leibnizian move of regarding the apparent simplicity of 
phenomenal qualities as a case of ‘confusion’, the relation could be one of 
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 As with our discussion of Schopenhauer in Section 2.1, NRIH is drawing on a historical predecessor but 
purging it of its panpsychist elements. 
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composition. I will stick with the Leibnizian move, though the alternative response can 
be kept in reserve. 
 
2.4. THE STRUCTURAL DIVERGENCE PROBLEM 
 
2.4.1. The Problem 
The inscrutable properties instantiated within our brain will have certain structural 
features such as their spatial distribution. The phenomenal qualities that characterise 
our conscious experience also have certain structural features, including their 
distribution in our experiential field. The problem for NRIH is that the structure of 
inscrutables and the structure of phenomenal qualities is likely to diverge, and it 
therefore seems impossible to account for the latter in terms of the former. 
This has been raised as an objection to panphenomenalist forms of Type-F 
Monism, so it is important to show that NRIH is not vulnerable to the same objection. 
The objection to panphenomenalism is that the micro-experiential entities claimed to 
be responsible for human consciousness have structural features that diverge from 
those of the conscious states they are supposed to constitute. Even though NRIH 
makes no appeal to micro-experiential entities, the same structural divergences 
plausibly occur.  
Unlike the previous objection, this problem is not concerned with whether the 
intrinsic nature of inscrutables could be of explanatory relevance to phenomenal 
qualities. It is simply concerned with the structural distribution of inscrutables, which is 
well within our epistemic grasp. An appeal to the unknown nature of inscrutables will 
not help NRIH when it is their structural status that is causing trouble. We can 
distinguish between three types of structural divergence in ascending order of 
seriousness: 
 
A) The Configuration Problem: Consider a phenomenal experience of a French flag. The 
colour-qualities that characterise that experience have a certain structure. If 
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inscrutables are responsible for those qualities, they had better have the same 
structure. After all, if they do not have that structure, we are left with the mystery of 
how it is possible for properties with one structure to give rise to experiences with a 
totally different structure. But it is implausible that inscrutables have the same 
structure as the qualities of that experience. Inscrutables are the absolutely intrinsic 
properties of fundamental physical entities. As we move around to get a different 
perspective on the flag, is it really plausible that there are corresponding movements 
of those fundamental entities in our brain? Is it plausible that when we open our eyes, 
these entities spring into action and jump into a configuration isomorphic to what we 
see? Clearly not. 
 
B) The Grain Problem: A further problem is that our experiences present us with a 
smooth qualitative field. However, the inscrutable properties claimed to be 
responsible for the field are discrete, since the entities that have those intrinsic 
properties are discrete. Even if they had a configuration close to that of our qualitative 
field, the inscrutables would be ‘gappy’ but our experience would involve a smooth 
qualitative field.14 How is it possible for discrete inscrutables to generate smooth 
qualitative fields? If it is an inexplicable mystery, NRIH fares no better than its 
competitors. 
 
C) The Combination Problem: This final problem is subtly different to the second. Even 
if inscrutables were configured in the same way as our qualitative field, there is a 
deeper respect in which they will still diverge structurally. Our phenomenal states have 
a natural unity. The various phenomenal qualities that contribute to our experience 
form a single experiential space, and the qualities within that space stand in a special 
relation to each other that they do not stand in to qualities of someone else’s 
experience. If we lined up two people, their respective experiences would remain 
distinct. If we somehow squished their brains together so that the relevant 
fundamental physical entities touched, we would still have distinct experiences, or at 
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 See Lockwood (1993), and Stoljar’s (2001) discussion of Maxwell. 
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least have no explanation for why a single experience should come about. There is 
more to the unity of a qualitative field than mere spatial contiguity. If a dozen 
inscrutable properties are configured side by side within us, with no gaps between 
them, why don’t we get a collection of twelve qualitatively simple experiences? What 
accounts for their unification in a single qualitative field?15 
The schematic form of this problem for NRIH can be captured as follows, and 
each of the three variations above can be used to fill in the place-holders: 
The Structural Divergence Problem (SDP): 
SDP1) A subject’s inscrutables have a certain structure X. 
SDP2) A subject’s qualitative field has a certain structure Y. 
SDP3) X and Y are divergent. 
SDP4) There is no accounting for properties with one structure in terms 
of properties with a divergent structure. 
SDP5) Therefore there is no accounting for a subject’s qualitative field 
in terms of their inscrutables. 
 
2.4.2. Response 
The ways in which we have already fleshed out NRIH are such that this problem should 
not seem too worrying. Nevertheless, it is worth working out exactly how it should be 
dealt with. The first option is to deny SDP3. Indeed, many panphenomenalists and 
panqualitativists make just this move. Lockwood (1993), for instance, suggests that on 
the quantum level our brain states form unified quantum fields. These fields are one-
and-the-same as our fields of experience, so there is no structural mis-match.16 The 
strategy is simply to maintain that inscrutables have the same structure as our 
phenomenal states. This move can be made on the level of configuration, grain and 
unity. This may seem implausible, but it is far from impossible. There is thus no knock-
down criticism of NRIH here. Nevertheless, I think we can present a more palatable 
solution to the problem. 
                                                 
15
 This is adapted from William James’s (1890) famous objection to panpsychism. For a more recent 
version of the objection, see Goff (2006). 
16
 Related moves are made by Seager (1995/2010) and by Coleman (2012). 
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 We can simply deny SDP4. It is not the case that inscrutables must have the 
same structure as our qualitative field in order to be of explanatory relevance. That is 
far too simplistic a view of the proposed explanatory relation. Our experiences would 
not have the qualitative features they have without inscrutables, but inscrutables need 
not be solely responsible for all aspects of our experience, and need not constitute our 
experience like pixels on a screen.17 We have already shown how the representational 
features of a phenomenal state play an integral role in determining our 
phenomenology. Just as internal properties are represented as external, and a complex 
of properties is confusedly represented as simple, so too a set of properties with one 
structure can be represented as having some divergent structure. Our representations 
bestow structure on our experience. It shapes them and unifies them in a single 
qualitative field. A smooth qualitative field, for instance, need not entail the existence 
of anything literally smooth in the head. Things seeming some way to us does not 
entail the occurrence of anything that literally is that way. 
 If our phenomenology can diverge so far from the physical state that grounds 
it, why not just scrap the appeal to inscrutables? Our brain state could simply 
represent the occurrence of intrinsic phenomenal qualities even though nothing like 
them is actually instantiated. However, as discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 2.2.1), this 
move is not open to the Representationalist. On a standard Physicalist ontology, there 
are no intrinsic properties to be represented, and we cannot make sense of brain 
states coming to represent properties that are nowhere instantiated. Intrinsic 
properties need to figure in the story somewhere, and NRIH is an attempt to sketch 
the most plausible place for them. Representational factors have been attributed a key 
role in NRIH’s account of consciousness, but only insofar as they do not threaten to 
compromise Physicalism. 
 Keeping up our theme of establishing historical precedent, NRIH now seems to 
be following Kant in distinguishing the form and the matter of experience. There are 
two components to experience: the chaotic manifold that we get through being 
affected by the world, and the order that the mind imposes upon that data. 
Inscrutables have a status reminiscent of the Kantian ‘manifold’ of sensation. Our self-
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 Stoljar (2001) offers this response to the ‘grain problem’ in his defence of RIH. 
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representational states provide the structure of our experience: they give our 
subjective reality its spatial configuration, its unity, and its apparent externality. But all 
that structure would amount to nothing to the subject without some substance to fill it 
in, and this is just what inscrutables provide. The specific nature of the inscrutables 
determines the specific qualitative character of each point in our experiential 
structure. 
 The responses to all four of the problems described so far involve letting the 
representational features of our conscious states do some of the heavy lifting. The 
original motivation behind NRIH was to help EV out by letting Self-Representationalism 
deal with the –tivity gap. It now emerges that the representational features of 
conscious states can allow us to close all the smaller gaps that threaten to derail NRIH 
as well. This most recent suggestion also indicates how Self-Representationalism can 
enjoy some benefits from the union. The problem for standard forms of 
Representationalism is that they can plausibly account for the structure of experience, 
but not its non-structural features: for its form, but not its matter. Inscrutables are 
introduced to give phenomenal representation its matter. Without them, our 
representations would be merely structural, and could never constitute a phenomenal 
reality for their subject. The pairing of RIH and Self-Representationalism is looking 
promising. 
 
2.5. THE PURPOSE PROBLEM 
 
2.5.1. The Problem 
The four problems discussed have each asked how could conscious experiences arise 
from the proposed explanatory base? I have developed NRIH’s explanatory story in a 
manner that should assuage those worries. Our final problem is of a different kind. It 
asks why would the proposed explanatory base occur? Even if it is allowed that the 
right self-representational and inscrutable properties are sufficient for conscious 
experience, we are owed an account of why it is that such states come about. What 
purpose, according to NRIH, could phenomenal states have? We will see that certain 
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considerations indicate that representing our own inscrutable properties achieves 
nothing. The problem is that if this achieves nothing, serious doubt is cast on NRIH. 
Our brain is an efficient machine that does things that serve our functional economy 
and help us as organisms. This is bound to the fact that our brains are the product of 
an evolutionary process. With a few exceptions, our characteristics aid our survival, 
especially when they are complex traits, so we should expect consciousness to have 
some evolutionary value. As such, if NRIH is committed to qualitative awareness being 
a useless side-show, its plausibility would be dramatically diminished. 
 Why is there any threat of NRIH entailing that qualitative awareness is 
purposeless? It comes down to causal considerations, and a revival of objections 
previously wielded against Primitivism. The Primitivist view that phenomenal 
properties are onticly distinct from physical properties entails that for every one of our 
physical actions, we would still have performed that action in the absence of our 
phenomenal states. There are two layers to this: we would have done the same thing 
had we had no conscious awareness at all. That is, our zombie twin would have the 
same functional profile as us. Second, we would have done the same thing had our 
conscious awareness had a different qualitative character. That is, our invert twin, for 
instance, would have the same functional profile as us. In Chapter 1 I argued that these 
were both unacceptable commitments. When you say ‘I am conscious’ this should be 
caused by your being conscious, and when you say ‘Ouch!’ this should (at least 
sometimes) be caused by your experience having the particular qualitative character it 
has. 
 To what extent does NRIH face the same problems? The good news is that self-
representational states are an efficacious part of our functional economy. Even if we 
do not know precisely what function they serve, it is plausible that self-representation 
achieves something. Representing our own mental states plausibly changes our 
functional profile in some way.18 This is the kind of thing that an efficient machine like 
the brain could plausibly spend its resources on, and which could have given our 
                                                 
18
 This is discussed by Kriegel (2009, Ch.7). There is also the possibility of drawing on claims made by 
various HOR theorists in this area. The fact that we have a rich variety of plausible options is enough to 
assuage doubts about the possible utility of self-representational states. As such, I will not advocate any 
specific account. 
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distant ancestors the kind of evolutionary advantage that accounts for the place of 
self-representational states in humans today. This means that the subjective 
awareness side of consciousness does not raise worries of purposelessness for NRIH. 
What of the qualitative character side? I will propose variations on the invert and 
zombie thought-experiments which indicate that NRIH is committed to qualitative 
character serving no purpose. 
NRIH claims that the qualitative character of experience depends on the 
specific nature of our inscrutables. Presumably then, mixing up your inscrutables 
would mix up the qualities of your experience. For instance, whatever inscrutables are 
responsible for colour qualities could be reversed to produce a being whose colour-
qualia are inverted relative to our own. Since such an inversion need not entail any 
functional difference, it is possible for a being to have precisely the same functional 
profile as us, but to differ from us with respect to their qualitative character. Call such 
a being an ‘inscrutable-invert’. Note, such a being is not a complete physical replica of 
us since they differ from us with respect to their intrinsic physical properties. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of such a being would have troubling ramifications for 
NRIH.  
If my inscrutable-invert twin has the same functional profile as me, then the 
specific qualitative character of my experience never contributes to my behaviour. I 
would have done the same thing had my inscrutables been such as to generate an 
entirely different experience. Perhaps this is not too worrying in the case of our colour 
qualities being re-arranged, but the implication is that all of our phenomenal qualities 
could be mixed up without making a difference to what we do. The question for NRIH 
is this: if the qualitative character of our conscious states makes no difference to our 
functional profile, why would our brains conspire to bring about qualitative 
awareness? If differences in qualitative character are not a difference that makes a 
difference, qualitative awareness is rendered pointless. 
Can a parallel objection to NRIH be developed involving zombies rather than 
inverts? Perhaps NRIH is committed to the possibility of beings whose representational 
states have no qualitative character, but who can do all the same things we do. A first 
pass at showing that NRIH has this unfortunate commitment is to hold that it is 
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possible for a being to have the same functional profile as us, but to lack inscrutables. 
Since NRIH claims that inscrutables are essential to qualitative character, such a being 
would be a zombie. As such, NRIH allows the possibility of zombies with the same 
functional profile as us, so renders qualitative character pointless.19 However, this 
initial line of argument clearly fails. According to NRIH, inscrutables are necessary for 
the instantiation of any causal properties. A twin with the same functional profile as 
you but without inscrutables is thus incoherent: a being cannot have the same 
functional profile as you without absolutely intrinsic properties. In fact, it cannot even 
exist without such properties. Consequently, the standard zombie scenario does not 
threaten NRIH. 
However, NRIH cannot escape that easily. In light of our previous conclusions, 
the mere possession of inscrutables by our self-representational states is not sufficient 
for qualitative awareness. Those inscrutables have to be suitably represented. 
Consequently, it seems possible for there to be a being like us on the level of 
inscrutables, but who does not represent those inscrutables, and so does not have 
qualitative awareness. Call such a being a ‘pseudo-zombie’. The proposed 
representational difference probably entails some functional difference. The problem 
is that this difference is unlikely to be a significant one. Surely it is not integral to the 
way we process stimuli and govern behaviour that we represent our inscrutables along 
the way? Our unconscious states do a perfectly good job without such representation, 
and our self-representational states could achieve whatever extra it is they achieve 
without representing inscrutables. Why don’t we just represent the structural 
properties of the world, and of our own mental states, and never represent intrinsic 
properties? What advantage does representing our inscrutables give us over the 
pseudo-zombie? If NRIH cannot answer these questions, serious doubt is cast on its 
potential to attribute an appropriate causal role to qualitative awareness: 
The Purpose Problem (PP): 
PP1) If NRIH is true, qualitative awareness makes no functional 
difference to its subject (or only makes a negligible functional 
difference). 
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 Again, this being is our functional duplicate rather than our physical duplicate, so the objection is not 
directed at showing that consciousness involves non-physical properties. 
[212] 
 
PP2) If qualitative awareness makes no functional difference to its 
subject (or only a negligible functional difference) it has no purpose in 
our mental economy, and no plausible evolutionary origin. 
PP3) Qualitative awareness must have a purpose in our mental 
economy and a plausible evolutionary origin. 
PP4) Therefore NRIH is false. 
 
2.5.2. Response 
How are we to respond to this problem? Biting the epiphenomenalist bullet by denying 
PP3 is not viable. We saw why epiphenomenalism is unacceptable in Chapter 1 
(Section 4.1). Furthermore, accepting epiphenomenalism would put NRIH in a poor 
dialectical position. NRIH is supposed to offer an alternative to Primitivism. It cannot 
fend off its Primitivist competitors by citing their unacceptable epiphenomenalist 
commitments, but then accept similar commitments further down the line. NRIH 
promised to attribute phenomenal consciousness an appropriate causal status, and 
should only be supported if it can fulfil that promise. 
Denying PP1 has got to be the way forward. NRIH must maintain that our 
qualitative awareness does make a substantial functional difference, thus allowing it to 
serve a purpose in our mental economy and to plausibly have an evolutionary origin. 
As with all of the solutions to the problems discussed, the task is not to present the 
actual function of consciousness, but rather to show that it is possible for 
consciousness to have some such function. Consequently, there is no obligation to 
explain precisely what it is that we can do that a consciousness-free counter-part 
cannot. Instead, I think we can undermine PP1 by attending to the place of 
inscrutables in nature. 
 Fundamental entities have causal powers, and the causal goings-on at higher 
levels of reality are fully determined by the causal powers instantiated at the 
fundamental level. What the discussion of our current conception of such entities 
revealed is that we have no grip on why fundamental entities have the dispositions 
they do. Science identifies entities by their dispositions and maps out the systematic 
causal relations in which they stand. On the most plausible account of inscrutables, it is 
the hidden intrinsic nature of these entities that determines their causal powers. 
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 How does this reminder help us to defend NRIH? The notion of inscrutable-
inverts only seems plausible if we assume that inscrutables can be re-arranged without 
this showing up on the level of causal powers. This is simply false. It only seems 
plausible because we have no conception of inscrutables. We know the causal 
characteristics of things from the outside, and presume that how those entities are on 
the inside (as it were) can be altered without making any difference to their outward 
manifestations. We cannot really imagine inscrutables being swapped around because 
we cannot really imagine inscrutables at all. NRIH can claim that if we did have a 
conception of inscrutables, we would see that they are bound by necessity to the 
functional economy of the brain. There is not an intrinsic property/causal power 
property dualism in play. There is thus no justification for the conclusion that one’s 
phenomenal qualities could be inverted or otherwise re-arranged without making a 
functional difference. We are not in a position to identify what that functional 
difference would be, but that is beside the point. 
 Dealing with the pseudo-zombie case is a bit more complicated since it does 
not involve alterations on the level of inscrutables, but rather alterations on the level 
of our representation. Nevertheless, our response should be similar. We cannot 
assume that a being who only represents structural properties (whether of the world 
or of its own mental states) would have all the same functional capacities as us. A 
commitment to the existence of inscrutables is a commitment to the real metaphysics 
of causation being beyond our grip. Assuming, as I think we must, that representation 
has at least something to do with causal relations, we should also display humility 
when speculating about possible variations in representational states. We are not in a 
position to conclude that a counter-part who does not represent their own 
inscrutables (in the ways necessary for qualitative awareness), could be a (near) 
functional duplicate of ourselves. Perhaps appropriately representing our inscrutables 
is integral to the functional economy of our minds. Again, it only seems like this is not 
the case because we are looking at brain processes from the outside. Given our 
proposed ignorance of the metaphysical foundation of such causal processes, it will 
inevitably appear that no extra properties are integral to that process occurring, but 
we have already shown why this appearance cannot be trusted. 
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 Of all the responses to the problems I have put forward, the response to the 
Purpose Problem makes the boldest appeal to our ignorance. This may be unsatisfying, 
but such dissatisfaction is something we could have predicted as soon as we concluded 
that dispositions are grounded in inscrutables. So long as our argument for that 
conclusion is sound, we have all the justification we need. We are not introducing any 
new kind of ignorance here – rather, we are just working out the full implications of 
the established ignorance claim. Nevertheless, it will be worthwhile to make some 
more positive claims about why the proposed representational states occur. 
 The representation of our own inscrutables may appear purposeless, but I think 
we can get some grip on its utility. Being responsive to the world is of enormous 
importance to our mental economy and is obviously the kind of thing that could have 
an evolutionary origin. We can understand this responsiveness in terms of information 
processes. For instance, we are responsive to certain spectral-reflectance’s because 
the relevant wavelengths affect our sense-organs, which in turn affect certain neurons. 
This neural state carries information about the world: it is a reliable (though fallible) 
sign that there is an object with the relevant spectral reflectance before us. However, 
our commitment to inscrutables means that there must be more to such information 
processes than we can currently understand. When we are affected by the world, our 
causal properties change. Where our causal properties change, there will be a change 
on the level of intrinsic properties instantiated within us. Consequently, being 
responsive to properties in the world will involve a correlation between our being 
presented with that property and certain alterations on the level of our inscrutables. In 
other words, our inscrutable properties carry information about the world. From a 
third-person perspective, we can only access the outward manifestations of such 
information-laden correlations, but we can be sure that they are there. 
In light of this, we can make some sense of why we would end up representing 
our own inscrutables. A change among our inscrutables is a mark that the world 
impresses upon the slate of our mind, and tracking those marks is a way of tracking 
how things are in the world. The potential utility of such tracking abilities is clear. The 
next question is why we misrepresent these information-laden inscrutables as 
externally located rather than as properties of the brain. The answer is that this is 
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plausibly a useful misrepresentation. We need to know how the world is, so 
representing our inscrutables in a way that projects them onto external objects is far 
more convenient than an inefficient two-tier representation. As Jakab (2003) proposes, 
such projection is evolution’s way round the laborious project of having to assign 
worldly correlates to each internal signifier. Our projective awareness of our own 
inscrutable properties is thus a natural consequence of the simple fact that we are 
responsive to the world in virtue of the differences it makes to us. There is a great deal 
more that could be said about this, but hopefully we have done enough to undermine 
the Purpose Problem. Any sense that our representation of inscrutables is without 
utility is plausibly a reflection of our ignorance. This defuses the worry that NRIH is 
committed to qualitative awareness being pointless. 
 
SECTION 3 
NRIH AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
The Core Thesis of NRIH is that a mental state is a phenomenal state in virtue of 
suitably representing itself, and is the type of phenomenal state it is in virtue of the 
unconceived inscrutable properties that implement it. I have now defended this thesis 
against a number of potential threats. In the process, I have added five further details 
to NRIH’s account of consciousness. The claims are: 
i) That the inscrutable properties doing the explanatory work must be 
properties of the self-representing state M (thus avoiding the 
Receptivity Problem). 
ii) That M’s inscrutables must be represented by M (thus avoiding the 
Content Problem), though this representation is ‘projective’. 
iii) That M’s representation of its own inscrutables is ‘confused’ (thus 
avoiding the Qualitative Character Problem). 
iv) That the structural features of a phenomenal state are determined 
by the content of M, not the actual structure of our inscrutables (thus 
avoiding the Structural Divergence Problem). 
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v) That the causal status of M’s inscrutables is such that they are 
integral to M’s having the functional profile it has (thus avoiding the 
Purpose Problem). 
We have a proposal about the metaphysical basis of consciousness – about how 
phenomenal states can arise from physical states. The final task is to explain how this 
proposal confronts the Problem of Consciousness. In Section 3.1 I offer NRIH’s 
response to the problem. In Section 3.2 I consider the significance of the fact that 
NRIH’s response is bipartite. 
 
3.1. NRIH’S SOLUTION 
 
3.1.1. NRIH and the Criteria of Success 
In Chapter 1 (Section 1.3) I introduced the following question: is the phenomenal 
onticly dependent on the physical, or onticly independent of the physical? NRIH 
answers that the phenomenal is onticly dependent on the physical. Of course, it is this 
question that leads to the Problem of Consciousness, which I formulated as follows: 
there are persuasive reasons to believe that the phenomenal is onticly independent of 
the physical, and persuasive reasons to believe that the phenomenal is onticly 
dependent on the physical (Chapter 1, Section 4.2). NRIH responds to this problem by 
denying that there are persuasive reasons to adopt Primitivism. The case for 
Primitivism rests on the apparent epistemic gap between the physical and the 
phenomenal. NRIH acknowledges this appearance, and explains why it has a grip upon 
us. Ultimately though, it denies that the epistemic gap is genuine. 
 In Chapter 2 I identified three criteria that a defensible response to the 
Problem of Consciousness must satisfy. NRIH holds that phenomenal states are 
nothing over and above physical states, thus satisfying the Physicalist Criterion. NRIH 
does not achieve this defence of Physicalism by denying the manifest reality of 
phenomenal consciousness, so satisfies the Phenomenal Realism Criterion (Chapter 2, 
Section 1.2). Furthermore, NRIH does not achieve this defence of Physicalism by 
claiming that the entailment from the physical to phenomenal is a brute a posteriori 
necessity. Rather, it holds that the psychophysical conditional is knowable a priori to 
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an appropriately informed subject, thus satisfying the A Priori Entailment Criterion 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.3). Failure to satisfy these criteria led me to reject Primitivism, 
Eliminative Type-A Physicalism, and Type-B Physicalism respectively. NRIH is a non-
standard form of Type-A Physicalism, and succeeds in satisfying all three of the criteria 
of success I established. This sets it apart from all familiar attempts to deal with the 
problem. 
 There are some further conditions of success that we must also consider. In 
Chapter 4 I introduced two conditions on EV: the Relevance Condition and the 
Integration Condition. As a variant on EV, NRIH must be able to satisfy those two 
conditions. The Relevance Condition required positive reason to believe that 
unconceived physical properties could evade the a priori obstacles to Physicalism, 
namely the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps. I will explain how NRIH deals with each of 
these gaps shortly. The important point here is that NRIH’s appeal to inscrutables 
satisfies this condition. As I argued in Chapter 4, positing inscrutables overcomes the   
–trinsicality gap. Though positing inscrutables does not plausibly avoid the –tivity gap, 
NRIH does not require them to. The –tivity gap is meant to be dealt with by the Self-
Representationalist component of this hybrid proposal. As such, inscrutables are 
relevant to the specific explanatory task that NRIH attributes them, so NRIH’s appeal to 
inscrutables satisfies the Relevance Condition.  
The Integration Condition required positive evidence of a blind-spot in our 
current conception of the physical that could plausibly be occupied by the proposed 
unconceived properties. In Chapter 4 (Section 4.3) I showed how the appeal to 
inscrutables satisfied this condition. NRIH can deploy precisely the same arguments to 
justify its appeal to inscrutables, and so satisfies the Integration Condition. By 
combining RIH with Self-Representationalism, we have formed an attenuated version 
of EV that is capable of meeting both conditions. NRIH is plausibly the best possible 
version of EV: if you are going to adopt any version of the ignorance hypothesis, you 
had better adopt the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis, or your prospects of 
satisfying the two conditions on EV are dim. 
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3.1.2. NRIH and the Epistemic Gap 
The case for Primitivism is premised on the apparent epistemic gap between the 
physical and the phenomenal. NRIH denies that there is such a gap. It holds that for 
subjects such as ourselves, it is natural to believe that such a gap exists. However, for 
an ideal subject the psychophysical conditional would be knowable a priori. Of course, 
we have seen that the epistemic gap is best understood as a composite of the               
–trinsicality and –tivity gaps. NRIH offers a different response to each of these gaps. 
The –trinsicality gap is symptomatic of our limited conception of the physical 
world. The physical-as-we-know-it is purely structural, yet phenomenal qualities are 
(absolutely) intrinsic properties. Intrinsic properties cannot be accounted for in 
structural terms; this is a conceptual principle that NRIH can respect. However, we 
have compelling reasons to believe that there are intrinsic physical properties beyond 
our current conception. Our ignorance makes it appear that no physical property could 
be suited to the explanation of phenomenal qualities, but having identified our 
ignorance, we know that this appearance should not be trusted. 
 The –tivity gap is the apparent conceptual gap between objective physical 
states and subjective phenomenal states. In contrast to its response to the –trinsicality 
gap, NRIH does not accept this as a conceptual principle. Once we appreciate the 
intentional nature of subjectivity, we will see that objective physical states could be 
the vehicle of phenomenal representations. This leaves us free to claim that subjective 
states are onticly dependent on objective properties. There may remain a deep 
intuition that subjectivity involves something more than the performance of an 
appropriate vehicular role by objective properties, but this is plausibly symptomatic of 
a further cognitive error. When objective properties perform the right role, they 
implement a self-representational state of subjective awareness. But the non-causal 
nature of our epistemic access to our own subjective states makes it wrongly appear 
to us that subjectivity has a nature that transcends the performance of any such role. 
Again, this appearance should not be trusted. 
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3.1.3. NRIH and the Conceivability Argument 
The case for Primitivism is normally presented in terms of the Conceivability Argument 
(CA) and Knowledge Argument (KA). I have argued that the plausibility of these 
arguments depends on the plausibility of the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps, each of 
which NRIH addresses. Nevertheless, it is worth considering exactly how NRIH 
responds to CA and KA. 
 CA is based on the claim that we can conceive of replicas of ourselves that are 
like us in all physical respects, but who differ from us phenomenally. Specifically, we 
can conceive of zombie replicas who have no phenomenal states at all, and invert 
twins whose phenomenal states are qualitatively inverted relative to our own. NRIH’s 
response to this is that we cannot really conceive of such twins. It may seem that we 
conceive of them if we suffer from ‘proposition confusion’. Here we do conceive of 
some genuine possibility, but misidentify what we have imagined. We can conceive of 
a being with the same structural profile as ourselves – like us in all functional respects 
and in all physical respects captured by our current conception of the physical – but 
who differs from us phenomenally. However, to imagine a structural twin is not to 
imagine a complete physical twin. There are intrinsic physical properties to be factored 
in of which we have no conception. 
These unknown intrinsic properties are relevant in two ways. First, the fact we 
have no conception of them means we lack the conceptual resources with which to 
conceive of a complete physical replica. Consequently, we cannot get as far as 
conceiving of that replica differing from us phenomenally. Second, NRIH suggests we 
have reason to believe that if we did have a conception of those hidden properties, we 
would not be able to conceive of genuine physical replicas who differ from us 
phenomenally. For instance, we would be unable to conceive of a being whose 
phenomenal qualities are inverted relative to our own without imagining appropriate 
changes on the level of their intrinsic physical properties. 
 It could be argued that even if we did have concepts for inscrutables, zombies 
would remain conceivable, because it is always conceivable for any collection of 
objective properties to be unaccompanied by subjective awareness. Self-
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Representationalism denies this. With a proper understanding of the physical 
explanation of intentional properties, and of the intentional explanation of 
subjectivity, zombie twins will be inconceivable. 
 
3.1.4. NRIH and the Knowledge Argument 
KA is based on the intuition that Mary would learn something new on escaping her 
room. Since she already has complete physical knowledge, what she learns must be a 
non-physical fact. NRIH responds to this by suggesting that our intuitions about this 
case are manifestations of our limited conception of the physical, and so of our skewed 
understanding of what Mary would learn within her room. With full knowledge of the 
inscrutable properties of the brain, and their place in our representational-functional 
economy, Mary could deduce that seeing a tomato would involve that phenomenal 
quality. This deduction is only possible if Mary already has a concept of phenomenal 
redness before leaving her room. She would not be able to infer what redness is like 
from her physical knowledge unless she had previously acquired a concept of 
phenomenal redness by experiencing if for herself. However, as I argued in Chapter 1 
(Section 2.3.1), the only plausible version of KA grants that Mary has this concept 
before leaving her room. The Primitivist claim is that she learns, on leaving her room, 
that this phenomenal quality is associated with that physical brain state rather than 
some other. NRIH denies this.  
A possibility explored in Section 3 of this chapter also has ramifications for KA. 
The entailment from inscrutables to phenomenal qualities might involve a type of 
explanation beyond our current grasp. If this were so, we would have the intuition that 
Mary could never deduce qualitative facts from non-qualitative facts, but this could be 
a reflection of our ignorance of an explanation type available to Mary but not to us. 
One speculation along these lines is that inscrutables have propensities to ‘fuse’ such 
that knowledge of inscrutables and their propensities would allow one to deduce 
which inscrutables are responsible for which phenomenal qualities. In this scenario, 
our ignorance of that variety of ontic dependence sends our intuitions awry, but for 
Mary the path from inscrutables to phenomenal qualities is perfectly clear. 
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3.2. A CONFLUENCE OF ILLUSIONS? 
 
According to NRIH, two factors make consciousness appear physically inexplicable. If 
one embraced a Self-Representationalist theory of subjectivity in isolation, the 
qualitative character of consciousness would remain mysterious and draw one towards 
Primitivism. Similarly, if one embraced the Russellian approach to qualitative character 
in isolation, the subjectivity of consciousness would remain mysterious and again draw 
one towards Primitivism. The subjective character and qualitative character of 
phenomenal states appear physically inexplicable for two distinct reasons, each of 
which would be sufficient to generate the impression of an epistemic gap on their 
own. 
 Kriegel (2009) discusses the possibility that ‘…several distinct properties suffice 
individually to generate the mystery in an overdetermining fashion’ (pp.6-7). He goes 
on to judge that though this is not impossible, it is quite implausible (2009, p.7). This 
captures a worry that many might have when presented with NRIH. Is it really plausible 
that nature has conspired to make one phenomenon appear inexplicable to us twice 
over? This does not constitute a knock-down objection to NRIH, but it is a worry that is 
worth considering. There are two ways of assuaging this worry. First, to suggest that 
the overdetermination of the mystery is not so implausible. Second, to show that NRIH 
does not posit two distinct sources of illusion after all, but rather two aspects of a 
single piece of cognitive trickery. 
 
3.2.1. An Overdetermined Illusion 
Two considerations indicate that the overdetermination of our sense of mystery is not 
so implausible. First, I have consistently put significant weight on the distinction 
between the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps. If we maintain, as I think we should, that any 
serious formulation of the epistemic gap consists in a combination of these two gaps, it 
will be no surprise that there are two distinct illusions in play. One illusion would 
generate the first apparent gap, and the other would generate the second.  
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Second, the limitations of certain existing responses to the epistemic gap can 
be diagnosed in terms of their failure to recognise that the illusion of consciousness 
being physically inexplicable is overdetermined. Those responses correctly identify one 
of the sources of illusion, but then exaggerate its significance, driven by the 
assumption that our sense of mystery has a single origin. 
Strawson and others identify that we have a limited conception of matter, and 
that the conviction that our conception of matter is relevantly complete makes 
consciousness appear physically inexplicable. According to NRIH, this much is true. 
However, if it is assumed that our sense of mystery has just one source, then the 
unknown aspects of matter had better be entirely responsible for consciousness. This 
leads to the panphenomenalist claim that the intrinsic nature of matter is inherently 
experiential. Of course, it is this panphenomenalist commitment that makes 
Strawson’s position implausible. 
Contrast this with the Representationalist approach to our sense of mystery. 
Self-Representationalism, and its HOR-theory cousins, claim that consciousness only 
seems physically inexplicable because we have failed to appreciate that consciousness 
is an intentional matter. Again NRIH agrees, at least where the –tivity gap is concerned. 
However, if it is assumed that our sense of mystery has a single origin, then 
Representationalism should be able to deal with the whole epistemic gap single-
handedly. This encourages misguided Representationalist accounts of the qualitative 
character of phenomenal states. Indeed, Kriegel offers just such an account (2009, 
Chapter 3).20 
The insights at the heart of NRIH have not sprung from nowhere. They are 
connected intimately to a great deal of work already done on the Problem of 
Consciousness. We can explain the strengths of those existing positions in terms of 
their correct identification of one of the two sources of mystery, and the failings of 
those positions in terms of the assumption that their source is the only source. The 
                                                 
20
 Interestingly, Kriegel concedes that the greatest objection to his account of qualitative character is 
that it makes phenomenal qualities dispositional properties, though they appear to us to be occurrent 
monadic properties (2009, p.95). In other words, he wrongly construes phenomenal qualities as 
structural properties rather than intrinsic properties, which I have argued is the fatal flaw of all 
Representationalist accounts of qualitative character (Chapter 5, Section 2). 
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partial success but ultimate failure of existing positions is an interesting datum, and 
the claim that the appearance of inexplicability is overdetermined is a plausible 
explanation of that datum. In this sense, the unexpected overdetermination of our 
sense of mystery is partly responsible for the Problem of Consciousness being so 
difficult to solve. A key virtue of NRIH is that it extracts what is best about existing 
positions whilst avoiding their mistakes. 
 
3.2.2. One Illusion, Two Manifestations 
Another reason for not being worried by NRIH’s commitment to the 
overdetermination of the appearance of an epistemic gap is that the two proposed 
sources plausibly have a deeper common source. The source of the apparent                 
–trinsicality gap is that science only reveals the causal profile of physical entities, never 
their intrinsic nature. The fact that consciousness is the only context in which 
inscrutables are manifest to us leads us towards a false picture of the physical world as 
devoid of intrinsic properties: a picture that cannot accommodate phenomenal 
qualities. The source of the apparent –tivity gap is that consciousness is the only 
context in which we know a state directly through being in it rather than knowing it via 
its causal profile. The fact that consciousness is the only context in which we have non-
causal epistemic access to something leads us towards a false picture of subjective 
awareness as something over and above the performance of an appropriate role.  
What this means is that both apparent gaps are manifestations of the 
within/without epistemic duality. If only we had access to the inside of external objects 
– their intrinsic nature – the qualitative character of conscious states would not seem 
inexplicable. If only we accessed our subjective awareness from the outside – through 
its causal profile – its instantiation would not seem to require anything more than the 
performance of an appropriate causal role by objective properties. Put another way, 
the receptive nature of our knowledge of the physical world makes qualitative 
character appear physically inexplicable, and the distinctively non-receptive nature of 
phenomenal self-knowledge makes subjectivity appear physically inexplicable.  
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On this view, the assumption that our epistemic access to things discloses their 
full nature is responsible for both apparent gaps. The assumption that the causal 
powers of external objects exhausts their nature, when in fact they have an absolutely 
intrinsic aspect, is what generates the apparent –trinsicality gap. The assumption that 
our direct access to our subjective awareness reveals its full nature, when in fact it is 
constituted by the performance of an appropriate vehicular role, is what generates the 
–tivity gap. Our failure to recognise that both modes of epistemic access are limited, 
each revealing just one aspect of reality, is the single source of the appearance of an 
epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal. 
This suggests that NRIH is not committed to an implausible confluence of 
illusions. It does not claim that our sense that consciousness is physically inexplicable is 
overdetermined. Rather, the illusion of inexplicability has one route with two very 
different manifestations. This conclusion is quite compatible with the points made in 
Section 3.2.1 about the failure of existing positions to acknowledge the two-part 
structure of the epistemic gap. That still stands, but must be understood in terms of 
two aspects of the apparent gap rather than two genuinely distinct sources of illusion. 
This discussion should also assuage worries, raised at the beginning of the chapter, 
about RIH and Self-Representationalism being an awkward pairing. We can now see 
that these two attempts to solve the problem each concern different sides of the same 
coin. It is clear that they are natural partners, and that together they form an 
integrated hybrid response to the Problem of Consciousness. 
 
CONCLUSION 
NRIH undermines the epistemic gap at the heart of the Problem of Consciousness 
whilst offering a powerful account of why that apparent gap seems so compelling. 
Central to its success is the proposal that the epistemic gap is really a composite of the 
–tivity and –trinsicality gaps. This division has proved itself to be invaluable in the 
evaluation of attempted responses to the Problem of Consciousness. NRIH offers a 
non-standard account of the metaphysical status of consciousness that avoids the key 
failings of standard accounts. It also offers the best possible way of deploying the key 
insights of EV and of Representationalism. Further work in a number of areas would 
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serve to reinforce the case for NRIH. For instance, I have taken it that representation 
can be accounted for in physical terms, though the formulation of such an account is a 
challenging on-going project. Overall, NRIH is a plausible metaphysical model of the 
phenomenal that provides a powerful and distinctive response to the Problem of 
Consciousness, and which offers a serious alternative to the entrenched approaches to 
that problem. 
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